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In accordance with its primary mission to reduce crashes, injuries, and fatalities involving large 
trucks and buses, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) initiated the 
Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010 (CSA 2010) Operational Model Test. The CSA 2010 
design includes initiating contact with more carriers and drivers than the prior system, 
development of a new measurement system to replace the Motor Carrier Safety Status 
Measurement System (SafeStat), application of a wider range of progressive interventions to 
correct high-risk behavior, and more efficient use of Agency resources. The major goals of the 
Operational Model Test are to assess the new design, determine whether it is likely to result in 
improved carrier safety performance, and to identify any features that need to be adjusted prior to 
rollout nationally.  
This report is an evaluation of the CSA 2010 Operational Model Test. The evaluation focuses on 
the key components of the Operational Model, including the following elements: 
• Evaluation of the Safety Measurement System (SMS) that is used to rank a carrier’s 
safety performance in the seven Behavior Analysis and Safety Improvement Categories 
(BASICs), including the data used to determine the scores and the associations between 
the BASICs and crash rates. 
• Comparison of the number and percentage of carriers touched by the CSA 2010 process 
with the existing SafeStat model. 
• Evaluation of the effectiveness of CSA 2010 interventions in improving carrier safety in 
comparison with the SafeStat model. 
• Comparison of the costs of performing the different interventions under CSA 2010 with 
the current process of conducting compliance reviews (CRs). 
• Survey of field staff participating in the Operational Model Test to collect their 
experience and insights on the effectiveness of the CSA 2010 Operational Model. 
Originally, the Operational Model Test was conducted in Colorado, Georgia, Missouri, and New 
Jersey. Carriers in these States were randomly divided into a “test” group that was subject to the 
provisions of the new CSA Operational Model, and a “control” group that would continue to be 
monitored by the Agency’s current process. For the four original States, the test ran for 29 
months from February 2008 through June 2010. Five additional States (Montana, Minnesota, 
Maryland, Kansas, and Delaware) were phased into the program as test-only States at various 
times as the test proceeded. Since one of the goals of the CSA evaluation was to compare the 
CSA 2010 process with the existing SafeStat model, the evaluation focused on the test and 




The SMS is intended to accomplish four goals: 
• Identify unsafe motor carriers for interventions. 
• Identify safety problems within broad areas at carriers. 
• Monitor the safety performance of carriers on a near-continuous basis. 
• Provide input safety measurements to the Safety Fitness Determination process, by which 
FMCSA identifies carriers that are conditional or unfit to operate. 
The SMS consists of seven metrics: 
• BASIC 1: Unsafe Driving. 
• BASIC 2: Fatigued Driving. 
• BASIC 3: Driver Fitness. 
• BASIC 4: Controlled Substances and Alcohol. 
• BASIC 5: Vehicle Maintenance. 
• BASIC 6: Improper Loading/Cargo Securement. 
• Crash Indicator. 
The data sources for the BASICs are the components of FMCSA’s Motor Carrier Management 
Information System (MCMIS). The MCMIS consists of the Census file, the Crash file, and the 
Inspection file. Each of these supplies data for the BASIC calculations, either counts of 
violations or crashes, or exposure measures. 
Data from the Census file are used as “exposure” data, to normalize the scores of certain BASICs 
in order to reflect the exposure of the carrier to crashes or to unsafe conditions. In particular, the 
counts of power units owned, term-leased, or trip-leased are used as exposure data. Carriers are 
required to update their information at least every 2 years. Doubtless some of the counts are 
incorrect, either because the carrier makes an error, does not understand the requirement, or 
ignores the requirement. However, the analysis and evaluation of the BASICs here have 
uncovered no reason to suspect a systematic bias. 
The MCMIS Crash file is the next primary source of data used as input to the SMS. States are 
required to report the involvements of trucks and buses in traffic crashes meeting certain severity 
thresholds: a fatality, an injury requiring transport for immediate medical attention, or at least 
one vehicle in the crash is towed due to disabling damage. These data are used in the Crash 
Indicator BASIC, along with counts of power units from the Census file. The Crash Indicator 
BASIC is most directly related to the actual crash rates of carriers and is most tightly linked to 
those crash rates. 
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The primary issues with the MCMIS Crash file related to the SMS are underreporting and 
reporting latency. In terms of reporting completeness, underreporting is an issue in some States, 
but comparison with estimates from NHTSA’s General Estimates System (GES) shows that the 
total number of crashes reported to the MCMIS system approximates the number estimated from 
GES. In addition, FMCSA’s State Safety Data Quality (SSDQ) program shows that compliance 
with reporting requirements is increasing in recent years. In terms of reporting latency, three out 
of the four test States substantially met the 90-day reporting standard while one did not. 
Nationally, the FMCSA SSDQ program shows about the same results, with about 70 percent of 
States rated “good” in terms of timeliness, 24 percent rated “fair” and 8 percent rated “poor.”  
The final source of inputs to the SMS BASICs is the inspection data, which is collected during 
roadside checks, traffic enforcement stops, and carrier reviews. Reporting from the test States 
was very good. All reported more than 95 percent of inspection results within the 21-day 
requirement.  
While the problem of complete crash reporting has not been resolved, there is evidence of 
improvement. Incomplete crash reporting primarily affects the accuracy of the Crash Indicator 
BASIC, which is derived from reported crashes. It is a strength of the SMS methodology that 
multiple indicators are available to identify motor carriers for interventions. 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE BASICS TO SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS IN 
IDENTIFYING UNSAFE CARRIERS 
The SMS was evaluated to determine how well it identifies unsafe carriers. Crash rates were 
calculated for carriers that exceeded the BASIC thresholds, and were compared to the crash rates 
of carriers that did not exceed any BASIC thresholds. Crash rates were also calculated for 
carriers identified under the current SafeStat system and compared to those under the SMS. In 
addition, scatter plots were made to assess associations between BASIC percentiles and crash 
rates. To provide a large sample of carriers, crash rates were calculated using 473,847 carriers 
not participating in the CSA 2010 test, (i.e., carriers from non-test States). 
The results showed that the SMS is a significant improvement over the current SafeStat system 
in identifying unsafe carriers. For all BASICs, crash rates were higher for carriers exceeding 
SMS thresholds than for carriers not exceeding thresholds. The crash rate was highest for carriers 
exceeding the Unsafe Driving threshold. Rates were also high for the Fatigued Driving BASIC 
and the Controlled Substance and Alcohol BASIC. The SMS also identified many more carriers 
for intervention than did SafeStat. Scatter plots indicate that all of the BASIC measures have 
positive associations with crash rates, except for two. Excluding the Crash Indicator BASIC, the 
Unsafe Driving BASIC has the strongest association with crash rates. 
Table 1 shows crash rates, calculated over an 18-month span, for 473,847 active carriers 
according to their BASIC percentile scores determined during February 2008. For each BASIC, 
carriers were classified as to whether they exceeded that particular BASIC threshold. Note that a 
carrier may exceed more than one BASIC threshold and may be counted several times among the 
various carrier groups. For comparison, crash rates are also calculated for carriers that exceeded 
any BASIC threshold, and those that exceeded no BASIC thresholds. Since those two categories 
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are mutually exclusive, adding those two categories sums to the total number of carriers in the 
table. The last column of the table gives the ratio of the crash rate for carriers exceeding each 
BASIC threshold to the crash rate for carriers that exceeded no BASIC thresholds. 
Table 1. SMS Crash Rates Based on SMS Classification February 2008 for Nonparticipating 
Carriers 
BASIC Threshold Exceeded Carriers Crash Rate Per 
100 Power Units 
Ratio to Not 
Identified 
Unsafe Driving 9,245 7.44 3.56 
Fatigued Driving 17,959 6.24 2.99 
Driver Fitness 3,981 3.04 1.46 
Controlled Substance and Alcohol 1,013 6.55 3.14 
Vehicle Maintenance 18,700 4.87 2.33 
Improper Loading/Cargo Securement 9,409 3.97 1.90 
Crash Indicator 5,077 7.32 3.51 
Exceeded Any BASIC 44,881 4.94 2.37 
Exceeded No BASICs 428,966 2.09 1.00 
All Carriers 473,847 3.15 1.51 
The crash rates for carriers exceeding BASIC thresholds are significantly higher than for carriers 
exceeding no BASIC thresholds. The crash rate for carriers exceeding the Unsafe Driving 
threshold is 7.44, which is greater than the crash rate for carriers exceeding the Crash Indicator 
threshold, and is 3.56 times greater than the rate for carriers exceeding no BASIC thresholds. 
Crash rates for carriers exceeding the Fatigued Driving, Controlled Substance and Alcohol, and 
Vehicle Maintenance BASICs are also high relative to the 2.09 crash rate for carriers exceeding 
no BASIC thresholds. Also note that the numbers of carriers exceeding the Vehicle Maintenance, 
Fatigued Driving, Improper Loading/Cargo Securement, and Unsafe Driving thresholds are 
relatively large. (Note that exceeding the Controlled Substance and Alcohol BASIC is relatively 
rare.) The total number of carriers exceeding any BASIC threshold is 44,881, or 9.5 percent of 
all active carriers. Using the crash rate as a measure of risk, it appears that the SMS tends to 
identify unsafe carriers. 
For comparison purposes, crash rates were calculated for the same 473,847 carriers based on 
SafeStat classification. (as shown in Table 2) Carriers are grouped into three SafeStat safety risk 
categories: SafeStat A/B, SafeStat C, and SafeStat A/B/C. Crash rates are also calculated for 
SafeStat Not Identified carriers, which are those not classified as A, B, or C. The last column in 
Table 2 gives the ratio of the crash rate to the Not Identified group. Of the 473,847 carriers that 
remained nonparticipating during the 18-month followup period, 5,402 are in the A/B category, 
3,389 are in the C category, 8,791 are in the A/B/C category, and 465,056 are Not Identified. 
Table 1 shows that, in the same group, the SMS identifies about five times as many carriers for 




Table 2.SafeStat Crash Rates Calculated Based on SafeStat Classification February 2008 
Carrier Group Carriers Crash Rate Per 
100 Power Units 
Ratio to Not 
Identified 
SafeStat A/B 5,402 6.94 2.30 
SafeStat C 3,389 4.94 1.64 
SafeStat A/B/C 8,791 6.20 2.06 
SafeStat Not Identified 465,056 3.01 1.00 
All Carriers 473,847 3.15 1.05 
The conclusion is that the BASICs are significantly related to underlying carrier safety, though 
the relationship is less strong for the Driver Fitness and Improper Loading BASICs. 
Annually, it is estimated that CSA interventions will touch approximately 6.3 percent of the 
carrier population (based on all interventions, including warning letters). This compares to about 
2.2 percent of carriers that receive full CRs under the current process. Therefore, the number of 
carriers touched by CSA on an annual basis is approximately 6.3/2.2 = 2.9 times greater than the 
current system based on CRs alone.  
Carriers with recent activity are identified based on updates (registration, inspection, review, 
crash, etc.) to the MCMIS data files, insurance filings, and fees paid to State highway funds (data 
collected by IRP, Inc.) in the past 3 years. When restricted to carriers with “recent activity”, CSA 
is expected to touch about 9.9 percent of the population. Excluding warning letters, the 
percentage of carriers expected to be investigated annually under the CSA program is about 6.2 
percent. The corresponding percent of “recent activity” carriers with CRs is 3.2 percent. The 
ratio of carriers identified by the SMS and SafeStat (9.9/3.2 = 3.1) remains fairly constant. 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CSA INTERVENTIONS 
Effectiveness of CSA 2010 interventions was determined by comparing test carriers that received 
CSA 2010 interventions to control carriers that did not. Three control groups were considered. 
One control group consisted of control carriers without CRs. In terms of safety, this group was 
designed to be a low-risk group. Another group consisted of carriers with CRs. This group was 
designed to be representative of high-risk carriers. The third group was sampled from control 
carriers to have safety characteristics similar to test carriers prior to evaluation, i.e., these are 
control group carriers matched to the test group. Carriers were then followed over a 12-month 
period and evaluated on the percentage of SMS thresholds exceeded.  
Interventions are applied as part of a systematic process to change the safety behavior of carriers 
that exceed BASIC thresholds. In application, it was found that some carriers were subject to 
only one intervention, while others received a series of interventions. For some carriers, the first 
intervention was a warning letter, while in others the initial intervention was an onsite 
investigation or some other intervention. Different combinations of interventions or “cycles” 
were identified. These cycles are reflective of the safety of the carrier, such that carriers with 
more BASICs violations had higher crash rates and the problems took longer and required more 
interventions to resolve. 
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Table 3 shows the top 10 intervention patterns observed in the test group. There was a total of 79 
unique cycles observed. The table also shows the average crash rate for the carriers that fell into 
each pattern. The most common pattern was carriers that received only a warning letter. These 
carriers had the lowest average crash rate, indicating that their violations were relatively mild, 
and it appears that the warning letter—with these carriers—was effective in improving their 
safety behavior. The second most common pattern was carriers that received only an onsite 
focused investigation. 











N Mean Crash 
Rate 
Warning Letter None None None None 668 2.9 
Onsite Focused None None None None 180 4.9 
Warning Letter Onsite Focused None None None 145 3.6 
Onsite 
Comprehensive 
None None None None 130 4.9 
Onsite Focused Cooperative 
Safety Plan 
(CSP) 
None None None 125 4.6 
Offsite CSP None None None 92 4.2 
Warning Letter Offsite None None None 88 3.4 
Onsite 
Comprehensive 
Notice of Claim 
(NOC) 
None None None 80 6.2 
Offsite None None None None 72 4.1 
Onsite 
Comprehensive 
CSP None None None 49 7.5 
The next two figures illustrate the results of the interventions for the first two intervention 
patterns in Table 3 above. 
Figure 1 shows the percentage of carriers exceeding at least one SMS threshold for the test group 
receiving the warning letter only and three control groups. The control group identified as 
control matched to test is the most appropriate comparison group. These are control group 
carriers that were carefully selected to have crash rates similar to the test group in the first month 
of the comparison, as well as to have a similar distribution of the number of BASIC thresholds 
exceeded. The other two comparison groups are control carriers that received a CR in the 




Figure 1. Percent of Carriers Exceeding At Least One SMS Threshold During 12-Month Followup 
(Test—Warning Letter Only) 
The effect of the warning letter intervention is likely one of the most significant findings in this 
evaluation. After 12 months of followup, only about 17 percent of test carriers still exceeded at 
least one SMS threshold, compared to about 45 percent of the control group carriers that were 
matched to test carriers. For carriers receiving CRs during the Operational Model Test, almost 60 
percent of carriers continued to exceed at least one SMS threshold after 12 months of followup. 
Table 3 shows that this intervention pattern is by far the most common, representing about one-
third of the total. 
Table 2 shows the results for the second most common pattern, carriers that received an onsite 
focused investigation only. After about 8 or 9 months, the line for the test group crosses lines for 
both the control group with CRs and the control group matched to the test group. After 12 
months, the percentage of the test group exceeding any BASIC threshold is 40.6 percent, which 
is slightly less than the 43.1 percent for the control group without CRs, but significantly below 
the control group matched to test group at about 57 percent. Before 9 months, however, the test 




Figure 2. Percent of Carriers Exceeding At Least One SMS Threshold During 12-Month Followup 
(Test—Onsite Focused Investigation Only) 
It appears that the FMCSA was most successful in bringing carriers under SMS thresholds in 
cases where a warning letter was followed by no other interventions. These carriers tended to 
have mild violations only, so the warning letter sufficed to resolve the problem. As discussed 
above, this intervention pattern was also the most prevalent, accounting for about one-third of the 
patterns and giving the largest sample size of carriers for evaluation. 
Effectiveness of any investigation type (offsite, onsite focused, onsite comprehensive) was also 
examined for carriers with one intervention. A similar pattern emerged. There appeared to be a 
lag time of about 8 months before carriers with these interventions improved. Once the carriers 
showed signs of improvement, however, they often had smaller percentages of thresholds 
exceeded than the control groups. For example, for the onsite focused investigation, after 12 
months of followup, 40.6 percent of test carriers still exceeded at least one SMS threshold, 
compared to about 56.7 percent of control carriers matched to test carriers, and about 60 percent 
for control group carriers receiving traditional CRs.  
For carriers with multiple interventions, it is more difficult to assess the effects that interventions 
had on safety behavior. For example, intervention patterns that ended in a notice of claim (NOC) 
generally took about 1 year to be completed. In addition, these carriers tend to be high-risk 
carriers from the beginning and throughout the investigation process, since interventions were 
generally escalated to the NOC. Therefore, many of these carriers still exceeded SMS thresholds 
after the NOC was completed, and the test group did not show lower percentages of thresholds 




COSTS FOR CSA 2010, TEST AND CONTROL GROUPS 
Costs to FMCSA of performing CSA 2010 interventions and CRs on the test and non-test 
groups, respectively, were calculated. All CSA2010 interventions included were those that were 
classified as closed and completed, to ensure that all tasks performed during a particular 
intervention have been finished. Table 4 shows the average and median costs per carrier for each 
intervention type and for CRs performed on non-test group carriers. Warning letters are assumed 
to incur only a nominal cost, while the other costs include labor hours, travel, and all other 
expenses. The estimated average total cost per test group carrier that received an intervention is 
$754, while the median cost is $590. For comparison, the average total cost for non-test group 
carriers receiving CRs is $1,438 and the median is $1,058. The estimated total annual cost for the 
test group is $675,000, in comparison with a total estimated annual cost of $785,000 for the non-
test group. 
Table 4. Adjusted Total Cost in Dollars for Test Group Interventions and Non-Test Group 
CSA Intervention Types Average Cost Median 
Cooperative Safety Plan (CSP) $95 $72 
Notice of Violation (NOV) $118 $96 
Notice of Claim (NOC) $428 $192 
Offsite Investigation $451 $406 
Onsite Focused Investigation $677 $588 
Onsite Comprehensive Investigation $1,038 $877 
Warning Letter Nominal Nominal 
Estimated Annual Test Group Costs $675,000 
Control Group 
CR $1,438 $1,058 
Estimated Annual Control Group Costs $785,000 
In addition to the costs to FMCSA of performing interventions on carriers, dollar amounts 
claimed from test and control group carriers were also calculated. During the 29 month 
evaluation period of the Operational Model Test, 720 claims were made on test carriers and 640 
claims were made on control carriers in the original four states. The average amount per claim 
was $5,016 for test carriers and $6,296 for control carriers. Because a few carriers had very large 
claims, the average does not reflect the typical claim, and the median is a better statistic for 
comparison. For test carriers the median is $2,200 and for control carriers the median is $2,480. 
The conclusion is that there is not a significant difference in the experience between test and 
control carriers with respect to claims made. 
FIELD SURVEY 
A survey of field staff participating in the Operational Model Test was conducted to determine 
which aspects of CSA 2010 worked well and which did not. The purpose was to collect their 
insights and perspective on both the process and results of the new system of identifying unsafe 
carriers and intervening. Responses were received from eight States including all four of the 
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original test States: New Jersey, Colorado, Georgia, and Missouri. Overall, the evaluation of the 
CSA was quite positive, both with regard to the process and procedures as well as the outcomes 
in terms of identifying the right carriers for interventions and having the right tools to improve 
carrier behavior. There were some critiques of the method of prioritizing carriers for 
interventions and questions about the quality of the data used to score the BASICs (mostly 
having to do with the timeliness of the data), but overall the people who were actually operating 
the new system believe that the new CSA model represents a significant improvement over the 
prior SafeStat system. 
Several respondents noted that more carriers are “touched” by CSA than under the previous 
regime. They report seeing the same carriers as before but also a large number of new carriers. 
These “new” carriers are finding out that FMCSA monitors their safety and requires compliance. 
The field staff respondents generally agreed that the system identifies the right carriers for 
interventions and provides the right tools to bring carriers into compliance. Several stated, in 
different contexts that using all available data on safety is the right thing to do. 
Several emphasized the usefulness of preserving flexibility in the local divisions. Their approach 
is clearly predicated on bringing carriers into compliance and they believe that they have the 
experience, knowledge, and discretion to choose the best tools to do so. Each of the interventions 
was regarded as useful, depending on the situation. Some were unwilling to vouch for the 
effectiveness of certain intervention types, specifically the CSP, primarily because enough time 
had not passed to assess the results. But virtually all clearly indicated that each intervention type 
could be useful in different situations. It also appears from their comments that most respondents 
regarded most carriers as willing to comply with the regulations, though there are some carriers 
that are indifferent to compliance and would not comply without coercion. 
Overall, however, the survey of the field staff showed widespread support for the CSA 2010 
process. Most would agree that, as one said, “[i]t’s better but could still be improved.”
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The primary mission of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) is to reduce 
crashes, injuries, and fatalities involving large trucks and buses. In carrying out its mission, the 
FMCSA has developed programs for monitoring safety performance and compliance with 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR) and Hazardous Materials Regulations 
(HMR) of motor carriers operating on the Nation’s highways. The Agency currently collects 
several types of data on motor carriers, including Federal and State information on crashes, 
roadside inspections, and enforcement actions. In addition, the Agency uses the data to determine 
which motor carriers should be selected for onsite compliance review (CR) and to determine the 
safety fitness of motor carriers. Along with roadside inspections, the CR is the primary tool used 
for ensuring compliance with FMCSR and HMR.  
Until December 2010, FMCSA used the Motor Carrier Safety Status Measurement System 
(SafeStat) to evaluate the safety status of motor carriers. SafeStat is an automated analysis 
system designed to incorporate current on-road safety performance information on all carriers 
with enforcement history information in order to measure relative motor carrier safety fitness. 
The SafeStat system evaluates carriers in four Safety Evaluation Areas (SEAs): Accident, Driver, 
Vehicle, and Safety Management. A SafeStat score is calculated that is a weighted combination 
of the individual SEA values for carriers that meet certain data sufficiency requirements. The 
scores are ranked and used to prioritize motor carriers for subsequent CRs and roadside 
inspections.(1) 
At current staffing levels, FMCSA and its State partners conduct about 16,000 CRs annually on 
the approximately 514,000 motor carriers nationwide that FMCSA considers to be active, based 
on recent activity. Approximately 10,000 of the annual CRs are conducted by FMCSA, while the 
remaining 6,000 are conducted by State partners. The CR program is resource-intensive and it 
may take a trained safety investigator several days to complete one CR. Therefore, the program 
requires considerable Agency and State partner resources and only reaches a small portion of the 
Nation’s motor carriers. After performing a CR, FMCSA issues a safety fitness determination 
and a corresponding safety rating. One of the limitations of this process is that the safety rating 
remains in effect until another CR is performed. As a result, a safety rating may not be an 
accurate indicator of a carrier’s current safety fitness. The CR is currently performed as a 
comprehensive investigation at a carrier’s place of business. It has been argued that, for a carrier 
having deficiencies in one particular area, a full CR may not be necessary. For example, 
inspections of a carrier over time may reveal a pattern of behavior that is associated largely with 
vehicle maintenance violations. In such cases, both the agency and the carrier may be better 
served by a focused investigation designed to address issues specifically related to vehicle 
maintenance. This would not only relieve the Agency from the costs associated with performing 
a full CR, but would also allow the carrier to focus on its primary deficiencies. 
For these and other reasons, FMCSA has initiated the Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010 
(CSA 2010) program. The goal of the program is to change the current process for monitoring, 
assessing, and improving the safety performance of motor carriers and drivers through: 
• Increased contact with carriers and drivers. 
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• Development of a new measurement system that replaces SafeStat. 
• Application of a wider range of progressive interventions to correct high risk behavior. 
• More efficient use of Agency resources. 
This report is an evaluation of the CSA 2010 Operational Model Test. The evaluation focuses on 
the design of the new safety measurement system (SMS), the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
new intervention processes compared to the current process, the cost to the Agency of applying 
the new interventions compared to the current process, the safety impact of the new interventions 
in terms of changes in motor carrier safety performance, and results from a survey of FMCSA 
field staff to determine their views on the aspects of CSA 2010 that worked well and those that 
did not. Before exploring each of these specific topics in detail, the next section provides 
background and design information about the Operational Model Test. 
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2. THE CSA 2010 OPERATIONAL MODEL TEST 
The CSA 2010 Operational Model Test is a field test initiated by FMCSA aimed at 
implementing components of the CSA2010 program in a small sample of States. It is called an 
Operational Model Test rather than a Pilot Program because it did not provide regulatory relief 
to the carriers participating in the program. For this evaluation, the test began in February 2008, 
and ended in June 2010, providing a 29-month period for data collection and analysis. Elements 
of the program are scheduled to be rolled out on a State-by-State or group-of-States basis in 2010 
through 2012, subsequent to this Operational Model Test. 
In the initial design, the Operational Model Test was conducted in Colorado, Georgia, Missouri, 
and New Jersey. These States were selected by the CSA 2010 program team based on various 
logistical, operational, and model design characteristics. For example, each State is from a 
different FMCSA Service Center; the States are in close proximity to CSA team members; they 
participate in the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program; and these States represent a good 
cross section of the carrier population. These four States account for approximately a 10th of the 
Nation’s interstate motor carriers and power units.  
As the test proceeded, five additional States (e.g., Montana, Minnesota, Maryland, Kansas, and 
Delaware) were phased into the program at various times. This report focuses mainly on 
evaluation of the test with respect to the original four States. These States provide the greatest 
amount of consistent information from the beginning of the test to the end of the test over the 29-
month period in which data were collected. Also, carriers in each of the original four States were 
randomly placed into either a “test” group or a “control” group. Test group carriers participated 
in the Operational Model Test while control group carriers continued to be monitored by the 
Agency’s current enforcement process. Comparison of the test and control groups based on 
certain metrics, such as crash rates, helps to assess the effectiveness of the Operational Model 
Test. The additional five States were added as test-only States, meaning that control groups were 
not formed and all carriers in those States participated in the Operational Model Test as test 
group carriers. In this report, data collected from the five test-only States are largely used to 
validate findings from analysis of the test group in the original four States. 
The new SMS and the intervention process are two key components of the CSA 2010 
Operational Model Test. The SMS is the major tool for measuring the safety of individual motor 
carriers and commercial motor vehicle (CMV) drivers and is designated to replace SafeStat when 
the CSA 2010 model becomes fully operational. While SafeStat evaluates carriers in four SEAs, 
the SMS ranks a carrier’s safety performance relative to its peers in seven Behavior Analysis and 
Safety Improvement Categories (BASICs). A carrier that exceeds a BASIC or Crash Indicator 
threshold is subject to any of a number of interventions, depending on the number and type of 
thresholds exceeded. Therefore, the SMS methodology acts as a trigger that starts the 
intervention process. The seven BASICs are briefly described below, followed by a brief 
description of the CSA 2010 intervention types. 
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2.1 THE BASICS 
Using roadside performance data recorded in the Motor Carrier Management Information 
System (MCMIS) database, carriers under CSA 2010 are scored in seven BASICs. Unlike 
SafeStat scores that are used to prioritize carriers for full CRs, BASIC scores are designed to 
identify specific safety problems which can be addressed by more focused interventions. Carriers 
are scored in each of the BASICs, ranked relative to their peers, and then assigned a percentile 
score. Carriers that exceed predetermined thresholds for a particular measure are identified for 
CSA 2010 intervention. The seven BASICs are described briefly below. They are discussed in 
more detail in Section 4. 
• Unsafe Driving—this score measures the operation of commercial motor vehicles 
(CMVs) in a dangerous or careless manner. Example violations include speeding, 
reckless driving, improper lane change, and inattention. 
• Fatigued Driving—this score measures the operation of CMVs by drivers who are ill, 
fatigued, or in non-compliance with the hours-of-service (HOS) regulations. This BASIC 
includes violations of regulations related to the complete and accurate recording of log 
books according to HOS requirements and the management of CMV driver fatigue. 
Instances related to the Fatigued Driving BASIC are distinguished from incidents where 
unconsciousness or an inability to react is brought about by the use of alcohol, drugs, or 
other controlled substances.  
• Driver Fitness—this score measures the operation of CMVs by drivers who are unfit to 
operate a CMV due to lack of training, experience, or medical qualifications. Example 
violations include failure to have a valid and appropriate commercial driver’s license and 
being medically unqualified to operate a CMV. 
• Controlled Substance and Alcohol—this score measures the operation of CMVs by 
drivers who are impaired due to alcohol, illegal drugs, and misuse of prescription or over-
the-counter medications. Example violations include use or possession of controlled 
substances or alcohol. 
• Vehicle Maintenance—this score measures the operation of CMVs that are not properly 
maintained. Example violations include brakes, lights, other mechanical defects, and 
failure to make required repairs. 
• Improper Loading/Cargo Securement—this score measures CMV incidents of shifting 
loads, spilled or dropped cargo, and unsafe handling of hazardous materials. Example 
violations include improper load securement, cargo retention, and hazardous material 
handling. 
• Crash Indicator—this score measures the carrier’s history of crash involvement, 
including frequency and severity.  
One of the characteristics of the SMS is that calculation of a BASIC measure depends on 
violations of certain FMCSR and HMR. As part of the roadside inspection program, 
approximately 3.3 million inspections are conducted annually. Overall, the SMS uses all safety-
based violations recorded during roadside inspections. Calculation of the Crash Indicator 
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depends on the number and severity of crashes recorded during the previous 24 months that are 
reported by individual States.  
Other characteristics that are taken into account when calculating the BASIC measures include 
violation and crash severity weights, time weights, normalization, peer grouping, and data 
sufficiency. That is, certain weights are imposed depending on the severity and timing of 
violations. Violations that are determined to be more severe are assigned larger weights. In 
addition, the time weight of a violation decreases with time. Normalization refers to the process 
of accounting for differences in exposure among drivers and carriers. Therefore, depending on 
the BASIC, measures are generally normalized (divided by) power units, driver inspections, or 
vehicle inspections. Carriers thought to have similar levels of exposure are placed in peer groups 
and are ranked among their peers. Lastly, carriers and drivers must meet certain data sufficiency 
requirements before a percentile score is assigned. This ensures that there are enough inspections 
or crashes to produce meaningful measures of safety. 
2.2 THE INTERVENTION TYPES 
As part of the CSA Operational Model Test, a test carrier is identified for intervention when it 
exceeds one or more of the BASIC thresholds as determined by the SMS. The intervention 
process is designed to be progressive, with subsequent interventions on the same carrier 
increasing in terms of the scope and intensity of the investigation, until the behavior that 
precipitated the action is resolved.  
• Warning Letter—correspondence is sent to a carrier’s place of business that points out 
which thresholds were exceeded and describes possible consequences of continued safety 
problems in these areas. 
• Offsite Investigation—a carrier is asked to voluntarily submit documents to enable 
FMCSA to evaluate the carrier’s safety management programs and determine the reason 
for a safety problem. 
• Focused Onsite Investigation—an investigation is undertaken at the carrier’s place of 
business when the carrier exhibits a persistent safety problem in one specific area. The 
investigation is triggered by the carrier exceeding a particular BASIC threshold over a 
period of time. 
• Comprehensive Onsite Investigation—an investigation is performed at the carrier’s place 
of business when the carrier exhibits broad and complex safety problems such as 
exceeding multiple BASIC thresholds over time. This investigation is similar to the CR 
conducted under the Agency’s current model. 
In addition to the above-mentioned types of interventions, the agency may take the following 
types of action during the course of any investigation: 
• Cooperative Safety Plan (CSP)—a safety improvement plan that is implemented by the 
carrier on a voluntary basis for problems which the motor carrier expresses a willingness 
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to remedy. The Agency monitors the carrier’s safety performance and escalates 
intervention if performance does not improve. 
• Notice of violation (NOV)—a notice to increase the carrier’s awareness of enforcement 
intent on the part of the Agency. Violations discovered are severe enough to warrant 
formal action but do not warrant fines. To avoid fines or further enforcement, the carrier 
may need to provide evidence of corrective action or challenge the violations. 
• Notice of claim (NOC)—a notice asserting a civil penalty triggered by evidence of severe 
regulatory violations sufficient to justify assessment of penalties. 
2.3 PHASE I AND PHASE II 
The CSA 2010 Operational Model Test was implemented in two phases. Phase I began in 
February 2008, and continued through the end of September 2008. This phase of the test served 
as a start-up period before the test became fully operational. During this period the test was 
restricted to the original four States and to interventions arising from three BASICs:  
• Unsafe driving. 
• Fatigued driving. 
• Vehicle maintenance. 
Focusing on these BASICs during Phase I allowed the safety investigators in each State to get up 
to speed with the new CSA2010 protocols more easily. These particular BASICs were chosen 
because they provide the bulk of the information on carriers exceeding at least one BASIC 
threshold. Also, during Phase I, carriers having had a CR within the past 18 months, as well as 
SafeStat A/B carriers, were excluded from the test. In Phase II, the Operational Model Test 
became fully operational. 
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3. SCOPE OF THE CSA 2010 OPERATIONAL MODEL TEST 
The intervention process begins when a carrier exceeds any one of the seven BASIC thresholds 
of the SMS. Once that happens, an intervention may be initiated, where a carrier is subject to any 
of a number of agency actions, depending on which SMS thresholds were exceeded and the 
number that were exceeded. The carrier is then monitored over time to determine if percentile 
scores have improved enough to indicate that the intervention process should be terminated, or if 
percentile scores have not sufficiently improved, the process should be escalated with additional 
interventions,. 
A natural starting point for evaluating the CSA 2010 process is to determine which BASIC 
thresholds were most likely to be exceeded and the frequency with which they were exceeded. 
Since interventions result once SMS thresholds are exceeded, the next step is to examine the 
interventions and intervention patterns carriers were likely to receive. The number of carriers 
touched by the new CSA 2010 model, in comparison with SafeStat, is also assessed. Finally, the 
effectiveness of the interventions themselves are assessed, by examining motor carrier safety 
performance prior to and subsequent to each intervention. First, however, crash rates are 
calculated for the test group and the control group to determine if there were any differences in 
this measure of safety before the test began. 
3.1 CRASH RATES PRIOR TO TEST 
Carriers in the original four States were randomly allocated into test and control groups prior to 
February 2008, when the Operational Model Test began. Ideally, there should be no difference in 
crash rates between the two groups prior to the test. Table 5 shows crash rates per 100 power 
units for the test and control groups calculated over the 2-year period between February 2006 
and January 2008. The crash rates are 3.72 and 3.32 for the control and test groups, respectively. 
A rate ratio close to one suggests no difference. It appears the crash rates were substantially 
similar prior to the test. The control group has slightly more power units, likely due to a few 
large carriers. 
Table 5. Crash Rates for Test and Control Groups Per 100 Power Units Prior to Test 


















7,257 194,935 3.72 5,956 179,272 3.32 1.12 
Table 6 shows crash rates further categorized by State. The rate ratios are close to one, even 
though the one in Georgia is 1.29. Power units counts for test and control groups are also very 
similar, with the exception of Missouri where the difference is about 16,000 power units. Again, 
this is likely due to a few carriers with a large number of power units. In general, crash rates 
prior to the test appear to be reasonably similar between the test and control groups. 
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Table 6. Crash Rates for Test and Control Groups Per 100 Power Units by State Prior to Test  





















Colorado 824 25,330 3.25 779 25,153 3.10 1.05 
Georgia 2,334 57,259 4.08 1,835 57,955 3.17 1.29 
Missouri 2,466 56,032 4.40 1,720 39,814 4.32 1.02 
New Jersey 1,633 56,314 2.90 1,622 56,350 2.88 1.01 
Total 7,257 194,935 3.72 5,956 179,272 3.32 1.12 
3.2 SMS THRESHOLDS EXCEEDED 
This section begins the process of identifying the primary patterns of BASIC thresholds 
exceeded by the test and control carriers. These patterns reflect the underlying safety 
performance of the carriers, which in turn affects the types and number of interventions applied, 
and the outcome of those interventions. Subsequent sections identify and evaluate the 
effectiveness of the interventions in reducing the number of BASICs thresholds exceeded.  
When the Operational Model Test began in February 2008, there were 35,008 test carriers and 
34,961 control carriers, for a total of 69,969 in the original four States. Table 7 shows the 
distribution of these carriers by number of SMS thresholds exceeded during February. Overall, 
93.9 percent of carriers exceeded no SMS thresholds. Of the approximate remaining 6.1 percent, 
4.5 percent exceeded one threshold, 1.3 percent exceeded two BASIC thresholds, and 0.3 percent 
exceeded more than two thresholds. It appears that the great majority of carriers exceeded no 
SMS thresholds. (There are data sufficiency requirements for calculating BASIC thresholds. 
Most carriers do not have a valid BASIC score calculated because of insufficient data. See 
section 4 for further discussion.) Among those carriers exceeding at least one threshold, 
3,114/4,267—or about 73 percent—exceeded only one and the remaining 27 percent exceeded 
multiple thresholds. 
Table 7. Number of Carriers Exceeding BASIC Thresholds by Number Exceeded 
(Test and Control Carriers, Original Four States, February 2008) 
Number of BASIC 
Thresholds Exceeded 
Carriers Percent 
0 65,702 93.9% 
1 3,114 4.5% 
2 921 1.3% 
3 195 0.3% 
4 29 <0.1% 
5 8 <0.1% 
Total 69,969 100.0% 
Table 8 shows the distribution of BASIC thresholds exceeded for the 3,114 carriers that 
exceeded one threshold. Two BASICs have relatively large and similar percentages. The Vehicle 
 
9 
Maintenance BASIC accounts for 37.4 percent of the total, while the Fatigued Driving BASIC 
accounts for 35.2 percent. Among carriers exceeding one threshold, about 10.2 percent is 
attributed to the Improper Loading/Cargo Securement BASIC. The Unsafe Driving and Crash 
Indicator BASICs have similar percents, 6.1 and 5.8, respectively. The Controlled 
Substance/Alcohol BASIC threshold is rarely exceeded and accounts for a very small percentage 
of the total. 
Table 8. SMS Threshold Exceeded for Carriers Exceeding One Threshold 
(Test and Control Carriers, Original Four States, February 2008) 
SMS Threshold Exceeded Carriers Percent 
1—Unsafe Driving 189 6.1% 
2—Fatigued Driving 1,095 35.2% 
3—Driver Fitness 142 4.6% 
4—Controlled Substance/ Alcohol 25 0.8% 
5—Vehicle Maintenance 1,164 37.4% 
6—Improper Loading/Cargo Securement 319 10.2% 
7—Crash Indicator 180 5.8% 
Total 3,114 100.0% 
Table 9 shows the different combinations of BASIC thresholds exceeded for the 921 carriers that 
exceeded two thresholds. The area in the table below the diagonal presents counts of carriers 
with two BASICs exceeded, while the upper portion presents the corresponding percentages. The 
BASICs are referenced by numbers 1–7 and cells with large numbers are shaded for ease of 
identification. Consistent with Table 8, the Fatigued Driving and Vehicle Maintenance 
thresholds are most likely to be exceeded for carriers with exactly two thresholds exceeded. 
These two BASICs account for 268, or 29.1 percent of the total. Two other pairs of BASICs 
account for considerable percentages. The number of carriers that exceeded the Vehicle 
Maintenance and Improper Loading/Cargo Securement thresholds is 196, or 21.3 percent of the 
total. The corresponding number for the Unsafe Driving and Fatigued Driving thresholds is 119, 
or 12.9 percent. Note that the Vehicle Maintenance BASIC is contained in the two pairs with the 
largest number of carriers, accounting for 29.1 + 21.3 = 50.4 percent, or more than half the total. 
Table 9. SMS Thresholds Exceeded for Carriers Exceeding Two Thresholds 
(Test and Control Carriers, Original Four States, February 2008) 
BASIC Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1—Unsafe Driving – 12.9 0.8 0.1 3.1 1.8 3.7 
2—Fatigued Driving 119 – 4.6 1.3 29.1 3.6 2.5 
3—Driver Fitness 7 42 – 0.0 5.4 3.6 1.0 
4—Controlled Substance/ Alcohol 1 12 0 – 0.4 0.2 0.0 
5—Vehicle Maintenance 29 268 50 4 – 21.3 2.8 
6—Improper Loading/Cargo Securement 17 33 33 2 196 – 1.7 
7—Crash Indicator 34 23 9 0 26 16 – 
Relatively few carriers exceeded more than two thresholds at any particular point in time. 
Although not all patterns are shown, Table 10 shows the most common patterns for carriers that 
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exceeded three or four thresholds. (The BASICs are identified by number in this table; their 
names are shown in Table 9.) These carriers were most likely to exceed the Unsafe Driving, 
Fatigued Driving, and Vehicle Maintenance BASICs simultaneously. The next most likely 
pattern involves Unsafe Driving, Fatigued Driving, and the Crash Indicator. In fact, the Unsafe 
Driving BASIC appears in six of the eight patterns, and the Fatigued Driving BASICs appear in 
seven of the eight patterns shown in Table 10. It will be shown later that these BASICs have the 
strongest associations with crash rates. 
Table 10. Most Common Patterns of SMS Thresholds Exceeded for Carriers Exceeding  



















3 x1 x2   x5   39 29.5% 
3 x1 x2     x7 26 19.7% 
3  x2   x5 x6  18 13.6% 
3   x3  x5 x6  17 12.9% 
3 x1 x2 x3     12 9.1% 
3 x1 x2    x6  10 7.6% 
4 x1 x2 x3  x5   5 3.8% 
4 x1 x2   x5 x6  5 3.8% 
Total 132 100.0% 
In summary, it appears that when one or two thresholds are exceeded, the Vehicle Maintenance 
and Fatigued Driving thresholds are the most prevalent ones. When more than two thresholds are 
exceeded, in addition to these two, the Unsafe Driving BASIC tends to be included. 
3.3 INTERVENTIONS RECEIVED BY CARRIERS 
The intervention process is triggered when a carrier exceeds at least one SMS threshold. Table 
11 shows the percentage of carriers receiving interventions by number of interventions. A total 
of 5,587 carriers received 10,281 interventions during the 29 months of the CSA 2010 
Operational Model Test in the original four States. The majority of carriers intervened upon, 49.8 
percent, received one intervention. An additional 26.9 percent received two interventions and 
16.6 percent received three. Among carriers receiving interventions, about 6.9 percent received 
more than three. 
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Table 11. Percent of Carriers Receiving Interventions by Number of Interventions, Original Four 







1 2,780 2,780 49.8% 
2 1,501 3,002 26.9% 
3 925 2,775 16.6% 
4 249 996 4.5% 
5 90 450 1.6% 
>5 42 278 0.8% 
Total 5,587 10,281 100.0% 
In this document, when all tasks for a particular intervention have been accomplished and the 
intervention is closed, the intervention will be referred to as closed/completed. The 
closed/completed status does not necessarily imply that the safety issue related to the 
intervention has been resolved. In fact, if the issue has not been resolved, a higher level 
intervention may be opened. Also, an intervention may be declared closed/completed while the 
carrier is still being monitored for potential future interventions. However, if a carrier receives 
one intervention during the early stage of the Operational Model Test, and the intervention is 
closed/completed without any interventions thereafter, it is likely that the cycle of interventions 
for that carrier is complete. On the other hand, for example, if a carrier receives a warning letter 
followed by an onsite investigation and then a CSP, that carrier is still being monitored actively 
even though the CSP may be declared closed/completed. Nevertheless, closed/completed status 
indicates that the safety investigator has completed tasks associated with the last intervention 
recorded.  
Table 12 shows the percentage of carriers receiving interventions according to the number of 
interventions when the last one is closed/completed. Among these carriers, 54.1 percent received 
one intervention, 22.6 percent received two interventions, 17.1 percent received three, and the 
remaining 6.2 percent received more than three. Although carriers are still monitored after the 
final intervention is closed/completed, restriction to carriers with this status provides a basis for 
the starting point of evaluation forward in time. 
Table 12. Percent of Carriers Receiving Interventions by Number of Interventions, 
Last Intervention Closed/Completed, Original Four States, 29 Months 
Number of Interventions Carriers Total Interventions Percent Carriers 
1 2,331 2,331 54.1% 
2 973 1,946 22.6% 
3 737 2,211 17.1% 
4 167 668 3.9% 
5 64 320 1.5% 
>5 33 215 0.8% 
Total 4,305 7,691 100.0% 
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Among the 4,305 carriers whose final intervention is recorded as closed/completed, Table 13 
shows the distribution of intervention type by number of interventions. Most carriers received 
one intervention, and that intervention was a warning letter. Of the 2,331 carriers receiving one 
intervention, 87.3 percent were warning letters. Investigations (offsite, onsite focused, onsite 
comprehensive) usually occurred as the first or second terminal intervention. When a carrier with 
one intervention received one of the investigations, the warning letter was bypassed based on the 
carrier’s safety performance as determined by the SMS. For carriers with two interventions, 
investigations were likely preceded by a warning letter. The CSP and the NOC are often the final 
intervention in the series of interventions when they were given to carriers with multiple 
interventions. Compared to other interventions, the NOV was rarely used. Intervention cycles 
and patterns are described and presented in more detail in section 4. The purpose here is to 
identify a group of carriers to evaluate the effectiveness of interventions, since the final 
intervention is closed/completed. 
Table 13. Distribution of Carriers With Interventions by Last Closed/Completed Intervention 
and Number of Interventions, Original Four States, 29 Months 
Last Intervention 
Closed/Completed 
Carriers with 1 
Intervention 
(Percent) 
Carriers with 2 
Interventions 
(Percent) 
Carriers with 3 
Interventions 
(Percent) 
Carriers with >3 
Interventions 
(Percent) 












































































3.4 CARRIERS TOUCHED BY CSA 2010 
While there is information recorded in the MCMIS Census file for approximately 750,000 
carriers, FMCSA makes a distinction between carriers with “recent activity” and carriers without 
“recent activity.” Carriers with recent activity are identified based on updates (registration, 
inspection, review, crash, etc.) to the MCMIS data files, insurance filings, and fees paid to State 
highway funds (data collected by IRP, Inc.) in the past 3 years.  
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Annually, it is estimated that CSA interventions will touch approximately 6.3 percent of the 
carrier population (based on all interventions, including warning letters). This compares to about 
2.2 percent of carriers that receive full CRs under the current process. Therefore, the number of 
carriers touched by CSA on an annual basis is approximately 6.3/2.2 = 2.9 times greater than the 
current system based on CRs alone. 
When restricted to carriers with recent activity, the percentage expected to be touched annually 
by interventions is about 9.9 percent. Therefore, one would expect the CSA program to touch 
approximately 10 percent of such carriers annually when fully implemented (see Table 14). 
Table 14. Annual Percentage of Test Group Carriers with Recent Activity Touched by Interventions  
(Original Four States, 29 Months) 
Average Number of 















22,586 10,095 5,419 2,242 9.9% 
Table 15 shows the results presented in Table 14 broken out by intervention type. The three 
mutually exclusive groups include warning letter only, warning letter followed by additional 
intervention(s), and all else. The all else group consists almost entirely of carriers that initially 
bypassed the warning letter and received some type of investigation (off-site, onsite focused, 
onsite comprehensive) as the first intervention. Carriers that received a warning letter as the only 
intervention represent 37.6 percent of all carriers intervened upon during the Operational Model 
Test. An almost equal percentage of carriers received the warning letter followed by additional 
interventions. Carriers that bypassed the warning letter and were escalated to an investigation 
represent 26.7 percent of carriers with interventions. Excluding warning letters, the percentage of 
carriers expected to be investigated annually under the CSA program is about 6.2 percent. 
Table 15. Annual Percentage of Test Group Carriers With Recent Activity Touched by 
Interventions by Intervention Type (Original Four States, 29 Months) 




















Warning letter only 2,035 2,035 37.6% 842 3.7% 
Warning letter followed 
by additional 
intervention(s) 
5,235 1,936 35.7% 801 3.5% 
All else 2,825 1,448 26.7% 599 2.7% 
Total 10,095 5,419 100.0% 2,242 9.9% 
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From the MCMIS Census file, there are approximately 514,000 carriers with recent activity in 
the 50 States and the District of Columbia. Of these carriers, 16,262 (3.2 percent) received full 
CRs in 2009.  
The ratio of the percentage of recent activity carriers touched by CSA 2010 interventions to the 
percentage of recent activity carriers with CRs on an annual basis is 9.9/3.2 = 3.1. It appears that 




4. THE SAFETY MEASUREMENT SYSTEM 
The SMS is a methodology intended to measure the safety of motor carriers. The SMS is 
intended to accomplish four goals: 
• Identify unsafe carriers for interventions. 
• Identify safety problems within broad areas at a motor carrier. 
• Monitor the safety performance of carriers on a near-continuous basis. 
• Provide input safety measurements to the Safety Fitness Determination process, by which 
FMCSA identifies carriers that are conditional or unfit to operate. 
The SMS consists of seven metrics: 
• BASIC 1: Unsafe Driving. 
• BASIC 2: Fatigued Driving. 
• BASIC 3: Driver Fitness. 
• BASIC 4: Controlled Substances and Alcohol. 
• BASIC 5: Vehicle Maintenance. 
• BASIC 6: Improper Loading/Cargo Securement. 
• BASIC 7: Crash Indicator. 
BASIC 1, Unsafe Driving: This metric is based upon reported moving violations; it is intended to 
capture driving a CMV in a dangerous or careless manner. The violations captured are all traffic 
violations, produced by a traffic stop by an enforcement officer. They include typical traffic 
violations that any driver is subject to, such as speeding, reckless driving, unsafe lane change, or 
unsafe turn. Since this BASIC is based on observed traffic violations, the violations counted in 
BASIC 1 are not uncovered during routine inspections, as is the case with several other BASICs. 
BASIC 2, Fatigued Driving: This metric incorporates violations of FMCSR governing HOS, 
completion of log books, and carrier fatigue management practices. Some of the violations are 
identified during routine roadside or carrier inspections. For example, if a motor carrier 
enforcement officer makes a traffic stop, he or she may identify violations for this BASIC while 
reviewing the driver’s log book. Incomplete duty status records and a variety of other paperwork 
violations contribute to this BASIC. 
BASIC 3, Driver Fitness: This BASIC captures a large number of violations that reflect a driver 
who is unfit to drive because of a lack of qualifications, training, certification, or experience. 
Violations include improper licensing (such as failure to possess a Commercial Drivers License 
or the appropriate endorsement to operate certain vehicles), the lack of required medical 
certification, or a carrier allowing an unqualified driver to operate. Data for this BASIC are 
accumulated during routine roadside inspections, traffic enforcement stops, and carrier 
inspections, such as occur as part of a CR. 
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BASIC 4, Controlled Substance and Alcohol: This score captures drivers cited for operating a 
CMV impaired by alcohol or illegal drugs, or who are found to have misused prescription or 
over-the-counter medications. Typical examples of violations captured in this BASIC include use 
or possession of controlled substances or alcohol. The BASIC also includes FMCSR governing 
the motor carrier’s drug and alcohol testing program.  
BASIC 5, Vehicle Maintenance: This BASIC is based on roadside inspections, carrier reviews, 
and post-crash inspections. It captures violations of FMCSR that set standards for the mechanical 
condition of the different systems on trucks and buses. Examples include brake adjustment, 
lighting system and conspicuity markings, tire inflation and tread depth, and a variety of other 
mechanical systems. Paperwork violations, such as failure to maintain maintenance records and 
failure to document required inspections correctly are also included. 
BASIC 6, Improper Loading or Cargo Securement: This basic captures violations of FMCSR 
that cover loading and securing cargo. Many of the requirements are related to the transport of 
hazardous materials, including regulations governing appropriate tank types, properly marking 
the tank or package, appropriate package or tank types, cargo release in a crash or while 
loading/unloading, appropriate documentation, and appropriate handling procedures of the 
hazardous material. Other violations included in the BASIC cover proper physical securement of 
cargo such as through the use of tiedowns or other means of securing the cargo. This BASIC also 
includes FMCSR governing routing restrictions for hazardous materials, as well as associated 
planning and documentation. Most of the data used in calculating the BASIC are collected 
during inspections, whether at the roadside or at the carrier. Violations uncovered during post-
crash inspections are also included. 
BASIC 7: Crash Indicator: This metric is the most direct indicator of safety, at least in terms of 
safety being measured by crash involvements. This indicator is based on crash counts from the 
MCMIS Crash file, normalized by a measure of exposure to produce a crash rate. This measure 
is the most direct measure of carrier safety, insofar as crash rates reflect the safety of the 
operations of a carrier. 
Nominally the BASICs cover the gamut of factors that can contribute to crashes: driver, vehicle 
maintenance, carrier operations. Carrier factors as such are not the focus of any specific BASIC, 
but carrier behavior and conduct are reflected in most of the BASICs. Moreover, virtually all of 
the factors that figure into the calculation of the BASICs are covered in the FMCSR. 
Crash rates are in a sense the best measure of a carrier’s safety because reducing crashes is the 
fundamental goal of improving safety. However, using crash rates as the sole measure of safety 
presents practical problems. Crashes are relatively rare and stochastic (probabilistic) events, such 
that whether they occur or not is not entirely determined by the behavior of the carrier and driver. 
Many factors can contribute to a crash, in addition to poor performance by the driver or vehicle. 
These include the other drivers and vehicles on the road and the environment itself. Thus, poor 
and unsafe carriers may have a low crash rate for a period of time, simply because not enough 
crashes had occurred by chance. This is particularly true of small carriers, which have low 
exposure to the chance of being involved in a crash, simply because they are small. Over time, 
poor carriers will have proportionately high crash rates, but it is highly desirable to identify poor 
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carriers as soon as possible, without waiting for a statistically reliable number of crashes to 
occur, so that they may be made safer or removed from operation. 
Since crash rates may in the short run be unreliable indicators of unsafe operations, alternatives 
that use events that occur more frequently and that are associated with crashes may be superior. 
The BASICs as defined in CSA 2010 are designed to serve this end. They function in effect as 
surrogates for the crash rates.  
Whether the BASICs are useful surrogates for crash rates, and by extension, carrier safety, is a 
testable hypothesis. Presented below is a statistical evaluation of whether the BASICs are related 
to crash rates, and the strength of the relationship. But first is a discussion and qualitative 
evaluation of the elements of the SMS, including the sources of the data, the use of weights for 
violations by severity and how recently the violation occurred. The measures are normalized by 
exposure, comparison within peer groups, and data sufficiency requirements. 
The general process or methodology is based on certain concepts, assumptions, and conditions 
that affect the ability of the SMS to identify unsafe carriers. The next section provides a 
discussion of those concepts and assumptions. A rigorous, quantitative evaluation of some of the 
assumptions is not possible because the data to support such a quantitative evaluation do not 
exist. For example, one of the implicit assumptions is that applicable violations that occurred 
within the past 6 months should be given three times the weight of an applicable violation that 
occurred between 12 and 24 months ago. A quantitative analysis of whether three is the correct 
weight or 6 months is the correct period is not attempted and is outside the scope of what is 
feasible in the evaluation. Instead, the authors discuss the elements and assumptions of the 
methodology in terms of strengths and weaknesses. The true test of the SMS is its ability to 
accurately identify unsafe carriers. That topic is taken up after the discussion of the elements. 
4.1 SOURCES OF DATA 
A primary concern for the SMS is the sources of data used to determine the BASIC scores. The 
question with respect to data sources is whether they are appropriate, the limitations of the data 
sources, and whether there are alternative sources of data. 
The data sources for the BASICs are the components of the MCMIS. The MCMIS consists of the 
Census file, the Crash file, and the Inspection file. Each of these supplies data for the BASIC 
calculations, either counts of violations or crashes, or exposure measures. 
The Census file contains one record for each motor carrier and shipper registered with the U.S. 
Department of Transportation (USDOT). Entities that operate trucks and buses in interstate 
commerce, and all hazardous materials carriers and shippers, are required to register with the 
USDOT. Most of the information in the Census file is supplied by the carrier or shipper. The 
information includes contact information, as well as information about the type of operations and 
the type of commodity carried. There is also information about the number of power units 
(vehicles), number of drivers, and the amount of travel (vehicle miles of travel [VMT]). The 
carrier is required to update the information every 2 years (49 CFR 390.19). The data can also be 
updated if there is a safety, compliance, or educational contact review. 
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Data from the Census file is used as “exposure” data, to normalize the scores of certain BASICs 
in order to reflect the exposure of the carrier to crashes or to unsafe conditions. In particular, the 
counts of power units owned, term-leased, or trip-leased are used as exposure data. Information 
about the number of power units operated by a carrier is supplied by the carrier itself. It is of 
unknown accuracy until there has been a CR or some other safety contact. Power units are used 
as exposure in the Crash Indicator and Unsafe Driving BASICs, so it is important that the 
number be accurate. In addition, the number of power units from the Census file is used to assign 
carriers to peer groups. Carriers are then given a percentile ranking for a BASIC within the peer 
group. 
The power unit information is likely quite accurate after a CR, though there is no audit of the 
data prior to a CR. Carriers are required to update their information at least every 2 years. One 
source of inaccuracy can be a change in the number of vehicles operated related to business 
conditions. Doubtless some of the counts are incorrect because the carrier makes an error, does 
not understand the requirement, or ignores the requirement. However, the analysis and 
evaluation of the BASICs here has uncovered no reason to suspect a systematic bias.  
It must be recognized that there is no real alternative to using the Census file for exposure or 
normalization. The Census file is the only data source that covers all motor carriers in interstate 
commerce and all hazardous materials carriers. Thus, there is no alternative for counts of 
vehicles at the carrier level.  
The MCMIS Crash file is the next primary source of data used as input to the SMS. States are 
required to report the involvements of trucks and buses in traffic crashes meeting certain severity 
thresholds, namely, a fatality, an injury requiring transport for immediate medical attention, or at 
least one vehicle in the crash towed due to disabling damage. The data used from the Crash file 
in the SMS is limited to the counts of crash involvements for carriers and the severity of those 
crashes. These data are used in the Crash Indicator BASIC, along with counts of power units 
from the Census file. The Crash Indicator BASIC is most directly related to the actual crash rates 
of carriers and is most tightly linked to those crash rates. 
The primary issues with the MCMIS Crash file related to the SMS are underreporting and 
reporting latency. Underreporting occurs when crashes that meet the MCMIS Crash file criteria 
are not reported by the States to the Crash file. Reporting latency refers to the time between 
when a crash occurs and when it is reported to the MCMIS Crash file. States are required to 
report all crash involvements that meet the MCMIS reporting criteria within 90 days of the crash. 
For both of these issues, the effect of the issue is incomplete data used in calculating the Crash 
Indicator BASIC. (Of course, unsafe carriers could still be detected by other BASICs, which rely 
on other sources of data, including the MCMIS Inspection file.) Incomplete data may result in 
unsafe carriers going undetected by the Crash Indicator BASIC. The effect of underreporting and 
reporting latency on identifying unsafe carriers in the SMS is considered in section 5.5 below. 
Underreporting has been a persistent issue for the MCMIS Crash file, which FMCSA has 
invested extensive resources in addressing. The researchers have conducted a series of 
evaluations of State data reporting to the MCMIS Crash file. The reports have consistently 
shown significant underreporting of crash involvements to the MCMIS file, though with an 
overall trend toward improvement. In most States evaluated thus far, more serious crashes tend 
 
19 
to be reported at a higher rate than less serious crashes, and large trucks, such as tractor-
semitrailers and tractor-double trailer combinations, tend to be reported at a higher rate than 
smaller trucks and buses. 
Reporting from three of the four original test States has been evaluated as part of this series. 
(Colorado has not yet been evaluated.) It should be noted that the most recent report available for 
Georgia covers crashes in 2006; the evaluation of MCMIS file reporting from Missouri was for 
the 2005 data year, and for New Jersey, 2003. Table 16 shows some of the results for these State 
evaluations. Reporting rates are calculated by examining the State’s crash file to identify 
involvements that meet the MCMIS reporting criteria and matching those involvements to the 
records reported to the Crash file, and then calculating the proportion of records that were 
reported to the number of records that should have been reported. The overall reporting rate—
that is, the rate for all reportable crashes—was 68.1 percent for Georgia 2006, while it was 
somewhat higher for the Missouri 2005 cases and New Jersey 2003 cases at 83.3 percent and 
82.5 percent, respectively. For both Georgia and Missouri, fatal crashes were reported at a 
substantially higher percentage than the overall reporting rate. New Jersey was somewhat 
anomalous, with only about two-thirds of fatal crash involvements reported, compared with the 
82.5 percent overall rate.(2,3,4) 
Table 16. Reporting Rate for Fatal and All Reportable Crashes 
State Evaluation Year Fatal Crashes Rate Overall Reporting Rate 
Georgia 2006 78.8% 68.1% 
Missouri 2005 94.6% 83.3% 
New Jersey 2003 67.4% 82.5% 
More recent information on the crash reporting from the four test States is available from 
FMCSA’s State Safety Data Quality (SSDQ) evaluation program. States are rated monthly on, 
among other items, the completeness of reporting to the MCMIS Crash file. In terms of crash file 
reporting, States are rated separately on the completeness of reporting fatal and nonfatal crash 
involvements. As of the end of 2010, all four test States were rated “good,” the highest rating, on 
the completeness of their nonfatal and fatal crash involvements. This indicates that both Georgia 
and New Jersey improved their reporting from the years in which they were evaluated by the 
researchers. A “good” rating for fatal involvements is assigned to States reporting 90 percent or 
more of their fatal involvements. The number of fatal involvements reported is compared to the 
count from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s Fatality Analysis Reporting 
System file, which is the standard census file for fatal traffic crashes. The standard for the 
“good” rating for nonfatal crash involvements is within 75 percent of the number predicted by a 
statistical model, using the number of fatal involvements. The prediction method was developed 
by the researchers.(5) The method assumes that fatal crash involvements are the most reliably 
identified crashes and that the ratio of fatal to nonfatal reportable involvements is reasonably 
fixed. 
Considering all States, as of the end of 2010, 44 States were rated “good” on fatal crash 
involvement reporting, four as “fair,” and one as “poor.” Two States were not rated due to 
insufficient data. In terms of the nonfatal crash completeness measure, 34 States were rated 
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“good,” 12 were rated “fair,” and three were rated “poor,” with two States again not rated due to 
insufficient data. 
A third method to gauge reporting to the MCMIS Crash file uses the National Automotive 
Sampling System General Estimates System (GES) file. These data can be used to estimate the 
total number of truck and bus crash involvements that meet the MCMIS reporting criteria 
nationally (i.e., a fatality, injury transported for treatment, or a vehicle is towed due to disabling 
damage). It is not possible to break out GES data by the individual States, but it is possible to 
estimate the total number of reportable involvements using GES and to compare that to the total 
number reported in MCMIS. Table 17 shows the number of involvements reported to MCMIS, 
the number of reportable cases estimated from GES along with the standard error of that 
estimate, and the ratio of MCMIS reported cases to GES estimated reportable cases. The ratio 
shows that the number of cases in MCMIS converged on the GES estimate in 2005, but in 
subsequent years actually exceeded the GES estimate. Twice the standard error gives the 95 
percent confidence interval, so the number of cases reported in each of the years is within the 95 
percent confidence interval for the estimate. However, the confidence interval is relatively wide, 
so this is a weak test of reporting completeness. Moreover, this approach is only able to assess 
the overall completeness of reporting to the MCMIS Crash file, and does not address any bias 
that may accrue due to underreporting from a particular State. 






Reportable Cases From 
GES 
Standard Error of 
GES Estimate 
MCMIS/GES 
2003 136,418 160,000 ±11,800 0.853 
2004 148,673 156,000 ±11,400 0.951 
2005 158,982 156,000 ±11,800 1.018 
2006 160,114 151,000 ±11,800 1.063 
2007 161,662 150,000 ±11,800 1.080 
2008 145,875 132,000 ±10,300* 1.105 
2008 122,807 108,000 ±9,900* 1.137 
* Estimated, using equations for prior years. 
Each of the three methods of gauging the completeness of reporting produces results that differ 
somewhat. The most rigorous evaluation—comparing actual reporting to cases that should have 
been reported from each State—shows a pattern of underreporting, but this result is for reporting 
that is three to six years old. The result of the GES comparison in Table 17 does show a steady 
increase in the number of cases reported, relative to the estimated national total of reportable 
cases. FMCSA’s SSDQ evaluation program does show improvement in recent years for 
individual States. This improvement is consistent with the result from the comparison with the 
total number of reportable cases estimated using GES files. However, it must be noted that none 
of the methods suggests that complete and consistent reporting has been achieved. Though all 
indications are that crash reporting is improving. While the problem of complete crash reporting 
has not been resolved, there is improvement. Incomplete crash reporting affects the accuracy of 
the Crash Indicator BASIC that is derived from reported crashes. It is a strength of the SMS 
methodology that multiple indicators are available to identify motor carriers for interventions. 
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Reporting latency also affects the completeness of the reports available to calculate the Crash 
Indicator BASIC. Latency is defined as the number days between the crash event and the date 
the record is uploaded to the MCMIS Crash file. Records are required to be reported within 90 
days. Table 18 shows the percentage of cases reported by the number of days elapsed between 
the crash date and the date the record was first uploaded to the MCMIS Crash file for the four 
original test States. The table shows that the rates of reporting vary significantly between the 
States. Colorado reported more than 98 percent within the 90-day requirement, but Georgia 
reported only about two-thirds, Missouri 88.9 percent, and New Jersey only about 83.3 percent. 
Within 120 days, Colorado and Missouri had reported almost all the cases they were ultimately 
to report, while Georgia still was missing almost 25 percent and New Jersey 8.8 percent. Even 
after 180 days, Georgia still had almost 20 percent of the records still to report. It is important to 
note that these rates are just of the cases ultimately reported, not of the records that should have 
been reported. 
Table 18. Reporting Latency for Test States, 2008 Crashes 
Latency in Days Colorado Georgia Missouri New Jersey 
30 62.5% 2.8% 43.0% 0.4% 
60 96.2% 30.9% 60.3% 47.0% 
90 98.4% 66.6% 88.9% 83.3% 
120 99.1% 76.5% 96.9% 91.2% 
150 99.4% 77.9% 98.7% 94.8% 
180 99.7% 78.8% 98.9% 96.2% 
For three out of the four States, reporting latency is not a major problem. Even though only one 
substantially met the 90 day reporting period, three of the States reported at least 90 percent of 
all the cases they were to report, and at least 95 percent within 150 days of the crash. Reporting 
latency had a significant effect for the fourth State however, with only 78.8 percent of the 
eventual cases reported within 180 days. If one assumes a 90 percent reporting rate, the observed 
78.8 percent latency means that only about 71 percent (0.788 times 0.9 equals 0.709) of crashes 
that should have been reported would have been available for the Crash Indicator BASIC after 
180 days. 
Reporting “timeliness,” or latency is also rated by the SSDQ program. The current ratings (as of 
December 2010) of the four States is consistent with the analysis above. Three of the States are 
rated “good” and one is rated “poor.” Overall, 35 States are rated “good” on timeliness of 
reporting, meaning that at least 90 percent of reportable cases are reported within the 90 day 
reporting period. Twelve are rated “fair,” (65-90 percent reported within 90 days), and four are 
rated “poor.” 
The final source of data for the BASICs is the MCMIS Inspection file. The file includes the 
results of inspections of vehicles, drivers, and carriers. Inspections may be conducted during 
roadside checks, traffic enforcement stops, and carrier reviews. Data from the inspection file are 
used to determine all the BASICs other than the Crash Indicator.  
Unlike the MCMIS Crash file, there really is no independent source of information to check the 
Inspection file for completeness and accuracy. In the case of the Crash file, the original State 
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files can be used to determine if a State is reporting all records that qualify for reporting. There is 
no alternative source of information on violations. Therefore, it is not possible to determine the 
completeness of the Inspection file. It is assumed to be complete; for practical purposes, it is 
assumed that there is no significant underreporting or over reporting of violations.  
Results of inspections are required to be uploaded to the MCMIS Inspection file within 21 days 
of the inspection. Reporting latency does not appear to be an issue for the four original test 
States. All the States had reported more than 95 percent of inspections within 21 days. After 28 
days, two of the four had reported more than 99 percent and the other two had reported more 
than 97 percent. Reporting was effectively 99 percent for all four States after 42 days. (See Table 
19.) 
Table 19. Reporting Latency for Test States, 2008 Inspections 
Reporting Latency (Days) Colorado Georgia Missouri New Jersey 
7 69.7% 93.7% 86.7% 77.6% 
14 74.8% 97.1% 95.6% 90.3% 
21 96.1% 98.5% 98.3% 95.4% 
28 97.8% 99.1% 99.3% 97.5% 
35 98.3% 99.4% 99.7% 98.5% 
42 98.9% 99.6% 99.9% 99.0% 
To serve as an optimal monitor of the safety performance of carriers, inspections would be 
carried out on a random basis. That way, all carriers operating on the roads would have an equal 
chance of being selected for inspection, and the results would be a true measure of compliance 
with FMCSR. However, inspections are triggered by a variety of events, including traffic 
enforcement stops, post-crash inspections, size and weight inspections, and local enforcement 
inspections. About 30 percent of the inspections are related to one of the triggers mentioned. In 
some States, (e.g., Michigan), probable cause is needed to stop a vehicle for an inspection. 
Roadside inspections are likely largely nonrandom, unless there is a specific program 
implemented at the State level to do random stops. Nonrandom stops tend to bias the data toward 
vehicles that in some way trigger a stop, such as vehicles that are speeding or have defects that 
are readily visible. Violations on vehicles where there is not some readily observed defect or 
traffic violation, (which could serve as probable cause for the stop) would be missed. It is 
unknown whether serious bias is introduced, without a rigorous study including random stops 
and inspections. 
4.2 DESIGN ELEMENTS 
The SMS includes a number of fundamental elements that are used in the calculation and ranking 
of the BASICs scores. These elements include normalization of counts of violations or crashes, 
the use of peer groups to rank the scores, weighting by time and by severity, and rules to 
determine whether the data are sufficient to calculate a BASIC score. In this section, each of the 
elements is discussed, to expose the rationale for the element and to consider the basic 
appropriateness of the element. In addition, the effect of the data sufficiency requirements in 
terms of the number of carriers scored is examined. 
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Normalization of BASICs to reflect exposure—the BASICs are “normalized” to reflect exposure. 
“Normalization” simply means that the metrics are expressed as a count of the relevant event per 
some unit of exposure. The measures of exposure used are the number of relevant inspections or 
the number of power units, depending on the metric. The purpose of this “normalization” is to 
account for the fact that carriers vary in size and operations. A very large carrier might have 
10,000 power units and hundreds of inspections, while a small carrier might operate only one or 
two power units and have only a handful of inspections. Normalization is the standard way to 
account for variation in exposure to risk. 
Two measures are used for normalization, depending on the BASIC. The count of power units is 
used for the Unsafe Driving (BASIC 1), Controlled Substances (BASIC 4), and the Crash 
Indicator. The number of relevant inspections is used for the other BASICs: Fatigued Driving 
(BASIC 2), Driver Fitness (BASIC 3), Vehicle Maintenance (BASIC 5), and Improper 
Loading/Cargo Securement (BASIC 6). 
The count of power units used for exposure includes power units owned, term-leased, or trip-
leased—in other words, the total number of power units operated by the authority of the carrier, 
which is appropriate. In addition, the number of power units used is the average number over the 
previous 18 months. For any given carrier, the number can vary in response to business 
conditions, such that a snapshot at a particular time can be misleading a few months later. 
Averaging power units at three points in the prior 18 months is a reasonable way to account for 
the variation over time. 
The use of inspections to normalize counts of violations is also reasonable, though subject to 
limitations related to reporting latency and nonrandom inspections. Reporting latency seems 
minimal, as shown in Table 19 above. The effect of nonrandom inspections is more related to 
whether enough inspections are carried out for a particular carrier to meet the data sufficiency 
requirements, discussed below. Some carriers might be overlooked and thus be less likely to 
have enough inspections to meet the data sufficiency requirements, while others would have 
more inspections than expected if the inspections were purely random. However, there is no 
reason to believe that would affect the results of the inspections themselves. 
Weighting by violation and by crash severity—violations and crashes are weighted by their 
severity and association with crash risk. The decision to weight violations and crashes is 
eminently reasonable. Clearly fatal crashes are much worse than nonfatal crashes and therefore 
should provoke a more rigorous response. And it is also clear, just based on experience, that not 
all of the hundreds of FMCSR bear the same relationship to crash risk, and that the focus should 
be on those that contribute more to crash risk and to crash severity.  
Whether the weights used in the calculation of the BASICs scores are appropriate is not known, 
however. With respect to crash severity, fatal and injury crashes are assigned a weight of two, 
and towaway crashes a weight of one. If hazardous materials were involved in the crash and 
released, one is added to the severity score. In the document describing the SMS, no rationale or 
justification for the weights are given.(6) One source for the weights could be to use crash costs 
associated with different crash severities. For example, Zaloshnja and Miller have developed 
comprehensive costs for different truck and bus crash types and severities.(7) These would 
provide a substitute based on analysis for the arbitrary weights currently used.  
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Choice of weights for violations appears to rest on a set of analyses of crash occurrence, 
consequences, and effectiveness, all subject to subject matter expert review.(6) These analyses 
have not been reviewed for this evaluation, and so no judgment is made here as to their 
reliability. However, based on our own experience with the data available for such an analysis, 
this is an area that would benefit from continuing review and improvement. The weights 
themselves seem reasonable, but given the sheer number of violations and the difficulty of 
linking individual violations to crash risk, this is clearly an area for continued development as the 
SMS goes forward.  
Time weights for safety events—safety events (crashes or violations) are weighted by time, i.e., 
recent crashes or violations are weighted more than crashes or violations more distant in time. 
The time window for crashes and violations is the previous 24 months. For all metrics, events 
more than 24 months old are excluded from consideration. Within the-24 month window, three 
time blocks are defined. Specific safety events within the previous 6 months are given a weight 
of 3; those occurring between 6 and 12 months prior are assigned a weight of 2; and those 
between 12 and 24 months receive a weight of 1.  
It is reasonable on its face to assign greater weight to recent safety events than older ones, since 
the purpose of the CSA 2010 process is to identify current safety issues and to move carriers 
toward safer behavior in the future. The choice of time periods and the weight values assigned 
are based on expert judgment and fairness. As the SMS is employed, it may be possible to refine 
the time weights based on analysis that estimates whether the association of past violations or 
crashes with future safety problems decreases over time. 
Peer groups—BASIC percentiles are assigned within peer groups, rather than with respect to all 
carriers. That is, for each BASIC, scores are ranked within subsets of carriers, based on either the 
number of power units or the number of inspections, depending on the BASIC. The effect of 
using peer groups is that carriers or drivers are only compared with other carriers or drivers that 
are similar in terms of the method of forming the peer group.  
Table 20 shows the methods used to assign peer groups for each of the metrics. The peer groups 
for BASICs 1, 4, and the Crash Indicator (BASIC 7) are based on the number of power units; the 
peer groups for BASICs 2, 3, 5, and 6 are based on the number of inspections. The relevant 
factor for peer groups for each BASIC is the same as the one used in normalization.  
Note: At the time this analysis was performed, the peer grouping used for the Crash BASIC was 
based on power units. It is the researchers’ understanding, however, that the FMCSA has 
recently changed the method of peer grouping for the Crash BASIC to a scheme based on a 
carrier’s number of crashes. The researchers’ understanding is that the change was made 
because the Agency believes a carrier’s number of crashes is a better proxy for exposure on the 
road than the number of power units. Because of the timing of this change, an assessment of this 




Table 20. Peer Groups Used in BASICs 
Peer Group Power Units  
(BASIC 1, 4, 7) 
Relevant Inspections 
(BASIC 2, 3, 5, 6) 
1 0–5 3–10 (BASIC 2); 5–10 (BASIC 3, 5, 6) 
2 6–15 11–20 
3 16–50 21–100 
4 51–500 101–500 
5 More Than 500 More Than 500 
The rationale for using peer groups when determining percentiles is to “account for differences 
among carriers or drivers.”(6) Motor carriers are diverse in their operational characteristics, 
ranging from only a single power unit to many tens of thousands, and from purely regional or 
dedicated contract operations to nationwide common carriers. Categorizing by the number of 
power units does reasonably group carriers that share at least some operational characteristics. 
Smaller carriers are less likely to have dedicated safety officers and the owners and operators are 
more likely to have to deal with the whole range of activities in running a trucking firm. In 
contrast, large carriers typically have safety directors who are responsible for the safe operation 
of the fleet. The use of peer groups also helps account for differences in exposure. Rates for 
small carriers are inherently more variable than for large carriers with much higher levels of 
exposure. By using peer groups, the SMS compares carriers with others that are similarly 
situated. The specific categories chosen were based on the judgment of the SMS designers. No 
analysis is cited in justification of the categories, though they are reasonable on their face. 
Data sufficiency—data sufficiency rules are designed to ensure that the BASIC scores and 
percentiles are based on enough data to be reliable and to reflect the underlying pattern of 
violations of the carriers.(6) The rules require both a minimum number of inspections (or crashes, 
in the case of the Crash Indicator), and at least one violation. Table 21 shows the data sufficiency 
rules for each BASIC. 
Table 21. Data Sufficiency Requirements for Each BASIC 
BASIC Data Requirement 
BASIC 1, Unsafe Driving 3 or More Relevant Inspections; at Least One Relevant Violation 
BASIC 2, Controlled Substances At Least One Relevant Violation 
BASIC 3, Fatigued Driving 3 or More Relevant Inspections; at Least One Relevant Violation 
BASIC 4, Driver Fitness 5 or More Relevant Inspections; at Least One Relevant Violation 
BASIC 5, Vehicle Maintenance 5 or More Relevant Inspections; at Least One Relevant Violation 
BASIC 6, Improper Loading 5 or More Relevant Inspections; at Least One Relevant Violation 
BASIC 7, Crash Indicator 2 or More Crash Involvements 
Most carriers, in both the test States and nonparticipating States, do not meet the data sufficiency 
requirements to determine a BASIC score and percentile of any of the BASICs. In fact, for each 
of the BASICs, an overwhelming majority of carriers do not receive a BASIC score. Table 22 
shows the percentage of carriers with BASIC percentiles for each of the BASICs. The 
percentages are shown both for test State carriers and for nonparticipating carriers (those in all 
the other States). The proportions with sufficient data are below 10 percent of carriers for all the 
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BASICs and below five percent for a majority of the BASICs. The pattern is the same for both 
the test States and for nonparticipating carriers. Only 11.0 percent of carriers in the test have a 
valid BASIC percentile for at least one BASIC. 
Table 22. Percent of Carriers Meeting Data Sufficiency Requirements by BASIC, Test States and 
Nonparticipating Carriers 
BASIC Percent Carriers With 
Sufficient Data: Test 
States 
Percent Carriers With 
Sufficient Data: 
Nonparticipating States 
BASIC 1 (Unsafe Driving) 4.8% 3.8% 
BASIC 2 (Controlled Substances) 6.4% 5.4% 
BASIC 3 (Fatigued Driving) 2.5% 1.0% 
BASIC 4 (Driver Fitness) 1.9% 0.3% 
BASIC 5 (Vehicle Maintenance) 8.7% 7.8% 
BASIC 6 (Improper Loading/Securement) 3.5% 2.4% 
BASIC 7 (Crash Indicator) 3.4% 1.9% 
At Least One BASIC 11.0% 10.4% 
N 63,824 755,076 
Of course, the data sufficiency requirements explain the low percentage of carriers with BASIC 
percentiles. The data sufficiency rules call for both a minimum number of inspections and as 
well as at least one violation recorded. To receive a BASIC score, a carrier must both have been 
inspected and have been found in violation of at least one FMCSR. That is, only carriers with 
violations are given a BASIC score, and then only if subjected to a minimum number of 
inspections. Carriers that have inspections, regardless of the number, and no violations are not 
included when the BASIC percentiles are determined.  
The two part data sufficiency test (a minimum number of inspections and at least one violation) 
reflects the fact that the data sufficiency rules really incorporate two different ideas. The 
requirement for a minimum number of inspections is designed to take only carriers that have 
been looked at enough that the inspection results can be considered reliable.(6) The second idea is 
to focus only on carriers with violations, and to exclude carriers with no violations from the 
percentile rankings. 
Table 23 shows the results of 15 months of inspections (January 2008–March 2009). The 
proportion of carriers with inspections that resulted in no violations uncovered is modest. In the 
test States, only 8.7 percent of inspected carriers had one or more inspection with no violations. 
The proportion was similar (9.2 percent) for carriers in the non-test States. But most of those 
were either one or two inspections. Of test State carriers with no violations, only 0.7 percent had 
three or four inspections, and only 0.2 percent had five or more inspections. So while there may 




Table 23. Percent Distribution of Carriers by Number of Violations and of Inspections, Test State 
and Nonparticipating Carriers 
Number of Violations Number of Inspections Test States Nonparticipating 
No Violations 1 or 2 7.8% 8.4% 
No Violations 3 or 4 0.7% 0.6% 
No Violations 5 or more 0.2% 0.2% 
One or More Violations 1 or 2 44.1% 46.9% 
One or More Violations 3 or 4 17.3% 15.9% 
One or More Violations 5 or more 30.0% 28.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 
N 19,352 369,702 
The consequence of excluding carriers with only a small number of inspections is more 
substantial. Over 44 percent of test State carriers had a violation but only one or two inspections, 
and thus did not meet the data sufficiency requirements. Another 17.3 percent of inspected 
carriers had only three or four inspections and so would not meet the data sufficiency 
requirements for BASICs 4, 5, and 6. Only 30.0 percent of inspected carriers had five or more 
inspections.  
And note that Table 23 includes only carriers with inspections. About 30.3 percent of test State 
carriers had any inspection over the 15 month period, meaning that about 70 percent of the 
carriers were not touched at all. Thus, about 70 percent of the low rates of data sufficiency are 
related to the fact that most registered carriers in the test States received no inspections. The 
reason for this is unknown, though doubtless some of the carriers operate at such a low level with 
so few vehicles that none of their vehicles or drivers were inspected by chance. 
Table 24 shows that rates of data sufficiency are strongly associated with carrier size. The rates 
for small carriers are quite low, with only 0.2 percent to 3.6 percent of carriers with five or fewer 
power units meeting the data sufficiency rules, depending upon the BASIC. Rates are much 
higher for larger carriers. More than 45 percent of carriers with 16–50 power units meet the data 
sufficiency rules for at least one BASIC. Almost 80 percent of the largest carriers (500 or more 
power units) meet the requirements for at least one BASIC. Thus the data sufficiency rules tend 
to catch the carriers with the most power units and that operate most trucks. 
Table 24. Data Sufficiency Rates, by BASIC and Carrier Size, Test States 
















0–5 PU 1.1% 3.1% 0.2% 0.1% 3.6% 0.4% 0.3% 5.7% 
6–15 PU 9.9% 11.6% 2.2% 0.4% 23.4% 5.5% 4.0% 28.3% 
16–50 PU 27.4% 25.1% 6.1% 1.3% 45.1% 17.2% 17.7% 50.2% 
51–500 PU 47.9% 40.0% 22.9% 4.3% 59.1% 37.2% 46.7% 65.7% 
500+ PU 71.4% 55.1% 63.3% 20.4% 79.6% 67.3% 77.6% 83.7% 
Missing Data 19.1% 19.1% 19.1% 19.1% 19.2% 19.1% 19.1% 19.2% 
Total 4.8% 6.4% 2.5% 1.9% 8.7% 3.5% 3.4% 11.0% 
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The data sufficiency rules are a reasonable effort to address the problem of small sample sizes. 
Only one or two inspections of a carrier’s vehicles or drivers is on its face too few to provide a 
reliable reading on its operations. However, the rules should be understood in the context of the 
number of inspections that are done and the probability that a carrier would be subject to an 
inspection. About 60 percent of carriers received no inspections in the 15 months of data 
reviewed. Probably most of those carriers were operating at such a low level, with so few trucks, 
that they escaped inspection. Of the carriers that were inspected, more than half had only one or 
two inspections, and so failed the data sufficiency rules on that basis. Almost 45 percent of the 
inspected carriers had a violation, but only one or two inspections.  
However, it is noteworthy that the net impact of the rules excludes more small carriers. Only 5.7 
percent of carriers with fewer than six power units meet the data sufficiency rules to be assigned 
a percentile on any BASIC. In contrast, more than 50 percent of carriers with 16–50 power units 
met the sufficiency requirements on at least one BASIC, as did almost 84 percent of carriers in 
the largest category, with more than 500 power units. It should be kept in mind, however, that 
most trucks are operated by large carriers. Carriers with 100 or more power units operate about 
half of all trucks. While small carriers are more numerous, large carriers operate a 
disproportionate share of the trucks on the road. 
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5. THE SMS BASICS AND IDENTIFICATION OF UNSAFE 
CARRIERS 
The goal of this section is to determine to what extent the BASIC percentiles calculated under 
the new SMS identify unsafe carriers. Since the ultimate goal of the FMCSA is to reduce 
fatalities and injuries resulting from CMV crashes, analysis of the relationships between crash 
rates and BASIC percentiles can help determine if the SMS identifies high-risk carriers. 
Therefore, crash rates are calculated for carriers that exceed the BASIC thresholds, and are 
compared to the crash rates of carriers that do not exceed BASIC thresholds. If the SMS is 
successful at identifying high risk carriers, then the crash rates for carriers exceeding BASIC 
thresholds should be significantly higher than those for carriers not exceeding BASIC thresholds. 
Another comparison of interest is whether the SMS does a better job of identifying unsafe 
carriers than the current SafeStat method. Unlike SafeStat, however, which scores motor carriers 
in four SEAs and ranks carriers according to a weighted average of unacceptable SEAs, the SMS 
is designed to identify specific types of unsafe behaviors by measuring carriers and drivers in the 
seven BASICs. One of the goals of the CSA 2010 test is to touch more carriers that exceed 
BASIC thresholds through specific interventions such as warning letters, onsite and offsite 
investigations, and CSPs. Therefore, crash rates and numbers of carriers identified by SafeStat 
and the new SMS are compared. 
The BASIC percentiles that are calculated under the new measurement system use data from the 
MCMIS data files. The FMCSA depends on the individual States to upload data on crashes and 
violations to the MCMIS database in a timely manner. Based on evaluations performed by the 
researchers, it is known that there is variability in reporting qualifying crashes to the MCMIS 
Crash file among the States. Since calculation of the BASIC percentiles depends on these data, 
effects of late reporting to the MCMIS Crash file are investigated. 
In addition to comparing crash rates between groups of carriers exceeding BASIC thresholds and 
carriers not exceeding BASIC thresholds, relationships between crash rates and BASIC 
percentiles are explored. If there are positive associations between crash rates and BASIC 
percentiles, then as BASIC percentiles increase, crash rates should increase. First, for each 
BASIC, scatter plots are created showing the association between crash rates and BASIC 
percentiles. Then a statistical model is developed that predicts crash rates from all six of the 
BASIC percentiles, excluding the Crash Indicator. The model can be used to predict a level of 
safety for carriers based on the BASIC percentiles exceeded. 
To assess the magnitudes of crash rates for carriers identified under the new SMS, crash rates 
were calculated for carriers classified as nonparticipating by the CSA 2010 Operational Model 
Test from February 2008 through July 2009. For the entire 18 months, these carriers were 
classified as nonparticipating, meaning they were not included in the CSA 2010 test and should 
not have received CSA 2010 interventions. On the other hand, they may have received CRs 
under the current SafeStat system used for identifying high-risk carriers. The reason for choosing 
the nonparticipating carriers is that they represent a large percentage of all carriers in the United 
States and are involved in sufficient numbers of crashes to make sample sizes large enough for 
analysis. To minimize any effects of late reporting to the MCMIS Crash file, the file is dated 
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June 2010, so crashes occurred at least 11 months prior to the date of the file, and should have 
been uploaded by the States. 
Carriers in the four original States in the Operational Model Test plus two States added as test-
only States during the time period that rates are calculated (Minnesota and Montana), are 
excluded from analysis. In addition, the analysis is restricted to the approximate 500,000 carriers 
with recent activity. For data quality purposes, certain carriers with outlying data that can have a 
large impact on group crash rates are excluded. Typically, these carriers have a large number of 
power units, but no reported crashes due to their type of operation (e.g., MCMIS data shows that 
a carrier that leases trucks has approximately 30,000 power units, but no crashes. Such a large 
number of power units with no reported crashes has a large influence on crash rates). 
5.1 DOES THE SMS IDENTIFY UNSAFE CARRIERS? 
Table 24 shows 18-month crash rates for 473,847 carriers with recent activity according to their 
BASIC percentile scores determined during February 2008. For each BASIC, carriers are 
classified as to whether they exceeded that particular BASIC threshold. Note that a carrier may 
exceed more than one BASIC threshold and may be counted several times among the various 
carrier groups. For comparison, crash rates are also calculated for carriers that exceeded any 
BASIC threshold, and those that exceeded no BASIC thresholds. Since those two categories are 
mutually exclusive, numbers will sum to totals. The last column of the table gives the ratio of the 
crash rate to the crash rate for carriers that exceeded no BASIC thresholds. 
The crash rates for carriers exceeding BASIC thresholds are significantly higher than for carriers 
exceeding no BASIC thresholds. The crash rate for carriers exceeding the Unsafe Driving 
threshold is 7.44, which is greater than the crash rate for carriers exceeding the Crash Indicator 
BASIC, and is 3.56 times greater than the rate for carriers exceeding no BASIC thresholds. 
Crash rates for carriers exceeding the Fatigued Driving, Controlled Substance and Alcohol, and 
Vehicle Maintenance BASICs are also high relative to the 2.09 crash rate for carriers exceeding 
no BASIC thresholds. Also note that the numbers of carriers exceeding the Vehicle Maintenance, 
Fatigued Driving, Improper Loading/Cargo Securement, and Unsafe Driving thresholds are 
relatively large. Exceeding the Controlled Substance and Alcohol BASIC is relatively rare. The 
total number of carriers exceeding any BASIC threshold is 44,881 (9.5 percent) of all carriers 
with recent activity. Note that this is close to the estimated 9.9 percent expected touches by CSA 
based on data from the original four test States given in Table 14. Using the crash rate as a 
measure of risk, it appears that the SMS tends to identify unsafe carriers.
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Table 25. SMS Crash Rates Calculated During the 18-Month Followup Period (February 2008–July 
2009), Based on SMS Classification February 2008 for Nonparticipating Carriers 






Unsafe Driving 9,245 33,532 450,874 7.44 3.56 
Fatigued Driving 17,959 15,525 248,862 6.24 2.99 
Driver Fitness 3,981 11,539 379,009 3.04 1.46 
Controlled Substance and Alcohol 1,013 6,860 104,799 6.55 3.14 
Vehicle Maintenance 18,280 13,643 278,198 4.90 2.34 
Improper Loading/Cargo Securement 9,409 16,747 421,670 3.97 1.90 
Crash Indicator 5,077 33,946 463,766 7.32 3.51 
Exceeded Any BASIC 44,881 63,452 1,284,475 4.94 2.37 
Exceeded No BASICs 428,966 45,029 2,157,939 2.09 1.00 
All Carriers 473,847 108,481 3,442,414 3.15 1.51 
5.2 COMPARISON BETWEEN THE SMS AND SAFESTAT CRASH RATES 
For comparative purposes, crash rates were calculated for the same 473,847 carriers based on 
SafeStat classification. Table 25 shows 18-month crash rates from February 2008 to July 2009 
for carriers according to their SafeStat status determined during February 2008. SafeStat uses 30 
months of data to compute various measures and indicators from the source data that are 
combined into the four SEAs. Based on the February 2008 ranking, carriers are grouped into 
three safety risk categories: SafeStat A/B, SafeStat C, and SafeStat A/B/C. For comparison, 
crash rates are also calculated for SafeStat Not Identified carriers which are those not classified 
as A, B, or C. The last column in Table 25 gives the ratio of the crash rate to the Not Identified 
group.  
Of the 473,847 carriers that remained nonparticipating during the 18-month followup period, 
5,402 are in the A/B category, 3,389 are in the C category, 8,791 are in the A/B/C category, and 
465,056 are Not Identified. Based on the results in Table 25, the crash rate for the A/B carrier 
group is 2.30 times greater during the followup period than the carriers not identified. The crash 
rate for the C carrier group is 1.64 times greater than the carriers not identified. 
Table 26. SafeStat Crash Rates Calculated During the 18-Month Followup Period  
(February 2008–July 2009), Based on SafeStat Classification February 2008 
Carrier Group Carriers Crashes Power Units Crash Rate 
Per 100 PU 
Ratio to Not 
Identified 
SafeStat A/B 5,402 6,605 95,159 6.94 2.30 
SafeStat C 3,389 2,764 55,900 4.94 1.64 
SafeStat A/B/C 8,791 9,369 151,059 6.20 2.06 
SafeStat Not Identified 465,056 99,112 3,291,355 3.01 1.00 
All Carriers 473,847 108,481 3,442,414 3.15 1.05 
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The SMS identifies many more carriers for intervention than does SafeStat. The number of 
SafeStat A/B/C identified carriers is 8,791, while the number of carriers exceeding any SMS 
BASIC threshold is 44,881. In addition, several of the BASIC crash rates are comparable to the 
SafeStat A/B crash rate. In particular, the crash rates for carriers exceeding the Unsafe Driving 
and the Controlled Substance and Alcohol BASIC thresholds are 7.44 and 6.55, respectively. 
The crash rate for carriers exceeding the Fatigued Driving crash rate is 6.24. The crash rate for 
the 428,966 carriers that exceeded no BASIC thresholds is 2.09 which is less than the 3.01 crash 
rate for carriers not identified by SafeStat. Therefore, the ratios to not identified measures in the 
last column of Table 24 tend to be larger than those shown in Table 25. 
5.3 THE EFFECT OF CRs ON GROUP CRASH RATES 
Carriers with recent activity classified as nonparticipating were chosen to evaluate the SMS 
because they represent almost the entire population of carriers in the United States, and they did 
not participate in the CSA 2010 Operational Model Test. Therefore, they provide an adequate 
sample of carriers for analysis, and they did not receive interventions under CSA 2010. 
However, they may have received CRs under the current method used to identify high-risk 
carriers.  
To remove the possible effects on crash rates of CRs during the 18-month followup period, crash 
rates were calculated for carriers that did not receive CRs during the followup period. Table 27 
shows SMS crash rates for the carriers that did not receive CRs during the followup period. 
Although not by a great amount, the crash rates in Table 27 are less than the crash rates in Table 
24 for each BASIC category. However, the last column of the table shows that crash rates for 
carriers exceeding BASIC thresholds are several times higher than for carriers exceeding no 
BASIC thresholds. It appears that the SMS still tends to identify high-risk carriers even after 
removing the effects of CRs. The result may not be surprising because the number of CRs over 
the period is 473,847 minus 457,740 equals 16,107 which is a small percentage of total carriers. 
Table 27. SMS Crash Rates Calculated for Carriers Without CRs During the 18-Month Followup 
Period (February 2008–July 2009), Based on SMS Classification February 2008 
BASIC Threshold Exceeded Carriers Crashes Power 
Units 
Crash Rate 
Per 100 PU 
Ratio to Not 
Identified 
Unsafe Driving 6,968 24,008 345,268 6.95 3.50 
Fatigued Driving 14,009 8,637 169,206 5.10 2.57 
Driver Fitness 2,838 8,117 325,546 2.49 1.26 
Controlled Substance and Alcohol 724 4,598 77,336 5.95 3.00 
Vehicle Maintenance 14,550 8,838 216,767 4.08 2.05 
Improper Loading/Cargo Securement 7,650 12,495 358,707 3.48 1.76 
Crash Indicator 3,363 24,991 360,322 6.94 3.49 
Exceeded Any BASIC 36,786 47,974 1,076,153 4.46 2.25 
Exceeded No BASICs 420,954 41,001 2,065,964 1.98 1.00 
All Carriers 457,740 88,975 3,142,117 2.83 1.43 
 
33 
In a similar fashion, crash rates were calculated for SafeStat group carriers that did not receive 
CRs during the followup period. Again, the crash rates are lower in every category when 
compared to the rates for carriers including those with CRs. However, the ratio to not identified 
column is very similar to the one that includes carriers with CRs. It appears that removing 
carriers without CRs does not substantially change the results presented. 
Table 28. SafeStat Crash Rates Calculated for Carriers Without CRs During the 18-Month Followup 
Period (February 2008–July 2009), Based on SafeStat Classification February 2008 
Carrier Group Carriers Crashes Power Units Crash Rate 




SafeStat A/B 2,499 2,400 38,741 6.19 2.23 
SafeStat C 2,250 1,452 34,926 4.16 1.50 
SafeStat A/B/C 4,749 3,852 73,667 5.23 1.88 
SafeStat Not Identified 452,991 85,123 3,068,450 2.77 1.00 
All Carriers 457,740 88,975 3,142,117 2.83 1.02 
5.4 RATE RATIOS COMPARING CARRIERS EXCEEDING THRESHOLDS TO 
CARRIERS NOT EXCEEDING THRESHOLDS 
A slightly different way of assessing SMS effectiveness is to compare the crash rate for carriers 
exceeding SMS thresholds to carriers not exceeding thresholds for each BASIC. Table 29 shows 
crash rates for carriers exceeding and not exceeding a particular threshold, and in the rightmost 
column the ratio of the two rates. The rate ratios for the Unsafe Driving BASIC and the Crash 
Indicator BASIC are similar and suggest that crash rates are about 3 times larger for carriers 
exceeding these two thresholds. The rate ratios for the Fatigued Driving and the 
Substance/Alcohol BASICs are also similar indicating that crash rates are about twice as large 
for carriers that exceed these thresholds. The Vehicle Maintenance and Loading/Cargo BASICs 
have rate ratios less than two. The rate ratio for the Driver Fitness BASIC is close to one, 
suggesting no difference in crash rates for carriers exceeding this BASIC compared to carriers 
not exceeding this BASIC. For carriers exceeding any threshold (at least one) the crash rate is 
about 2.37 times higher than for carriers exceeding no thresholds. 
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Table 29. Crash Rates and Rate Ratios for Carriers Exceeding Thresholds and Carriers not Exceeding Thresholds Calculated During the 
































Per 100 PU 
Rate 
Ratio 
Unsafe Driving 9,245 33,532 450,874 7.44 464,602 74,949 2,991,540 2.51 2.97 
Fatigued Driving 17,959 15,525 248,862 6.24 455,888 92,956 3,193,552 2.91 2.14 
Driver Fitness 3,981 11,539 379,009 3.04 469,866 96,942 3,063,405 3.16 0.96 
Substance/Alcohol 1,013 6,860 104,799 6.55 472,834 101,621 3,337,615 3.04 2.15 
Vehicle Maintenance 18,280 13,643 278,198 4.90 455,567 94,838 3,164,215 3.00 1.64 
Loading/Cargo 9,409 16,747 421,670 3.97 464,438 91,734 3,020,744 3.04 1.31 
Crash Indicator 5,077 33,946 463,766 7.32 468,770 74,535 2,978,648 2.50 2.93 




5.5 UNDERREPORTING AND LATE DATA REPORTED TO THE MCMIS CRASH 
FILE 
The FMCSA depends on the States to upload data on crashes and roadside inspections to the   
MCMIS database. Calculation of the SMS BASICs depends on this information. All reportable 
crash involvements for a calendar year are required to be transmitted to the MCMIS Crash file 
within 90 days of the date of the crash. The requirement for inspection data is within 21 days. 
The focus here is on late reporting to the crash file since it generally takes longer to receive the 
crash data. In addition, calculation of the Crash Indicator BASIC depends on data reported to the 
MCMIS Crash file. 
In 2003, researchers began evaluating data reported by the States to the MCMIS Crash 
file.(8,9,10,11) Although reporting rates tend to vary from State to State, the studies have shown 
some consistent trends in underreporting. For example, fatal involvements are much more likely 
to be reported than those involving injury or those in which vehicles are towed due to disabling 
damage. Crashes involving tractor combinations are more likely to be reported than those 
involving straight trucks. Reporting to the crash file can also depend on county size or the law 
enforcement agency responsible for reporting the crash. 
Figure 3 shows total crashes reported to the MCMIS Crash file over two consecutive 12-month 
periods for carriers with USDOT numbers. The MCMIS file is dated June 2010. The dashed line 
represents crashes that occurred from July 2009 through June 2010. The solid line represents 
crashes that occurred one year earlier from July 2008 through June 2009. The solid line shows 
about 8,000 crashes per month, with a spike to more than 10,000 in December 2008, and then a 
decline to about 7,000 through June 2009. The important note is that the solid line is fairly 
consistent over time, except for a slight decline that may be due to reduced crashes, indicating 
that most of the crashes in the earlier period have been uploaded to the MCMIS Crash file by 
June 2009. However, the dashed line shows a steep decline in reported crashes over the 3 months 
prior to June 2010. There is a 90-day grace period for individual States to upload crashes to the 
file, but calculation of the CSA 2010 Crash Indicator BASIC percentiles depend on a 24-month 
window of crashes, which includes the 3 most recent months of data recorded in the file. As long 
as systematic differences among entities being compared remain constant over time, the time lag 
may not pose any major difficulties. Although reporting by the States is improving over time, a 




Figure 3. Crashes Reported to the MCMIS Crash File by Month as of June 2010 
Table 30 shows crashes reported to the MCMIS Crash file by State in March 2010, as a 
percentage of the average number of crashes over the 3-month period from April 2009 through 
June 2009. The MCMIS Crash file being used here is dated June 2010, so March 2010 is outside 
the 90-day grace period in which States should have uploaded crashes to the file. The 3-month 
average of crashes between April and June 2009 represents the typical number of crashes that a 
State reports in a month, and data reported over that time period should be fairly complete, 
except for any underreporting, since June 2009 is 1 year prior to the date of the file. It should be 
pointed out that Table 30 is only a snapshot of a point in time, and results can vary by month. 
Carriers in States that do not report crashes in a timely manner are less likely to be identified by 
the Crash Indicator BASIC. For example, based on historical data, Maryland typically reports 
about 114 crashes per month to the crash file. However, by June 2010, Maryland reported only 
one crash that occurred in March of the same year. Using the same criteria, other States such as 
Arkansas and Georgia have reporting percentages less than 50 percent.  
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Table 30. MCMIS-Reported Crashes in March 2010 by State as a Percentage of 3-Month Average 
Reported Crashes (April 2009–June 2009), From the June 2010 MCMIS Crash File  






AK 8 3 7 6.0 5 83.3% 
AL 141 152 126 139.7 179 128.2% 
AR 101 117 89 102.3 43 42.0% 
AZ 145 130 150 141.7 141 99.5% 
CA 375 348 361 361.3 395 109.3% 
CO 104 89 105 99.3 120 120.8% 
CT 38 52 62 50.7 47 92.8% 
DE 33 24 24 27.0 15 55.6% 
FL 294 168 245 235.7 329 139.6% 
GA 290 325 302 305.7 151 49.4% 
HI 4 2 4 3.3 4 120.0% 
IA 111 109 95 105.0 114 108.6% 
ID 33 27 36 32.0 45 140.6% 
IL 338 352 407 365.7 331 90.5% 
IN 246 235 266 249.0 240 96.4% 
KS 97 83 119 99.7 83 83.3% 
KY 191 183 177 183.7 182 99.1% 
LA 183 165 170 172.7 221 128.0% 
MA 109 136 114 119.7 94 78.6% 
MD 94 129 120 114.3 1 0.9% 
ME 21 28 42 30.3 27 89.0% 
MI 216 211 212 213.0 182 85.4% 
MN 122 114 136 124.0 90 72.6% 
MO 211 251 239 233.7 256 109.6% 
MS 96 79 64 79.7 65 81.6% 
MT 26 29 23 26.0 21 80.8% 
NC 243 220 250 237.7 222 93.4% 
ND 6 20 16 14.0 21 150.0% 
NE 71 64 80 71.7 57 79.5% 
NH 20 22 23 21.7 23 106.2% 
NJ 301 279 341 307.0 346 112.7% 
NM 32 32 32 32.0 40 125.0% 
NV 46 30 38 38.0 26 68.4% 
NY 174 236 196 202.0 174 86.1% 
OH 211 231 286 242.7 299 123.2% 
OK 131 136 149 138.7 164 118.3% 
OR 63 58 65 62.0 59 95.2% 
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PA 360 367 375 367.3 370 100.7% 
RI 22 11 15 16.0 14 87.5% 
SC 109 130 155 131.3 163 124.1% 
SD 18 19 15 17.3 27 155.8% 
TN 215 224 216 218.3 171 78.3% 
TX 621 593 655 623.0 427 68.5% 
UT 88 74 94 85.3 71 83.2% 
VA 224 220 252 232.0 210 90.5% 
VT 9 10 10 9.7 5 51.7% 
WA 68 81 75 74.7 74 99.1% 
WI 109 126 132 122.3 112 91.6% 
WV 58 53 58 56.3 53 94.1% 
WY 63 15 28 35.3 86 243.4% 
To determine what impact late data has on the calculation of crash rates used to assess the SMS 
and SafeStat, the analyses shown previously were repeated using data from the latest months of 
the MCMIS Crash file. That is, the data are taken from the period January 2009 through June 
2010 and include the last three months shown by the dashed line in Figure 3. Therefore, crash 
rates are calculated over an 18-month followup period beginning in January 2009, at which time 
BASIC percentiles and SafeStat status are recorded, and ending with June 2010, the date of the 
file.  
The same types of carriers are identified for analysis—carriers with recent activity that were 
nonparticipating for the 18-month followup period, from 44 States and the District of Columbia. 
This provides the sample sizes necessary to calculate stable rates. However, some of these 
carriers are not the same carriers used in the previous analysis because the data are from a 
different time period. The total number of identified nonparticipating carriers using these data is 
447,371, compared to 473,847 in the previous analysis. 
Table 31 shows SMS crash rates calculated during the 18-month followup period using data 
based on BASIC percentiles recorded January 2009. Since fewer crashes have been uploaded to 
the MCMIS Crash file using the latest data, crash rates are smaller for each category when 
compared to Table 24. However, the ratios to not identified measures, which represent relative 
risks and not absolute risks, are of similar magnitude to those shown in Table 24. Therefore, in 
this aggregate analysis of current data, it appears that the SMS tends to identify high risk carriers. 
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Table 31. SMS Crash Rates Calculated During the 18-Month Followup Period (January 2009–June 
2010), Based on SMS Classification January 2009 
Carrier Group Carriers Crashes Power 
Units 
Crash Rate 
Per 100 PU 
Ratio to Not 
Identified 
Unsafe Driving 8,914 27,823 446,296 6.23 3.74 
Fatigued Driving 17,741 13,303 243,500 5.46 3.27 
Driver Fitness 3,793 10,154 404,292 2.51 1.50 
Controlled Substance and Alcohol 878 4,938 94,486 5.23 3.13 
Vehicle Maintenance 18,613 13,644 310,377 4.40 2.63 
Improper Loading/Cargo Securement 9,388 13,359 437,012 3.06 1.83 
Crash Indicator 4,775 28,556 467,532 6.11 3.66 
Exceeded Any BASIC 44,680 53,122 1,305,240 4.07 2.44 
Exceeded No BASICs 402,691 34,537 2,069,186 1.67 1.00 
All Carriers 447,371 87,659 3,374,426 2.60 1.56 
For the same 447,371 active and nonparticipating carriers identified above, Table 32 shows the 
repeated analysis for SafeStat identified carriers. As for the SMS results, crash rates are smaller 
than those in Table 25 for each category due to the smaller number of reported crashes. 
However, there are not substantial differences in the last columns of Table 25 and Table 31. 
Table 32. SafeStat Crash Rates Calculated During the 18-Month Followup Period  
(January 2009–June 2010), Based on SafeStat Classification January 2009 
Carrier Group Carriers Crashes Power Units Crash Rate 
Per 100 PU 
Ratio to Not 
Identified 
SafeStat A/B 5,483 5,064 86,065 5.88 2.37 
SafeStat C 3,648 2,306 59,114 3.90 1.57 
SafeStat A/B/C 9,131 7,370 145,179 5.08 2.04 
SafeStat Not Identified 438,240 80,289 3,229,247 2.49 1.00 
All Carriers 447,371 87,659 3,374,426 2.60 1.04 
These aggregate analyses tend to demonstrate that the BASIC measures can be used to identify 
high risk carriers. At the individual carrier level, however, some high risk carriers may not be 
identified. For example, carriers in States that are late in reporting crashes to the MCMIS Crash 
file might not be identified by the Crash Indicator BASIC. This would tend to penalize carriers in 
States that do a good job of reporting. 
5.6 SMS AND SAFESTAT CLASSIFICATION 
The following analysis is an attempt to compare carriers in the Operational Model Test based on 
whether they were flagged as SafeStat A/B carriers or whether they exceeded any BASIC 
thresholds. Table 33 shows a 2x2 cross tabulation of 81,067 carriers that were test or control 
group carriers in the original four States at any time during the 29 months of the Operational 
Model Test. The carriers are categorized as to whether they exceeded at least one BASIC 
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threshold or whether they were classified as a SafeStat A/B carrier at least once during the time 
that they were test or control carriers.  
All of the 81,067 carriers in Table 33 may not have participated in the Operational Model Test 
for the entire 29 months. Some may have been removed or excluded from the test at some time, 
but they are only evaluated over the period in which they were test or control carriers. The table 
shows that 121 carriers were classified as SafeStat A/B carriers at least once over the time 
period, but exceeded no BASIC thresholds over the same time frame. On the other hand, 9,521 
carriers were identified by the new SMS as exceeding at least one BASIC threshold over the time 
frame, but were not classified as SafeStat A/B over the same time period. Therefore, the new 
SMS identifies many carriers for intervention that are not identified as SafeStat A/B carriers.  
Table 33. Test and Control Carriers Categorized by SafeStat and BASIC Classifications Over the 
29 Months of the Operational Model Test (Original Four States: CO, GA, MO, NJ) 
Exceeded Any BASIC SafeState A/B At Least Once SafeState A/B None Total 
At Least Once 1,776 9,521 11,297 
None 121 69,649 69,770 
Total 1,897 79,170 81,067 
5.7 ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN BASIC PERCENTILES AND CRASH RATES 
In terms of safety, crash rates are generally considered one of the best measures for identifying 
high risk carriers. Figure 4 shows scatter plots of crash rates by percentiles for six BASICs. 
These crash rates are calculated from the same 473,847 nonparticipating carriers with recent 
activity in 44 States and the District of Columbia used in Table 24. That is, they are 18-month 
crash rates calculated from February 2008 through July 2009 using the MCMIS Crash file dated 
June, 2010. Some of the crash rates are presented on the natural log scale, and similarly, some of 
the BASIC percentiles are presented on the log scale. The method that produced the strongest 
association was used. 
Each plot is based on 90 data points representing percentiles 11–100. The first 10 percentiles 
were omitted from the graphs since BASIC percentiles are often not recorded at those small 
levels, resulting in unstable rates. As an example, for the Unsafe Driving BASIC, the crash rate 
at the 80th percentile is calculated by aggregating crashes and power units for all carriers that 
have a BASIC percentile in the interval (79, 80). Using this method of aggregation, each data 
point represents a group crash rate calculated from generally several hundred carriers. 
All of the BASIC measures have positive associations with crash rates, except for two. The 
Unsafe Driving BASIC has a strong and consistent linear association with crash rates. Of all the 
BASICs, it is the strongest. Although there is a little more scatter about the regression line, the 
Fatigued Driving BASIC is also strongly correlated with crash rates. The Vehicle Maintenance 
BASIC also shows a positive association with crash rates. Note from Table 24 that Vehicle 
Maintenance and Fatigued Driving BASIC thresholds are the most likely to be exceeded. 
Although somewhat weaker than the others, the Controlled Substance and Alcohol BASIC has a 
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positive association with crash rates, but relatively few carriers exceed this BASIC threshold. 
The greater scatter about the regression line for this BASIC is likely due to smaller sample size. 
 
Figure 4. Scatter Plots of Crash Rates by BASIC Percentiles (February 2008–July 2009, MCMIS File 
Dated June 2010) 
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The Driver Fitness BASIC shows a negative correlation with crash rates. It may be that this 
BASIC measures attributes other than those related to crash rates. Table 24 shows that carriers 
exceeding this BASIC threshold have a crash rate of 3.04 per 100 power units, which is the 
lowest rate among carriers exceeding any of the other BASIC thresholds. Nevertheless, the ratio 
to not identified carriers is about 1.5, suggesting that carriers that exceed the Driver Fitness 
BASIC threshold have a higher crash rate than carriers that do not exceed any BASIC thresholds. 
These two findings are not in contradiction. One measure compares carriers exceeding a BASIC 
threshold to carriers that do not exceed any BASIC thresholds. The other is a scatter plot of crash 
rates ranked by percentile scores. Table 29, however, suggests that there is no difference in crash 
rates between carriers that exceed the Driver Fitness BASIC and those that do not.  
Finally, Figure 5 shows a scatter plot of crash rates by the Crash Indicator BASIC percentiles. As 
expected, this indicator has the strongest association with crash rates among all measures since it 
is calculated from crash history. The association is very strong, but note the greater scatter about 
the regression line at the lower percentiles, say, less than 40. This is due to fewer carriers having 
crash rates calculated at these percentile values. In other words, these data points are based on 
fewer carriers, resulting in greater variability.  
 
Figure 5. Scatter Plot and Fitted Line of Log Crash Rate by Crash Indicator BASIC Percentile 
Figure 6 is a matrix scatter plot of crash rates for each BASIC for those crash rates presented on 
the log scale. Each plot is based on the 90 data points corresponding to percentiles 11–100. Both 
the horizontal and vertical axes are log rates. In a matrix scatter plot, the plots in the upper 
diagonal are the same as those in the lower diagonal with the horizontal and vertical axes 
reversed. The plots show a strong correlation between the Unsafe Driving BASIC and the Crash 
Indicator BASIC. The Fatigued Driving BASIC also has log rates that are correlated with Unsafe 
Driving and Crash Indicator rates. The Vehicle Maintenance rates are associated with the Crash 
Indicator rates, and others. The Driver Fitness rates display a negative correlation with rates from 




Figure 6. Matrix Scatter Plot of Log Crash Rates for Five BASICs 
5.8 A STATISTICAL MODEL FOR PREDICTING CRASH RATES FROM BASIC 
PERCENTILES 
While examining scatter plots of crash rates by BASIC percentiles one at a time is a useful 
exercise, a statistical model can be developed that uses the input from six BASIC measures 
simultaneously to measure the association with crash rates. An empirical Bayes model that 
predicts crash rates was developed to provide a measure of safety of a carrier’s on-road crash 
performance. This model will be used, for example, in section 8 when evaluating the 
effectiveness of certain interventions by matching a control group’s distribution of crash rates to 
a test group’s distribution of crash rates, with the hope that the only difference between the test 
group and the control group before comparison and during the followup period is that the test 
group received CSA 2010 intervention(s) and the control group did not. The model, as presented 
here, will be described in general terms. For a detailed description of the model and assumptions, 
the interested reader is referred to Appendix E. 
A statistical model using the BASICs to predict crash rates has two purposes. The first is to 
measure the association of each BASIC with the crash rate, while holding all the other BASICs 
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constant. This provides the best estimate of the association of each BASIC with the fundamental 
metric of safety, which is the crash rate. The second reason, or rather use, of the model is to be 
able to provide a stable metric of safety for each carrier, even when a crash rate for a carrier 
might not be available. In comparison with inspections and the other data the BASICs are based 
on, crashes are rare events. In fact, the very design of the CSA 2010 is an effort to get a more 
accurate measurement of carrier safety by incorporating all available data. Since crashes are 
relatively rare events, more frequent events such as the inspections and violations that go into the 
BASICs are used to predict crash rates. Because they are based on more common and frequently 
measured events related to safety, a statistical model using the BASICs can be a more stable 
predictor of carrier safety than the crash rate itself. 
The model predicts crash rates using six BASIC percentile measures and the carrier’s operation 
type (passenger, hazardous material, general). The Crash Indicator BASIC is not included as a 
predictor variable in the model since the crash rate is being modeled as the response variable. As 
throughout this section, and to be consistent with analyses already presented, input data were 
taken from the 473,847 nonparticipating carriers. Crash rates were calculated over the 18-month 
period beginning with the start of the Operational Model Test in February 2008 and ending in 
July 2009. The MCMIS Crash data that are used as input to the SMS are dated June 25, 2010. 
Therefore, the crash data used in the empirical Bayes model should be representative of data that 
eventually are uploaded to the MCMIS file since June 2010 is 11 months after the date of any 
crashes used in the statistical model. 
One major difference between this analysis and previous analyses of crash rates is that this 
analysis is performed at the carrier level. Previous analyses used aggregated data to calculate 
crash rates for groups of carriers. For this analysis, each record corresponds to one carrier, and 
the model predicts a crash rate based on the BASIC percentiles for a particular carrier.  
The 473,847 carriers provide a large sample to validate the empirical Bayes model. Because the 
sample is so large, a procedure was used to select a stratified random sample of 9,500 carriers 
using the number of power units and the carrier’s operation type as strata. Table 34 shows the 
437,847 carriers categorized by power units and operation type. The lower portion of the table 
shows the sample of 9,500 categorized by the 15 strata. Where sample sizes are relatively small, 
all carriers were selected. For example, all 574 carriers with more than 500 power units were 
included. In addition, all passenger carriers with more than 50 power units were included. The 
resulting sample includes 1,500 passenger carriers, 3,000 hazardous material carriers, and 5,000 
general carriers. The idea is to select a representative sample of carriers and to design a model 
that can predict a crash rate for a carrier regardless of the number of power units and the 
operation type. 
If a carrier does not meet the data sufficiency requirements of a particular BASIC, a percentile 
score is not calculated. Few carriers have percentile scores recorded for all BASICs, let alone for 
even a few. For this reason, a categorical variable was created for inclusion in the model. For 
each of the six BASICs, the variables were categorized into three levels: 
• 1 = percentile not recorded. 
• 2 = percentile recorded, but below BASIC threshold. 
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• 3 = percentile recorded and above BASIC threshold. 
In this way, carriers that have percentiles recorded for any of the BASICs, or none at all, can be 
included in the model. When predictor variables are categorical, one level, usually the first, is 
designated as the baseline category, and the other levels are fit as predictor variables. In this 
model, the first level, where the percentile is not recorded, will serve as the baseline or referent 
category. Since the three levels have a natural ordering, the usual convention is to set the first 
level as the baseline case. The other two levels of the variable, levels 2 and 3, will be fit in the 
model as predictor variables.  
Table 34. Population and Sample Size of Carriers Used in the Empirical Bayes Model 
Power Units Passenger Hazmat General Total 
1–-5 2,275 18,463 376,510 397,248 
6–15 736 7,338 43,393 51,467 
16–50 413 4,135 13,698 18,246 
51–500 206 2,329 3,777 6,312 
>500 12 295 267 574 
Total 3,642 32,560 437,645 473,847 
Table 35. Sample Size of Carriers Used in the Empirical Bayes Model 
Power Units Passenger Hazmat General Total 
1–5 500 900 1,500 2,900 
6–15 400 700 1,233 2,333 
16–50 382 605 1,000 1,987 
51–500 206 500 1,000 1,706 
>500 12 295 267 574 
Total 1,500 3,000 5,000 9,500 
Figure 7 shows the empirical Bayes estimator of the crash rate for carrier i. 
 
Figure 7. Equation for the Empirical Bayes Estimator of the Crash Rate for Carrier i 
For a particular carrier, y/t is the observed crash rate and mu is the rate predicted by a negative 
binomial regression model. Therefore, the Bayes estimator is a weighted average of the observed 
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rate and the rate predicted by negative binomial regression. When a carrier has a lot of power 
units, the observed rate tends to be a good estimator and the Bayes estimator smoothes towards 
the observed rate. When a carrier has few power units, the observed rate is not a good estimator 
and the Bayes estimator smoothes towards the negative binomial rate, which borrows 
information from all carriers through a regression model on BASIC percentiles. The scale 
parameter alpha also helps to determine how much weight the observed rate receives, and how 
much weight the negative binomial rate receives. As alpha tends to zero, more weight is given to 
the negative binomial rate. 
In addition to the six BASIC measures, the carrier’s operation type is also included in the 
regression model. It is a categorical variable with three levels: 
• 1 = passenger carrier. 
• 2 = hazardous material carrier. 
• 3 = general carrier. 
The first level, passenger carrier, will serve as the baseline category and the other two levels, 
hazardous material and general, will be fit as variables in the negative binomial regression.  
The regression model is fit as a log-linear model. If beta represents regression parameters and chi 
represents predictor variables, the negative binomial rates mu are calculated by exponentiation of 
the regression function as shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Equation for Calculating the Negative Binomial Rates Mu 
Table 36. Fit of a Log-linear Negative Binomial Regression Model to Crash Data shows the fit of 
a negative binomial regression on six BASIC measures and operation type. Note that the baseline 
level is set to zero and is not fit. Since this is a log-linear model, the parameters have 
interpretations as log relative risks, relative to the baseline category. Relative risks can be 
estimated by exponentiation of parameter estimates. Positive coefficients are associated with 
increased risk, while negative coefficients are associated with reduced risk. For example, the 
crash rate for a carrier that exceeds the Unsafe Driving threshold is approximately exp(1.0284) = 
2.8 times the rate of a carrier that has no percentile measured for this BASIC.  
The magnitudes of the chi-square statistic can be used to assess significance in the model. In 
addition, p-values less than 0.05 are significant at the usual 0.05 level. After Unsafe Driving, 
Vehicle Maintenance has the largest chi-square statistic. The crash rate for a carrier exceeding 
the Vehicle Maintenance threshold is approximately exp(0.5816) = 1.8 times the rate of a carrier 
that has no percentile measured for this BASIC. Other estimates can be judged similarly. It 
appears that Unsafe Driving, Vehicle Maintenance, and Fatigued Driving are the three most 
important predictors in the model. 
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The signs of the parameters in the model tend to be consistent with the scatter plots shown in 
Figure 6. Note the negative coefficients attached to Driver Fitness, which support the scatter plot 
showing a negative correlation with crash rates. In addition, the Substance/Alcohol variable is 
not significant in this model since the p-values are greater than 0.05. At the third level, the 
Loading/Cargo variable is technically not significant, with a p-value of 0.0764. The negative 
coefficients attached to operation type suggest that passenger carriers have a higher crash rate 
than either hazardous material or general carriers. Hazardous material carriers have the lowest 
crash rate among operation types. 
Table 36. Fit of a Log-Linear Negative Binomial Regression Model to Crash Data 
Parameter Level Estimate Std Err Chi-square p-value 
Intercept – -4.0006 0.0564 5,026.4 <.0001 
Operation Type 2 -0.4628 0.0661 49.0 <.0001 
Operation Type 3 -0.4247 0.0610 48.4 <.0001 
Unsafe Driving 2 0.4259 0.0581 53.7 <.0001 
Unsafe Driving 3 1.0284 0.0755 185.6 <.0001 
Fatigued Driving 2 0.3063 0.0563 29.6 <.0001 
Fatigued driving 3 0.3499 0.0789 19.7 <.0001 
Driver Fitness 2 -0.1903 0.0581 10.7 0.0011 
Driver Fitness 3 -0.3538 0.0726 23.8 <.0001 
Substance/Alcohol 2 -0.0620 0.0893 0.5 0.4877 
Substance/Alcohol 3 -0.0312 0.1086 0.1 0.7741 
Vehicle Maintenance 2 0.4781 0.0576 68.9 <.0001 
Vehicle maintenance 3 0.5816 0.0764 57.9 <.0001 
Loading/Cargo  2 0.2107 0.0605 12.1 0.0005 
Loading/Cargo  3 0.1174 0.0662 3.1 0.0764 
Scale α  – 0.9663 0.0348 – – 
It is important to note that the negative binomial regression results are only part of the Bayes 
estimator used here. The Bayes estimator uses both the observed rate and the predicted rate under 
the regression model since it compromises somewhere in between. It uses the good properties of 
each estimator to determine which one receives more weight. For a particular carrier, whichever 
estimate is more appropriate gets used.  
As an example of the properties of the Bayes estimator, Table 37 shows a comparison of the 
estimated empirical Bayes rates for two carriers. Carrier 1 has only one crash and one power 
unit. Therefore, the observed rate is 100 crashes per 100 power units. Due to the small number of 
crashes and power units, this rate suffers from uncertainty due to large variation. The negative 
binomial rate is based on a regression model that combines the information from all carriers that 
have a similar number of power units and similar BASIC thresholds exceeded. Note that this 
carrier exceeded the Unsafe Driving threshold, which is highly correlated with crash occurrence. 
The predicted rate from the negative binomial regression is 5.40. The Bayes rate is 10.09 and 
compromises between the observed rate and the negative binomial rate, but in this case gives 
more weight to the negative binomial rate. On the other hand, Carrier 2 has 14 crashes and 134 
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power units, so the observed rate is a good estimator. In this case, the Bayes estimator will give 
almost all weight to the observed rate, since the observed is based on relatively many power 
units, and is therefore stable. 
















Carrier 1 Unsafe Driving 1 1 100.00 5.40 10.09 




6. INTERVENTION CYCLES 
This section identifies the cycles of interventions that were applied to the test carriers in the four 
primary test States, establishes the primary patterns of interventions that were applied, and 
evaluates the association of the primary patterns with the underlying safety of the carriers. The 
underlying safety of the carriers is characterized in two ways: in terms of the number of BASICs 
exceeded by the carriers and in terms of the crash rate of the carrier at the initiation of the 
intervention cycle. The section also begins the process of evaluating the effectiveness of 
interventions by analyzing the extent to which it was necessary to follow up one intervention 
type with another. 
6.1 IDENTIFICATION OF INTERVENTION CYCLES 
Intervention “cycles” can be identified in the data, although they are not explicitly coded as such. 
Many carriers are subject to more than one intervention. If the initial intervention does not result 
in the intended improvement, additional intervention(s) are imposed. In the data, there is an 
indication of which interventions are part of these cycles. The intervention data table includes a 
field (“Inter_link”) that lists interventions that are “linked” together.  
Using the Inter_link field, sets of linked interventions, which will be referred to as cycles of 
interventions, were established. Within each cycle, the initial BASIC percentiles are recorded 
along with the date of the first intervention, the type of each intervention in the cycle, and the 
date when the final intervention in the series was marked closed/completed (all tasks completed 
and the intervention marked as closed), if the last intervention was closed. 
It was noted during the process of constructing the intervention cycles that a warning letter 
intervention is never linked explicitly to a subsequent intervention; i.e., when the intervention is 
a warning letter, the Inter_link field is always left blank. Yet, review of the series of 
interventions received by a carrier makes it clear that warning letters are often followed up by 
other intervention types. Accordingly, warning letters were added to intervention cycles when 
the warning letter was followed within 12 months by another intervention. Twelve months was 
set as the interval because the CSA training manual suggests that the investigators monitor the 
carriers at least 6 months following a warning letter to allow them time to improve. If a carrier’s 
safety does not improve within 12 months after a warning letter, then follow up is necessary. 
Accordingly, if another intervention followed a warning letter within 12 months, the warning 
letter was included in the intervention cycle for the carrier. 
Intervention cycles permit a more detailed look at the effectiveness of the interventions in the 
context in which they are actually applied in the field. As carriers are identified and intervened 
upon, some will improve and the action is closed, while others may not improve and further 
intervention is necessary to improve the carrier’s compliance and safety outcome. An 
intervention type that was always followed by another intervention could be considered 
ineffective, since the intervention only rarely resolved the issue. 
Some types of interventions can be considered and often are “terminal,” such as the NOV or 
NOC, in that they culminate a series of interventions aimed at altering behavior by moving 
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toward a penalty. A CSP is also typically the end point of an intervention cycle, as it involves a 
carrier developing and implementing a plan to eliminate the high BASIC scores that prompted it. 
Other types of interventions are clearly part of a graded system of escalation intended to move 
carriers to compliance and safer behavior. These include the warning letter, offsite investigation, 
onsite focused investigation, and onsite comprehensive investigation. However, it should be 
noted that there is no fixed sequence of interventions that must be followed. The CSA 2010 
program has a built-in flexibility that permits the intervention selected to be tailored to the 
circumstances. 
For the current analysis, intervention cycles initiated in the first full year of Phase II in the four 
test States are included. In addition, only cycles in which the last intervention in the series is 
marked closed/completed at some point before the end of the data collection period in June, 
2010, are included. The motivation for these two restrictions is to provide a realistic examination 
of the intervention process as it will be conducted when the full CSA 2010 program is 
implemented. During the first phase of the Operational Model Test, A/B carriers were excluded 
and not all intervention types were available. In Phase II, all test carriers are included and all 
intervention types are available to the safety investigator) 
The goal of the restriction to intervention cycles that were initiated in the first full year of Phase 
II is to identify a set of intervention cycles that have effectively run their course. At any given 
point in time, it is not possible to know whether the cycle has come to an end, meaning that the 
safety and compliance issues have been resolved. The status of each intervention in the cycle is 
known, including whether or not the intervention has a “closed/completed” status. But the linked 
set of interventions applied to the carrier as such is not marked as “completed” or “not 
completed”. And in a sense, the books are not closed on an intervention cycle at the point when 
the last in the list is marked closed/completed because the last stage in the process is to monitor 
carriers after an intervention is closed for 12 months. The cycle is really an artificial construct, 
but it is motivated by the fact that the intervention process may consist of several discreet 
actions, which may be escalated to a different intervention if the required improvement on the 
part of the carrier does not occur. It is important to identify and evaluate these cycles because 
they are fundamental to the CSA process. 
Table 38 shows the number of intervention cycles experienced by carriers in the first year of 
Phase II of the Operational Model. Intervention cycles were initiated on a total of 1,964 carriers 
in the first full year of Phase II, which began in October 2008, and the last intervention in the 
cycle was marked closed/completed by the end of data collection of the operational model in 
June 2010. Ultimately, 1,926 or 98.1 percent of those carriers experienced only one intervention 
cycle, while 36 went through two cycles and two went through three cycles. Accordingly, it is 
important to keep in mind that, while some few carriers had more than one cycle, the 




Table 38. Number of Intervention Cycles Per Carrier First Year of Operational Model Phase II 
Number of Cycles Carriers Percent 
1 1,926 98.1% 
2 36 1.8% 
3 2 0.1% 
Total 1,964 100.0% 
Table 39 shows the distribution of the specific intervention types included in the cycles initiated 
in the first year of Phase II of the Operational Model Test. The warning letter is the most 
common intervention type, accounting for about 35 percent of the total interventions. An onsite 
focused was the second most common with about 20.4 percent of the interventions. offsite and 
onsite comprehensive investigations each accounted for about 11 to 12 percent of the 
interventions, as did the CSP. NOVs were fairly rare, with only 1.1 percent. An NOV is a formal 
notice of safety deficiencies that requires a response from the carrier. The violations are severe 
enough to warrant formal action, but not a civil penalty such as a fine. The NOC is an issuance 
of a civil fine for severe violations of the FMCSR. Almost 9 percent of the intervention cycles 
initiated in the first year of Phase II culminated in an NOC. 
Table 39. Interventions in Cycles Initiated in First Year of Operational Model Phase II 
Intervention Type N Percent 
Warning Letters 1,104 34.6% 
CSP 382 12.0% 
NOV 35 1.1% 
NOC 278 8.7% 
Offsite 375 11.7% 
Onsite Focused 650 20.4% 
Onsite Comprehensive 369 11.6% 
Total 3,193 100.0% 
More than 50 percent of intervention cycles consisted of only one intervention, and another 37.1 
percent consisted of only two interventions. Overwhelmingly, the intervention cycles consist of 
only one or two interventions. Table 40 also shows the relationship between the number of 
interventions in a cycle and the number of BASICs exceeded. The association is in the expected 
direction. Also shown is the predicted crash rate using results from the statistical model 
presented in Section 8, and again the relationship is in the expected direction. At the initiation of 
the intervention cycle, carriers that require more interventions to improve, tend to have exceeded 
more BASICs and to have higher predicted crash rates. Note also that 99.0 percent of the cycles 
are accounted for by three or fewer interventions. More than half include only one intervention, 
about 37 percent had only two interventions and an additional 9.5 percent included three 
interventions. More than three interventions in a cycle is quite rare, with only about 1 percent of 
the carriers who were intervened upon receiving more than three interventions. These carriers 
also exceeded more BASIC thresholds and had significantly higher crash rates, as predicted by 
the statistical model. In fact, the predicted crash rates for carriers with intervention cycles that 
include four or more interventions are more than twice as high as those who took fewer 
interventions to improve. 
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Table 40. Number of Interventions in the Intervention Cycles, Mean Number of BASICs Failed and 











1 1,042 52.4 1.22 3.6 2.5 
2 738 37.1 1.45 4.6 2.9 
3 188 9.5 1.28 4.0 2.8 
4 14 0.7 2.00 9.7 3.4 
5 2 0.1 2.00 6.0 6.0 
6 1 0.1 2.00 11.9 11.9 
7 3 0.2 2.67 6.9 4.8 
Total 1,988 100.0 1.32 4.0 2.7 
There is also a relationship between the nature of the first intervention in a cycle and the relative 
safety of the carrier as measured by the predicted crash rate (Figure 9). Intervention cycles that 
were initiated by a warning letter tended to be for carriers that had lower crash rates than those 
where the initial intervention in the cycle was one of the more severe, such as an investigation, 
whether offsite, onsite focused, or onsite comprehensive. Carriers in which the first intervention 
was a warning letter had an average predicted crash rate of 3.1, compared with 3.9 for those in 
which the intervention cycle started with an offsite, 5.0 where it was an onsite focused, and a 
mean predicted crash rate of 6.2 where the intervention cycle started off with an onsite 
comprehensive investigation. The figure shows the measure of safety (predicted crash rate) by 
the type of initial intervention in the intervention cycle for the four most common initial 
intervention types. (Two cycles were initiated by a NOV and two by a NOC. These cycles are 
not shown.) The figure also shows 95 percent confidence intervals for the predicted crash rates.  
 
Figure 9. Predicted Crash Rate by First Intervention Type 
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This pattern is expected since interventions are escalated for carriers with more serious or more 
frequent violations, and carriers that exceed multiple BASICs tend to have higher crash rates. For 
example, carriers that have exceeded two or more BASICs, including the Fatigued Driving or 
Crash Indicator BASIC, are recommended by the CSA process to receive an onsite investigation. 
Carriers that have not exceeded the Fatigued Driving or Crash Indicator BASIC but have had a 
prior failed BASIC are recommended for an offsite investigation. Carriers that are repeat 
offenders or who have exceeded the critical Fatigued Driving or Crash Indicator BASIC have 
lower levels of safety, as measured by the predicted crash rate. Thus, the rules guiding the 
selection of appropriate interventions seem to be correctly targeting carriers with high crash 
rates. 
6.2 INTERVENTION PATTERNS 
One measure of the effectiveness of individual intervention types is whether the intervention 
resolved the issue or whether further interventions were necessary. An intervention that was 
followed by safety improvement and no further intervention required would be considered 
effective, but a type where it was almost always necessary to escalate to another intervention 
would not be considered effective. This is just one measure of effectiveness. Section 5 will 
consider each intervention type and measure the change in safety following interventions, both 
for individual interventions and patterns of interventions. 
Table 41 shows the number of interventions that followed each intervention type in the 
intervention cycles. Within each intervention cycle, the first instance of each type was identified 
and then the subsequent interventions were counted. The top number shows the frequency counts 
and the bottom number shows the percentages for each intervention type. 
It appears that each of the intervention types is effective in some situations. In 61.7 percent of the 
intervention cycles in which a warning letter was issued, there were no followup interventions. In 
almost all of these cases, of course, the warning letter was the first intervention in the cycle. And 
in most cases, it appears that the warning letter was sufficient. In about 24 percent of the cases, 
one further intervention was necessary, and in an additional 14 percent, two more interventions 
were needed. Each of the other primary intervention types also was effective in 45 to 55 percent 
of the cycles, and additional interventions were needed in the remainder. Note that most 
intervention cycles consisted of only one or two interventions and that carriers requiring more 
interventions tended to exceed more BASIC thresholds and to have higher crash rates (Table 40).  
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Table 41. Number of Subsequent Interventions, by Intervention Type 
Intervention Type 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
















































































































Certain intervention types—CSP, NOV, NOC—in most cases are not followed by further 
interventions. In more than 96 percent of instances in which a CSP is implemented there is no 
follow-on intervention. This is evidence that the CSP is an effective intervention. In most of the 
NOVs, the following intervention is a NOC, and in the case of the NOCs, where there is more 
than one, the following is almost always another NOC. 
Table 42 shows the most frequent patterns of interventions in the first full year of Phase II of the 
Operational Model Test. The patterns are sorted from the most frequent to the least frequent, and 
only the top 16 combinations are shown (there were 79 different patterns) for reasons of space. 
These top 16 account for 91 percent of the intervention cycles. Note that in these 16 patterns, 
none included four or more interventions. As is noted below, most intervention cycles include 
only one or two types. More than three interventions in a cycle is rare. The N column presents 
counts of intervention cycles for carriers. As noted, in almost all cases carriers experienced only 
one cycle of interventions. One-third of the cycles were completed by issuing a warning letter 
only. Another 9 percent consisted of only an onsite focused investigation, and about 7 percent 
included only a warning letter, followed by an onsite focused investigation. 
 
55 
Table 42. Primary Intervention Patterns, Cycles Initiated in First Year of Phase II 
1st Intervention 2nd Intervention 3rd 4th 5th N Percent 
Warning Letter None None None None 688 33.3% 
Onsite Focused None None None None 180 9.0% 
Warning Letter Onsite Focused None None None 145 7.2% 
Onsite comprehensive None None None None 130 6.5% 
Onsite Focused CSP None None None 125 6.2% 
Offsite CSP None None None 92 4.6% 
Warning Letter Offsite None None None 88 4.4% 
Onsite Comprehensive NOC None None None 80 4.0% 
Offsite None None None None 72 3.6% 
Onsite Comprehensive CSP None None None 49 2.4% 
Warning Letter Offsite CSP None None 47 2.3% 
Onsite Focused NOC None None None 43 2.1% 
Warning Letter Onsite Focused CSP None None 40 2.0% 
Warning Letter Onsite Focused NOC None None 26 1.3% 
Warning Letter Onsite Comprehensive None None None 19 0.9% 
Warning Letter Onsite Comprehensive NOC None None 16 0.8% 
The intervention patterns in the cycles are clearly associated with the underlying safety of the 
carriers. This result is consistent with the results above, but Table 42 illustrates the point. The 
table shows the mean crash rate for each of the 16 intervention cycles identified in Table 42. 
(The N column shows the number of cycles for which a valid crash rate could be calculated, not 
the total number of such cycles, as in Table 42.) Cycles resolved only by a warning letter have 
the lowest crash rate. The next most frequent pattern, an onsite focused investigation with no 
follow up, has a substantially higher crash rate at 4.9. The warning letter followed by an onsite 
focused has a lower crash rate, but still significantly higher than the pattern where the warning 
letter was sufficient. The highest crash rates occur for patterns that include an onsite 
comprehensive investigation and some further intervention. As the prior analysis has shown, the 




Table 43. Mean Crash Rate by Primary Intervention Patterns, Intervention Cycles Initiated in First 
Year of Phase II 
1st 2nd 3rd N Mean Crash Rate 
Warning Letter None None 667 2.9 
Onsite Focused None None 174 4.9 
Warning Letter Onsite Focused None 145 3.6 
Onsite Comprehensive None None 125 4.9 
Onsite Focused CSP None 125 4.6 
Offsite CSP None 92 4.2 
Warning Letter Offsite None 88 3.4 
Onsite Comprehensive NOC None 79 6.2 
Offsite None None 72 4.1 
Onsite Comprehensive CSP None 49 7.5 
Warning Letter Offsite CSP 47 3.2 
Onsite Focused NOC None 41 4.4 
Warning Letter Onsite Focused CSP 40 3.4 
Warning Letter Onsite Focused NOC 26 2.9 
Warning Letter Onsite Comprehensive None 19 4.3 
Warning Letter Onsite Comprehensive NOC 16 4.5 
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7. EFFECT OF WARNING LETTERS ON BASIC 
PERCENTILES 
The effect of interventions on BASIC percentiles is explored by comparing test carriers and 
control carriers in the original four States that exceeded a particular BASIC threshold for the first 
time, and then following those carriers for 12 months after exceeding the threshold. The analysis 
in this section focuses on test carriers that received a warning letter as the only intervention. The 
reason for this restriction is that the warning letter is typically closed within a month, which 
facilitates evaluating the effectiveness of the intervention. Carriers with multiple interventions 
have longer times to closed status after exceeding a BASIC threshold and are less likely to have 
much followup time for evaluation. In addition, the sample sizes for carriers with multiple 
interventions are small and are generally too small to make valid inferences about changes in 
specific BASIC scores even over 6 months, let alone 12. The effectiveness of other types of 
interventions is considered in section 8, which examines their impact upon motor compliance in 
general, rather than on specific BASIC scores. 
The purpose here is to demonstrate the general effectiveness of the warning letter intervention on 
BASIC percentiles by comparing test and control carriers that initially exceeded the same 
BASIC threshold for the first time over a 12-month followup period. The CSA 2010 data provide 
sufficient sample sizes for this comparison. The control carriers are those in the original four 
States that had no CR during the Operational Model Test. 
Because the test group received the warning letter as the only intervention, the test group can be 
regarded as a low-risk group of carriers in terms of safety performance. However, the control 
group carriers had no CRs during the Operational Model Test, and may also be regarded as a 
mild group among control carriers in terms of safety performance. 
The BASICs considered in this analysis include: 
• Unsafe Driving. 
• Fatigued Driving. 
• Driver Fitness. 
• Vehicle Maintenance. 
• Improper Loading/Cargo Securement. 
The Controlled Substance and Alcohol BASIC was not considered due to insufficient data for 
evaluation. Among the BASICs, the threshold for this one is least likely to be exceeded by 
carriers. See, for example, Table 8 that shows that this BASIC is rarely exceeded in relation to 
the other ones. 
Key components of the analysis are listed below: 
• Both test and control carriers exceeded the same BASIC threshold for the first time. 
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• During the Operational Model Test, the test carriers received the warning letter as the 
only intervention and the status of that intervention is closed. 
• The date of the warning letter was after the date that the BASIC threshold was exceeded. 
• During the Operational Model Test, the control carriers received no CRs under the 
agency’s current enforcement protocols. 
• Both test and control carriers were followed for 12 months after exceeding the BASIC 
threshold and are compared based on the percentage of carriers still exceeding the 
threshold. 
• Not all carriers contribute 12 months of followup time. If a carrier exceeded a threshold 
for the first time in month 25 of the 29 month evaluation period, that carrier would 
contribute data from months 26 through 29, resulting in four months of followup data. 
• Supporting data for all plots, including sample sizes, are given in Appendix A. 
It is recognized that warning letters are often sent to carriers in batches, and not necessarily 
immediately after a BASIC threshold is exceeded. Therefore, a few months may lapse between 
the time a carrier exceeds a threshold and the time it receives the intervention. However, the 12 
month followup period includes sufficient time after the warning letter has been received by the 
carrier for evaluation. The reason for starting the evaluation at the time the carrier first exceeds 
the threshold, and not at the time of intervention, is because control carriers did not receive the 
intervention. In this way, both test and control carriers are being evaluated over the same 12 
month moving window. 
Figure 10 shows the percentage of carriers exceeding the Unsafe Driving threshold over a 12-
month period. At time zero, both test and control carriers exceeded this BASIC for the first time. 
Over the next 12 months the two groups are followed and the percentage still exceeding the 
threshold is shown. The “time zero” point is generally a different month for each carrier. It 
represents the first month that a carrier exceeded the threshold. In addition, not all carriers have 
12 months of followup data. If a carrier has only 3 months of followup data after exceeding a 
BASIC, it contributes only the first 3 months of data to the plot. Figure 10 shows that after 12 
months, 14.5 percent of the test carriers were still exceeding the threshold, compared to 37.4 
percent of the control carriers. For the test group, there were initially 132 carriers for evaluation, 




Figure 10. Percent of Carriers Exceeding the Unsafe Driving Threshold With 12 Months 
of Followup After Exceeding the Threshold (Test Carriers Closed With  
Warning Letter, Control Carriers With No CR During the Model Test) 
The following plots show similar results for the remaining BASICs. Figure 11 and Figure 13 
show plots for the Fatigued Driving and the Driver Fitness BASICs, respectively. After the 12-
month followup period, 24.6 percent of test carriers and 40.6 percent of control carriers were still 
exceeding the Fatigued Driving threshold. For the Driver Fitness BASIC, 19.2 percent of test 
group carriers and 35.8 percent of control group carriers were still exceeding the threshold after 
12 months of followup. The number of carriers at the beginning and end of the 12 month period 
is also shown in each plot. 
There appears to be a period of about two months in these plots where there is no difference 
between test and controls in terms of the percentage of carriers still exceeding the threshold. This 
could represent the average lag time between a test carrier exceeding a threshold, and the time it 




Figure 11. Percent of Carriers Exceeding the Fatigued Driving Threshold With 12 Months of 
Followup After Exceeding the Threshold (Test Carriers Closed With  
Warning Letter, Control Carriers With No CR During the Model Test) 
 
Figure 12. Percent of Carriers Exceeding the Driver Fitness Threshold With 12 Months 
of Followup After Exceeding the Threshold (Test Carriers Closed With Warning Letter, Control 
Carriers With No CR During the Model Test) 
Figure 13 and Figure 14 show results for the Vehicle Maintenance and the Improper 
Loading/Cargo Securement BASICs. Again, the test groups show considerable improvement 
over the control groups. After the 12-month followup period, 25.1 percent of test carriers, and 
47.0 percent of control carriers were still exceeding the threshold. For the Improper 
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Loading/Cargo Securement BASIC, 35.6 percent of test group carriers and 49.9 percent of 
control group carriers were still exceeding the threshold after 12 months of followup. 
 
Figure 13. Percent of Carriers Exceeding the Vehicle Maintenance Threshold With 12 Months of 
Followup After Exceeding the Threshold (Test Carriers Closed With Warning Letter, Control 
Carriers With No CR During the Model Test) 
 
Figure 14. Percent of Carriers Exceeding the Improper Loading/Cargo Securement Threshold With 
12 Months of Followup After Exceeding the Threshold (Test Carriers Closed With Warning Letter, 
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8. EFFECTIVENESS OF CSA 2010 INTERVENTIONS 
In this section, the effect of various CSA 2010 interventions on motor carrier compliance is 
examined by comparing test carriers that received CSA 2010 interventions both to control 
carriers that did not receive any interventions, and to control carriers that received traditional 
CRs in the original four States. The test and control group populations are evaluated by 
examining the percentage of carriers in each group exceeding any of the BASIC thresholds over 
a 12-month followup period.  
Using results from Table 13 and Table 42, intervention patterns were chosen according to those 
that occurred most frequently and provide sample sizes adequate for analysis. The warning letter 
followed by no further interventions accounts for about one-third of the intervention cycles and 
is by far the most common intervention pattern. In total, seven intervention patterns are 
considered and evaluations are presented in the following order: 
• One Intervention. 
– Warning Letter. 
– Offsite Investigation. 
– Onsite Focused Investigation. 
– Onsite Comprehensive Investigation. 
• Multiple Interventions. 
– Warning Letter—Any Investigation. 
– Warning Letter—Any Investigation—CSP. 
– Any Intervention Process Terminated by an NOC. 
The choice of a good control group is necessary in order to make the comparison valid. For 
example, there are several thousand control carriers that can be selected for comparison to the 
test carriers in the four original States. However, the control group should be as similar as 
possible to the test group being evaluated in terms of several key factors so that the only 
difference between the two groups before evaluation begins is that the test group received CSA 
2010 intervention(s), while the control group did not. Then, any difference in safety performance 
between the two groups in a followup period is likely attributable to the CSA 2010 
intervention(s).  
As an example, suppose it is of interest to compare test carriers that exceeded at least one SMS 
threshold, received a warning letter as the first intervention, were escalated to one of the 
investigations (offsite, onsite focused, onsite comprehensive) for a second intervention, and 
finally agreed to a CSP for yet a third intervention to a group of control carriers. Based on the 
CSA 2010 methodology, the warning letter was not sufficient enough to bring the test carrier’s 
SMS percentiles below acceptable thresholds since the intervention process was escalated to an 
investigation resulting in a CSP. Therefore, this particular group of test carriers has likely 
exhibited safety behavior that is considered to be at a higher level of risk than the general 
population of control carriers. A comparison of this test group to a general population of control 
carriers would not account for differences in levels of safety at the beginning of the evaluation, 
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and it would be difficult to determine if any differences in safety performance in a followup 
period were due to CSA 2010 interventions received by the test group. 
To account for differences in levels of safety between test and control groups, several key factors 
were matched between the two groups prior to evaluation. Figure 15 is a timeline describing the 
procedure used for comparison. First, both test and control carriers must exceed at least one SMS 
threshold for the first time. This triggers the intervention process for the test group and puts both 
test and control carriers in the group of approximately 6.1 percent of carriers (9.9 percent of 
carriers with recent activity) that exceed at least one threshold. The control group is selected such 
that its crash rate distribution closely matches the distribution of the crash rate for the test group 
for the period 2 years prior to exceeding the first threshold. Crash rates are predicted using a 
statistical model described at a high level in section 5.8. Since control carriers do not receive 
CSA 2010 interventions, they were randomly assigned a time to closed/completed (recall that 
closed/completed indicates that all tasks associated with the specific interventions have been 
accomplished and the intervention moved to a closed status) that matches the distribution of time 
to closed/completed for the test carriers. This was done by sampling from a normal distribution 
with the mean and standard deviation of time to closed/completed for the test group. Finally, the 
total number of SMS thresholds exceeded between the time of exceeding the first threshold and 
the time to closed/completed is calculated for both groups, and the control group is sampled 
among control carriers with the same distribution of total thresholds exceeded as the test group. 
Both groups are then followed for 12 months after time to closed/completed and evaluated 
according to SMS thresholds exceeded. 
 
Figure 15. Method for Comparing Test and Control Groups 
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The procedure to match test and control carriers is designed to ensure that the two groups are as 
similar as possible in key measures of safety before the evaluation begins, so that any reductions 
in SMS thresholds exceeded during the 12-month followup period are more likely due to CSA 
2010 interventions, and not due to different levels of safety prior to evaluation. The stochastic 
nature of the sampling procedure is designed to make the two groups as similar as possible on 
average. This control group is designed to be the most appropriate for comparison to the test 
group. 
In addition to the control group described above, results from two other control groups are 
presented for comparison. One control group is selected among control carriers that exceeded at 
least one SMS threshold, but did not receive CRs during the Operational Model Test (February 
2008 through June 2010). This group is designed to be a generally large sample of mild carriers 
from a safety performance point of view. For this control group, the median time to 
closed/completed for test carriers is added to the month that the first SMS threshold was 
exceeded to account for the delay in time to closed/completed before the 12-month followup 
period. The second control group consists of control carriers that did receive CRs after exceeding 
at least one SMS threshold, and the 12-month followup period begins after CR. This control 
group is designed to be a generally high-risk group of carriers for comparison to the test group. 
This control group remains the same for each of the seven intervention patterns considered. 
• Several points are worth noting concerning this analysis: 
– For carriers with the intervention pattern of warning letter only, which represents the 
majority of intervention patterns, it is not necessary to match distributions by time to 
closed/completed and total thresholds exceeded since the time from exceeding the 
first SMS threshold to time to closed/completed is generally 1 month. However, crash 
rates are matched in the 2 years prior to exceeding the first threshold.  
– Since the three variables (crash rate, time to closed/completed, total thresholds 
exceeded) are necessarily positive, they are analyzed on the natural log scale to make 
their distributions symmetric and close to normal. 
– It is not necessary for all carriers to have 12 months of followup after the final 
intervention is closed/completed. For example, a carrier that receives a warning letter 
a few months before the Operational Model Test ends will likely have only several 
months of followup. The cohort method of analysis used here allows such a carrier to 
contribute carrier months of followup to the study before dropping out. The same is 
true of control carriers in which time to closed/completed is sampled. 
– Closed/completed does not imply that safety issues related to a carrier with 
intervention(s) have been resolved. It means that the safety investigator has 
completed certain tasks associated with performing a particular intervention. 
– Except for the warning letter, evaluations for test carriers receiving one investigation 
(off-site, onsite focused, onsite comprehensive) tend to be based on relatively small 
sample sizes due to available data during the 12 month followup period. Supporting 




8.1 THE WARNING LETTER 
The effectiveness of the warning letter is examined by following test carriers that exceeded at 
least one SMS threshold and received the warning letter as the only intervention. Since the time 
to closed/completed for this intervention pattern is generally one month from the time of 
exceeding the first SMS threshold, matching distributions of time to closed/completed and total 
thresholds exceeded within that time frame is not considered for the “Control Matched to Test” 
group (Figure 15). However, test and control groups are matched to have similar distributions of 
2-year crash rates just prior to exceeding the first SMS threshold for the matched control group. 
Figure 16 shows distributions of log crash rates for the test group and three control groups. In 
this case, it appears that test carriers are fairly matched with control carriers without CRs since 
test carriers with warning letter as the only intervention tend to be a mild group in terms of 
safety. There is one large outlying crash rate in the test group. As expected, control carriers with 
CRs have the highest crash rates. The control group that is sampled among control carriers to 
have the same distribution of crash rates as the test carriers is shown at the far right of the figure, 
and the distributions match closely. 
 
Figure 16. Distributions of Log Crash Rates for Test Group With Warning Letter Only and Three 
Control Groups 
Figure 17 shows the percentage of carriers exceeding at least one SMS threshold for the test 
group receiving the warning letter only and three control groups (data supporting this figure are 
provided in Appendix B). This is likely one of the most significant findings in this evaluation. 
After 12 months of followup, approximately 17 percent of test carriers are exceeding at least one 
SMS threshold compared to about 45 percent of control carriers matched to test carriers. Table 
42 shows that this intervention pattern is by far the most common one, representing about one-
third of the total. Since this intervention pattern is the most common, the sample size for the test 
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group is relatively large: 1,749 test carriers could be identified from the original four States with 
the warning letter that is closed/completed as the only intervention. Of those carriers, 1,048 had 
complete data recorded for the 12 month followup period. For analyses of the intervention 
patterns that follow, sample sizes are not nearly as large. 
In this case, the “Control Matched to Test” and the “Control without CR” groups show similar 
results. Therefore, matching on crash rate did not produce significant differences between the 
two groups. Figure 17 shows that the distributions of crash rates for these two groups are also 
somewhat similar, and in this case matching may not have had a big effect. For carriers receiving 
CRs during the Operational Model Test, almost 60 percent of carriers continue to exceed at least 
one SMS threshold after 12 months of followup. At time zero, not all carriers were still 
exceeding at least one threshold. Each group starts at 100 percent to show that all carriers 
initially exceeded at least one threshold prior to evaluation. However, the first month and the 12 
months thereafter reflect the percentage of carriers exceeding at least one threshold for each of 
the four groups. 
 
Figure 17. Percent of Carriers Exceeding At Least One SMS Threshold During 12-Month Followup 
(Test—Warning Letter Only) 
8.2 THE OFFSITE INVESTIGATION 
The effectiveness of the offsite investigation is examined by following test carriers that exceeded 
at least one SMS threshold and received the offsite investigation as the only intervention. Again, 
test carriers are compared with three control groups over 12 months. Since time to 
closed/completed from the time exceeding the first SMS threshold averaged about 3 or 4 months, 
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in addition to the crash rate, distributions of time to closed/completed and total thresholds 
exceeded were matched to the “Control Matched to Test” group. The purpose of Figure 18 is to 
show that crash rates and total thresholds exceeded have been matched to have similar 
distributions prior to the 12-month evaluation period for the “Control Matched to Test” control 
group. 
 
Figure 18. Distributions of Crash Rate and Total Thresholds Exceeded Matching Test and Control 
Groups (Test—Offsite Investigation Only) 
Figure 19 shows distributions of log crash rates for the test group and three control groups. In 
this case, the test group tends to have a higher crash rate than the control group without CRs, but 
a lower crash rate than the control group with CRs. The control group that is matched to the test 
group is the same one shown in Figure 18, and has a distribution of crash rates similar to the test 
group by design. 
For the remaining intervention patterns evaluated, box plots similar to those shown in Figure 18 
and Figure 19 are shown in Appendix C. These plots are of distributions matched on crash rates 
and thresholds exceeded and of crash rates for the test and three control groups. 
Figure 20 shows the percentage of carriers exceeding at least one SMS threshold for the test 
group receiving the offsite investigation only and three control groups. In this plot, the 
percentage of test carriers exceeding at least one threshold is similar to the control group with 
CRs for about the first 8 months, then declines to be comparable to the matched control group, 
and then in the final month declines to about 45 percent. The sample size for the test group is 68 
carriers initially, and drops to 49 after 12 months. After 12 months, 54 percent of the “Control 
Matched to Test” carriers exceed at least one threshold. Results for this control group are 
intermediate between the two control groups with and without CRs. The sample size for the 




Figure 19. Distributions of Log Crash Rates for Test Group With Offsite Investigation Only  
and Three Control Groups 
 
Figure 20. Percent of Carriers Exceeding At Least One SMS Threshold During 12-Month Followup 
(Test—Offsite Investigation Only) 
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8.3 THE ONSITE FOCUSED INVESTIGATION  
The methods are now applied to the onsite focused investigation. The effectiveness of the onsite 
focused investigation is examined by following test carriers that exceeded at least one SMS 
threshold and received the onsite focused investigation as the only intervention. Test carriers are 
compared with the three control groups over 12 months. The time to closed/completed from the 
time exceeding the first threshold averaged about 4 or 5 months for the onsite focused 
investigation. Boxplots showing distributions matched on crash rates and total thresholds 
exceeded as well as crash rates for the test and three control groups are shown in Appendix C. 
Figure 21 shows percentage of any thresholds exceeded for the 12 month followup period after 
time to intervention closed/completed. There are some similarities and differences between this 
plot and the one for the offsite investigation (Figure 20). After about 8 or 9 months, the line for 
the test group crosses lines for both the control group with CRs and the control group matched to 
the test group. After 12 months the line for the test group reaches 40.6 percent, which is slightly 
below the 43.1 percent for the control group without CRs. Before 9 months, however, the test 
group has the largest percent of carriers exceeding at least one SMS threshold. It should be 
pointed out that the sample size for the test group is 84 carriers at the beginning of the 12 month 
period and drops to 32 carriers at the end of the period. Supporting data for test and control 
groups are provided in Appendix B. 
 
Figure 21. Percent of Carriers Exceeding At Least One SMS Threshold During 12-Month Followup 
(Test—Onsite Focused Investigation Only) 
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8.4 THE ONSITE COMPREHENSIVE INVESTIGATION 
The effectiveness of the onsite comprehensive investigation is examined. Carriers that exceeded 
at least one SMS threshold and received the onsite comprehensive investigation as the only 
intervention are followed over 12 months after the intervention was closed/completed. Test 
carriers are compared with the three control groups. The time to closed/completed from the time 
exceeding the first threshold averaged about 6 or 7 months for the onsite comprehensive 
investigation. Therefore, the time to closed/completed for this intervention is longer than for 
either the offsite or the onsite focused investigations. 
The sample size for evaluating test carriers receiving the onsite comprehensive investigation is 
small. The number of carriers at the time of closed/completed is 33 and after 12 months the 
number is 11. This is likely due to the Phase I period conducted in the original four States in 
which SafeStat A/B carriers were removed from the Operational Model Test. 
Figure 22 shows percentage of carriers exceeding at least one SMS threshold over the 12 month 
period after the onsite comprehensive investigation was closed/completed. In terms of safety, the 
control group without CR is generally a mild group of carriers and usually provides a lower 
bound in the plot. The control group with CRs is generally a group of at-risk carriers since some 
prior behavior prompted a CR, and this group usually provides an upper bound in the plot. The 
control group matched to the test group is generally intermediate between the other two control 
groups in the plot since this control has been matched to the test group on several key safety 
factors (crash rate, time to closed/completed, prior thresholds exceeded). However, in Figure 22, 
the “Control Matched to Test” group tends to exceed at least one threshold at a higher percentage 
than the other three groups. After 12 months of followup, about 70 percent of the “Control 
Matched to Test” carriers still exceed at least one threshold. After 12 months, approximately 46 
percent of test carriers continued to exceed at least one threshold, although sample size is small 




Figure 22. Percent of Carriers Exceeding At Least One SMS Threshold During 12-Month Followup 
(Test—Onsite Comprehensive Investigation Only) 
8.5 THE WARNING LETTER—INVESTIGATION 
In this section, carriers receiving a warning letter followed by any of the three investigations 
(off-site, onsite focused, onsite comprehensive) are considered. The three investigations are 
combined to maintain adequate sample size for the test group in the 12-month period of 
evaluation. There were 376 carriers at the time the last intervention was closed/completed, and 
130 remaining after 12 months of follow up. For these carriers, the warning letter was escalated 
to an investigation, so in this case the warning letter may be viewed as not being sufficient at 
bringing percentile scores under thresholds. The time to final intervention closed/completed was 
13 or 14 months for this intervention pattern. 
Figure 23 shows the percentage of carriers exceeding at least one threshold over the 12-month 
period after the last intervention was closed/completed. As in some of the other plots, the control 
group without CRs gives a lower bound, and the control group with CRs gives an upper bound. 
As in many of the other plots ending in investigations, after approximately 8 or 9 months the test 
group starts to show improvement relative to the control groups. After 8 months, about 50 
percent of the test group and about 50 percent of the control group matched to the test group 
exceed at least one threshold. After that time, the percentage for the test group is lower, although 
the difference is modest. After 12 months, the percentage for the test group is 41.5 percent and 




Figure 23. Percent of Carriers Exceeding At Least One SMS Threshold During 12-Month Followup 
(Test—Warning Letter and Investigation) 
8.6 THE WARNING LETTER—INVESTIGATION—CSP 
The intervention pattern beginning with a warning letter, followed by one of the investigations 
(offsite, onsite focused, onsite comprehensive), and ending with a CSP is considered. The sample 
size for the test group in which the CSP was closed/completed is fairly large. There are 385 
carriers at the time the CSP was closed/completed and 185 after 12 months of followup. The 
average time to closed/completed from the time of first exceeding any SMS threshold is 
approximately 11 or 12 months. Therefore, on average it took about 1 year from the time of 
exceeding the first threshold until the CSP was closed/completed. 
Figure 24 shows percentage of carriers exceeding at least one threshold for the test group and 
three control groups over the 12-month period. The control without CR provides a lower bound 
while the control with CR provides an upper bound. The control matched to the test group is 
intermediate between the two. The test group shows results similar to the control group with CR 
for approximately 6 months, and then improves. After 12 months, however, the percentage of 
carriers exceeding at least one BASIC threshold drops to approximately the same level as the 
matched control group (approximately 50 percent of carriers). 
Carriers with multiple interventions take longer until time to closed/completed. It may be that 12 
months is not a sufficient period of followup to detect differences for carriers with intervention 
patterns involving multiple interventions over a generally long timeframe. Even though the CSP 
is closed/completed prior to the 12-month followup, carriers are likely being monitored well after 
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that time. Note that carriers receiving one intervention that was an investigation, for example, the 
offsite, the onsite focused, or the onsite comprehensive, tended to improve after the 8-month lag 
time after the investigation was closed/completed. For intervention patterns involving multiple 
interventions, the lag time may be longer. 
 
Figure 24. Percent of Carriers Exceeding At Least One SMS Threshold During 12-Month Followup 
(Test: Warning Letter—Investigation—CSP) 
8.7 INTERVENTIONS ENDING IN NOC 
The last intervention pattern considered is any pattern that ended with a NOC. The average time 
to closed/completed for this pattern was between 11 and 12 months. The sample size for the test 
group is 267 carriers at the time of closed/completed and 95 after 12 months of followup.  
It makes sense that carriers that require the most severe intervention patterns have the hardest 
time coming into line. Carriers with interventions ending with the NOC clearly fall into this 
category. In Figure 25, percentages for the matched controls are similar to those for carriers with 
CRs. The test group has the highest percentages until the seven month mark, at which time it 
improves relative to the controls with CRs and the controls matched to the test carriers. At the 
12-month mark, the percentage of carriers exceeding at least one BASIC threshold is 57.9 for the 




Figure 25. Percent of Carriers Exceeding At Least One SMS Threshold During 12-Month Followup 
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9. SAFETY COMPARISON OF SAFESTAT A/B CARRIERS  
The SafeStat ranking of carriers is one of the current criteria used by FMCSA to prioritize 
carriers for CRs. A question of interest is how test and control SafeStat A/B carriers fared in 
terms of safety performance during the Operational Model Test. One way to answer this question 
is to compare the two groups with respect to certain safety metrics over a designated period of 
time. Four metrics that are particularly relevant to carriers that have been classified as SafeStat 
A/B were used to evaluate safety performance: 
• Percent carriers exceeding at least two BASIC thresholds. 
• Percent carriers exceeding the Unsafe Driving or Crash Indicator thresholds. 
• Average number of BASIC thresholds exceeded. 
• Crash rate predicted by the model described in Section 5.8. 
Carriers identified as SafeStat A/B often exceed more than one BASIC threshold, so it seems 
reasonable that the first metric evaluates carriers exceeding at least two thresholds. The Unsafe 
Driving and Crash Indicator measures were shown to be most related to crash rates, so the 
second metric evaluates carriers exceeding either one or both of those thresholds. The third 
metric evaluates carriers on total number of BASIC thresholds exceeded, and the final metric is 
the crash rate as predicted by the model described in Section 5.8. 
Not all test group A/B carriers received interventions under CSA 2010 and not all control group 
A/B carriers received CRs under the current system. However, as has been shown, CSA 2010 
touches more carriers with interventions than does the current system with CRs. Analysis of the 
data shows that approximately 95 percent of test carriers identified as SafeStat A/B at some time 
during the Operational Model Test received interventions under the CSA 2010 system, and they 
were generally high level investigations (onsite focused, onsite comprehensive), or CSPs or 
NOCs.. Approximately 70 percent of control carriers identified as SafeStat A/B received CRs 
during the same time period under the current system. To answer the original question of how 
test and control SafeStat A/B carriers fared under the two systems, results are restricted to the 95 
percent of test carriers that received interventions under the new system (CSA 2010), and the 70 
percent of control carriers that received CRs under the current system. 
It is not necessary to match test and control carriers in terms of safety performance prior to the 
evaluation, as was done in section 8, because SafeStat A/B carriers have already been identified 
as those with specific safety performance issues and the two groups are well-matched. Sample 
sizes are large enough to evaluate both test and control carriers over an 18 month time period. 
Supporting data in Appendix D shows that there are approximately 800 test A/B carriers for 
evaluation at time zero, and about 250 after eighteen months. The corresponding numbers for 
control A/B carriers are 600 at time zero and 150 after eighteen months. Time zero corresponds 
to the month that the carrier was first identified as a SafeStat A/B carrier. 
Figure 26 shows the comparison between test and control SafeStat A/B carriers according to the 
four safety performance measures. The test group carriers perform better in each case. In two of 
the four plots (percent exceeding at least two BASIC thresholds, average number of BASIC 
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thresholds exceeded), the lines for the test and control groups are similar for a number of months 
and then separate with improved performance for the test group in the later months. For the other 
two performance measures (percent exceeding the Unsafe Driving or the Crash Indicator 
BASICs, average predicted log crash rate), the test group continuously performs better than the 
control group from beginning to end. Crash rates predicted by the model show small 
improvement over time, but they are shown on the log scale which is a common practice when 
presenting rates. Log crash rates for the test group improve over time relative to the control 
group. It should be noted that in this analysis, all A/B test carriers received CSA 2010 
interventions and all A/B control carriers received CR’s at some time during the 29 months of 
the Operational Model Test. However, no distinction was made as to when interventions or CRs 
occurred. They may have occurred either before or after the month the carrier was first identified 
as a SafeStat A/B carrier. Nevertheless, the test group shows better performance than the control 
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10. COSTS TO FMCSA OF CSA 2010 INTERVENTIONS AND 
CRs, AND TOTAL AMOUNTS CLAIMED  
Two of the major goals of the CSA 2010 Operational Model Test are to have more contact with 
carriers (more touches) and to use Agency resources more effectively. Using Agency resources 
more effectively is largely related to performing cost-effective interventions according to current 
Agency staffing levels. In this section, costs to FMCSA of performing CSA 2010 interventions 
on carriers in the Operational Model Test are investigated, as well as the dollar amounts claimed. 
Results pertain to the original four States, namely, Colorado, Georgia, Missouri, and New Jersey, 
and are based on the 8 months of data collected during the Phase II period from October 2008 
through May 2009 inclusive. The analysis is based on all interventions for test group carriers that 
were classified as closed/completed (all tasks for the intervention completed and the intervention 
marked closed). For comparison, costs to the Agency of performing CRs to control group 
carriers under the current enforcement program are also calculated. 
Staff personnel record four variables relevant to calculating costs that are uploaded into data files 
when conducting CSA 2010 interventions: labor hours, Government miles, vouchers, and other 
expenses. For test group carriers receiving CSA 2010 interventions, the formula used for 
calculating cost in dollars is: Cost equals (adjusted hourly rate times labor hours) plus (0.585 
times Government travel miles) plus vouchers plus other expenses. 
The adjusted hourly rate is the basic hourly rate according to the General Schedule (GS) salary 
table effective January 2009 plus 32.85 percent fringe benefits and 12 percent overhead applied 
to the basic hourly rate plus fringe benefits. Adjusted hourly rates for staff personnel responsible 
for tasks when conducting interventions are calculated for four labor categories and are shown in 
Table 44 below: 
Table 44. Adjusted Hourly Rates for CSA 2010 Staff Personnel  






Intervention Manager GS-13 Step 5 $38.35 $12.60 $6.11 $57.06 
Safety Investigator GS-12 Step 5 $32.25 $10.59 $5.14 $47.99 
Program Analyst GS-9 Step 1 $19.62 $6.45 $3.13 $29.19 
Clerical Specialist GS-5 Step 1 $12.95 $4.25 $2.06 $19.27 
The quantity 0.585 in the cost formula is the amount used by FMCSA to cost Government travel 
miles in dollars. For control group carriers receiving CRs, it is assumed that the safety 
investigator performed all of the labor, and the adjusted hourly rate of $47.99 is applied to all 
labor hours.  
Distributions of cost and other related variables presented tend to be skewed due to the nature of 
the data and some large outliers. Therefore, along with the average, the median, minimum, and 




Since the cost of a warning letter is nominal, test group carriers were evaluated to estimate the 
costs associated with all interventions except warning letters. Overall, 603 test group carriers 
with 940 interventions were identified in the Phase II period between October 2008, and May 
2009. All interventions are closed/completed. Of the 603 test carriers, 17 did not have data 
recorded for labor hours and other relevant expenses. Table 45 shows totals for labor hours, 
Government travel miles, vouchers, expenses, and cost for the 586 carriers with 920 
interventions for which complete data are recorded. The safety investigator accounts for a large 
percentage of the totals. The total cost in dollars during the 8-month period for which data are 
complete is approximately $442,000. 
Table 45. Total Cost in Dollars by Labor Category for All Interventions  
(October 2008–May 2009, Phase II) 
Labor Category Labor Hours Government 
Miles 
Vouchers Expenses Cost 
Intervention Manager 37.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 $2,125.49 
Safety Investigator 8,680.75 23,402.00 5,354.10 1,056.34 $436,689.80 
Program Analyst 89.75 0.00 0.00 56.78 $2,676.58 
Clerical Specialist 9.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 $178.25 
Total 8,817.00 23,402.00 5,354.10 1,113.12 $441,670.12 
Table 46 shows statistics of the five variables per carrier. The values in the average column can 
be calculated by dividing the totals in Table 45 above by 586. The median, minimum, and 
maximum provide an indication of the effect of outliers on the average. The estimated average 
cost per carrier for all interventions performed is $754.00, while the median cost is $590.00.  
Table 46. Cost and Related Statistics Per Carrier for All Interventions Performed  
(October 2008–May 2009, Phase II) 
Statistic Carriers Average Median Minimum Maximum 
Cost 586 $753.70 $590.03 $7.30 $7,838.72 
Labor Hours 586 15.05 11.75 0.25 153.50 
Government Miles 586 39.94 0.00 0.00 779.00 
Vouchers 586 9.14 0.00 0.00 424.00 
Expenses 586 1.90 0.00 0.00 337.87 
In order to adjust total values to account for the 17 carriers that received interventions, but for 
which labor data were not recorded, the average cost of each intervention per carrier (see Table 
52 through Table 57 which estimate costs by intervention type) was applied to the 17 carriers 
with missing labor data. The 17 carriers with missing labor data had 20 interventions as shown in 
Table 47 below. Eleven of the 20 are CSPs. Among the interventions other than the warning 
letter, the CSP is the least expensive to conduct. A reasonable estimate for the total cost of all 
interventions is about $450,000. Multiplying the 8-month total by 1.5 gives an estimated annual 
cost of $675,000. 
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Table 47. Adjusted Total Cost in Dollars for All Interventions Performed by Applying Average 
Cost of Each Intervention (October 2008–May 2009, Phase II) 
Intervention N Average Cost Total Cost 
CSA 11 $94.78 $1,042.58 
NOV 0 $117.87 $0.00 
NOC 3 $427.56 $1,282.68 
Offsite Investigation 0 $450.70 $0.00 
Onsite Focused Investigation 5 $677.06 $3,385.30 
Onsite Comprehensive Investigation 1 $1,038.50 $1,038.50 
Total for Missing Data 20 – $6,749.06 
Total Cost from Table 45 $441,670.12 
Adjusted Total Cost $448,419.18 
A similar analysis as the one presented above is performed, restricting test group carriers to those 
classified as SafeStat A/B during the same Phase II period with interventions that are 
closed/completed. Once again, values are broken down by labor category and totals are presented 
in the bottom row. Overall, 174 test group carriers with 302 interventions were identified in the 
Phase II period from October 2008 through May 2009. Of the 174 test carriers, 4 do not have 
data recorded for labor hours and other relevant expenses. Table 48 shows totals for labor hours, 
government travel miles, vouchers, expenses, and cost for the 170 carriers with 297 interventions 
for which complete data are recorded. The total cost in dollars is approximately $175,000. 
Table 48. Total Cost in Dollars by Labor Category for All Interventions Limited to SafeStat A/B 
Carriers (October 2008 through May 2009, Phase II) 
Labor Category Labor Hours Government 
Miles 
Vouchers Expenses Cost  
Intervention Manager 10.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 $613.40 
Safety Investigator 3,486.75 9,549.00 1,505.19 104.48 $174,524.97 
Program Analyst 12.50 0.00 0.00 6.48 $371.36 
Clerical Specialist 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 $0.00 
Total 3,510.00 9,549.00 1,505.19 110.96 $175,509.72 
Table 49 shows statistics of the five variables per carrier. The values in the average column can 
be calculated by dividing the totals in Table 48 above by 170. The estimated average cost per 
SafeStat A/B carrier for interventions performed is $1,032, while the median cost is $824. 
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Table 49. Cost and Related Statistics Per Carrier for All Interventions Performed Limited to 
SafeStat A/B Carriers (October 2008–May 2009, Phase II) 
Statistic Carriers Average Median Minimum Maximum 
Cost 170 $1,032.41 $824.14 $7.30 $6,046.74 
Labor Hours 170 20.65 17.00 0.25 126.00 
Government Miles 170 56.17 0.00 0.00 779.00 
Vouchers 170 8.85 0.00 0.00 360.00 
Expenses 170 0.65 0.00 0.00 60.00 
In this case, only four carriers received interventions for which no labor data were recorded. 
However, to be consistent, adjusted totals are presented. Table 50 shows results which represent 
adjusted totals for all 174 test group carriers that were classified as SafeStat A/B and received 
interventions during the Phase II period. The adjusted total cost is about $180,000.  
Table 50. Adjusted Total Cost in Dollars for All Interventions Performed Limited to SafeStat A/B 
Carriers (October 2008–May 2009, Phase II) 
Totals Labor Hours Government 
Miles 
Vouchers Expenses Cost 
Totals from Table 48 3,510.00 9,549.00 1,505.19 110.96 $175,509.72 
Averages from Table 49 20.65 56.17 8.85 0.65 $1,032.41 
Averages x 4 82.59 224.68 35.42 2.61 $4,129.64 
Adjusted Totals 3,592.59 9,773.68 1,540.61 113.57 $179,639.36 
For purposes of comparison, costs are now calculated for non-test carriers receiving CRs during 
the same Phase II period used to evaluate test group carriers. Non-test carriers are those 
classified as control, removed, excluded, or nonparticipating carriers (all but test carriers) in the 
original four States. Table 51 shows carrier level statistics for non-test carriers receiving CRs as 
recorded by safety investigators. For non-test carriers, it is not possible to present totals by labor 
category since data are not recorded at that level. Therefore, the adjusted hourly rate of a safety 
investigator is used to calculate cost. Overall, 364 non-test carriers with 481 CRs were identified 
during the Phase II period from October 2008, through May 2009. The average cost per carrier is 
$1,438, while the median cost is $1,058. No adjustment for missing data is required here since all 
364 carriers have labor data recorded. 
Table 51. Cost and Related Statistics Per Carrier for All CRs Performed for Non-Test Carriers 
(October 2008–May 2009, Phase II) 
Statistic Carriers Average Median Minimum Maximum 
Cost 364 $1,438.02 $1,058.43 $191.65 $16,935.63 
Labor Hours 364 27.30 19.84 3.25 345.00 
Government Miles 364 170.59 120.00 0.00 1,300.00 
Vouchers 364 27.06 0.00 0.00 2,112.00 
Expenses 364 0.87 0.00 0.00 93.00 
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Tables analogous to the ones presented above for test group carriers receiving CSA 2010 
interventions are now presented for each of the specific intervention types, excluding the 
warning letter. The interventions considered are CSP, NOV, and NOC. Results for offsite and 
onsite focused and comprehensive investigations are also presented. All interventions are 
closed/completed. Note that the number of carriers will not add up to 586 since many of these 
carriers received more than one intervention and can be counted multiple times in the various 
tables. The intervention types are presented in order of cost from lowest to highest. 
Of the intervention types, the CSP is the least expensive to perform. Table 52 shows that among 
244 carriers evaluated, the average cost is about $95 and the median cost is $72. 
Table 52. Cost and Related Statistics Per Carrier for the CSP (October 2008–May 2009, Phase II) 
Statistic Carriers Average Median Minimum Maximum 
Cost 244 $94.78 $71.99 $7.30 $551.89 
Labor Hours 244 1.97 1.50 0.25 11.50 
Government Miles 244 0.45 0.00 0.00 90.00 
Vouchers 244 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Expenses 244 0.05 0.00 0.00 6.07 
The NOV is the rarest of all interventions. In the 8-month period of Phase II under consideration, 
only six carriers received NOVs. Table 53 shows that the average cost of the NOV is 
approximately $118 and the median cost is $96. 
Table 53. Cost and Related Statistics Per Carrier for the NOV (October 2008–May 2009, Phase II) 
Statistic Carriers Average Median Minimum Maximum 
Cost 6 $117.87 $95.98 $21.08 $254.22 
Labor Hours 6 2.46 2.00 0.50 5.25 
Government Miles 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Vouchers 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Expenses 6 1.08 0.00 0.00 6.48 
The NOC was performed on 115 carriers during the 8 months under consideration. Table 54 
shows that the average cost per carrier is $428 and the median cost is $192. The disparity 
between the average and the median is due to a few large values that skew the average to the 
right. For example, note the maximum value of $4,799 is an extreme case. For this reason, both 
the average and the median are presented. 
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Table 54. Cost and Related Statistics Per Carrier for the NOC  
(October 2008–May 2009, Phase II) 
Statistic Carriers Average Median Minimum Maximum 
Cost 115 $427.56 $191.96 $7.30 $4,799.00 
Labor Hours 115 8.90 4.00 0.25 100.00 
Government Miles 115 0.56 0.00 0.00 64.00 
Vouchers 115 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Expenses 115 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Cost-related results for the three investigations are presented. The investigations tend to be more 
costly than the CSP, NOV, or NOC. Table 55 shows that for the 149 carriers receiving the offsite 
investigation, the average cost is $450 and the median cost $406. 
Table 55. Cost and Related Statistics Per Carrier for the Offsite Investigation  
(October 2008–May 2009, Phase II) 
Statistic Carriers Average Median Minimum Maximum 
Cost 149 $450.70 $405.94 $14.60 $1,435.00 
Labor Hours 149 9.55 8.50 0.50 30.00 
Government Miles 149 0.77 0.00 0.00 70.00 
Vouchers 149 0.27 0.00 0.00 40.96 
Expenses 149 0.75 0.00 0.00 14.49 
Table 56 shows cost-related results for 249 carriers receiving the onsite focused investigation. 
The average cost per carrier for this intervention is approximately $677 and the median cost is 
$588. 
Table 56. Cost and Related Statistics Per Carrier for the Onsite Focused Investigation  
(October 2008–May 2009, Phase II) 
Statistic Carriers Average Median Minimum Maximum 
Cost 249 $677.06 $587.88 $7.30 $2,207.54 
Labor Hours 249 13.31 11.75 0.25 46.00 
Government Miles 249 48.78 0.00 0.00 400.00 
Vouchers 249 8.55 0.00 0.00 360.00 
Expenses 249 2.08 0.00 0.00 337.87 
Finally, Table 57 shows cost-related results for the 128 carriers that received the onsite 
comprehensive investigation. This investigation is similar to a full CR and the average cost per 
carrier is approximately $1,040 while the median cost is about $880. 
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Table 57. Cost and Related Statistics Per Carrier for the Onsite Comprehensive Investigation 
(October 2008–May 2009, Phase II) 
Statistic Carriers Average Median Minimum Maximum 
Cost 128 $1,038.50 $876.84 $7.30 $7,736.67 
Labor hours 128 20.01 16.88 0.25 151.50 
Government miles 128 85.68 10.00 0.00 779.00 
Vouchers 128 24.88 0.00 0.00 424.00 
Expenses 128 3.62 0.00 0.00 229.60 
Table 58 provides a summary of the estimated costs associated with each CSA intervention type 
and the CR. Estimated annual costs for the test and non-test groups are also shown. These costs 
pertain to carriers in the original four States. 
Table 58. Summary of Costs in Dollars for Test Group Interventions and Non-Test Group CRs 
CSA Intervention Types Average Cost Median 
CSP $95 $72 
NOV $118 $96 
NOC $428 $192 
Offsite Investigation $451 $406 
Onsite Focused Investigation $677 $588 
Onsite Comprehensive Investigation $1,038 $877 
Warning Letter Nominal Nominal 
Estimated Annual Test Group Costs $675,000 
Non-Test Group 
CR $1,438 $1,058 
Estimated Annual Non-Test Group Costs $785,000 
In addition to the costs to FMCSA of performing interventions on carriers in the CSA 2010 
Operational Model Test, dollar amounts claimed from test and control group carriers are also 
presented. Dollar amounts settled are essentially the same as dollar amounts claimed and are not 
shown because any differences are negligible. The amounts shown are those claimed during the 
29 months of the Operational Model Test evaluation period and are restricted to those carriers in 
the original four states. Table 59 shows number of carriers, number of claims, and total dollar 
amounts claimed for both test and control carriers. Most carriers received one claim, but some 
received two claims, and a few received three, which explains why the number of claims is 
greater than the number of carriers. In addition to the total amount claimed, the average and 
median are shown. Because a few claims were large, the average is skewed as a large number 
and does not reflect the typical claim. The median is presented to represent the typical claim.  
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Table 59. Dollar Amounts Claimed From Test and Control Carriers 














Test 658 720 $3,611,547 $5,016 $2,200 
Control 601 640 $4,029,516 $6,296 $2,480 
Total 1,259 1,360 $7,641,063 $5,618 $2,265 
 
Based on the results in the table, it appears that there are no significant differences in the 
experience between test and control groups with respect to claims made. The number of carriers 
against whom claims were made is about the same. The average per claim is somewhat higher 
for the control group, but results are skewed by a few very large claims. Because of this, the 





11. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS (PROCESS REVIEW) AND 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
A survey of the field staff implementing the CSA program was conducted. The purpose was to 
collect their insights and perspective on both the process and results of the new system of 
identifying unsafe carriers and intervening. The survey was reasonably short in terms of the 
number of questions, but covered the broad areas of implementing the interventions, collecting 
and processing documentation from the carriers, and perspectives on the effectiveness of 
different interventions. The specific areas for the qualitative evaluation specified in the original 
statement of work for this project are the following: 
• Which interventions were effective in terms of ease of implementation? 
• To what extent was requesting documentation from carriers a problem? 
• To what extent was processing requested documentation from carriers a problem? 
• Which interventions should be made a part of a new FMCSA enforcement model, which 
should not? 
In implementing this survey in practice, a short survey instrument was developed consisting of 
eight primary questions with four additional questions probing for detail. The complete survey 
instrument is included in Appendix F. The questions all ask for a discussion response. None of 
the questions asked for a numerical rating or a categorical response, in which respondents would 
have to choose from a fixed list of answers. All were discussion questions, which allow 
respondents more latitude. 
The survey instrument was sent to 18 respondents—only nine of which were non-Federal (i.e., 
State) employees—with at least one from each of the original four test States, as well as 
representatives from all the other States that were added as “100 percent” test States. All 
respondents were assured of confidentiality, to get as frank responses as possible. The 
respondents were told that, within a State, they could collaborate on the answers if they wished. 
We received responses from eight States, including all four of the original test States: New 
Jersey, Colorado, Georgia, and Missouri. 
Overall, the evaluation of the CSA was quite positive, both with regard to the process and 
procedures as well as the outcomes in terms of identifying the right carriers for interventions and 
having the right tools to improve carrier behavior. There were some critiques of the method of 
prioritizing carriers for interventions and questions about the quality of the data used to score the 
BASICs (mostly having to do with the timeliness of the data) but overall the people who were 
actually operating the new system believe that the new CSA model represents a significant 
improvement over the prior SafeStat system. 
In terms of the CSA 2010 process for prioritizing carriers for intervention, one respondent 
remarked that he was seeing more carriers than in the past, and a different group of carriers. “I 
[attribute] the change to the new SMS safety yardstick that is being applied more equally across 
all carriers.” Thus, more carriers are being identified for attention, and they were seeing many 
carriers that they had not seen in the past. This respondent said that they were still seeing the 
 
90 
“traditional problem carriers” that they frequently dealt with but also carriers with which 
FMCSA had not had contact in the past. 
Most of the respondents felt that the prioritization system, to identify and rank carriers for action 
works well, though there were some questions about the balance struck in the new system 
between the number of BASICs failed by carriers and the length of time since the last contact. 
The investigation priority rules combine both the number of failed BASICs and the time since 
the last intervention. Carriers with one or more BASIC thresholds exceeded but which have not 
had a contact within the past 2 years are given a higher priority over carriers with more failed 
BASICs but who have been contacted (intervened upon) more recently. One respondent asked, 
“If a company is high risk and our own roadside information confirms this why should I assign a 
two BASIC carrier [two failed BASICs][for investigation] prior to a five BASIC carrier [five 
failed BASICs] in investigate two [second highest priority]?” Others shared this concern, though 
all acknowledged that some sort of trade-off is necessary between the length of time since the 
last contact and the number of failed BASICs. 
In related observations, several respondents commented on the effect of the amount of data from 
inspections and the time lag between the data (e.g., inspection results) and carriers’ current 
deficiencies. One respondent stated that older data carries too much weight and “we’re often left 
visiting carriers with few or no violations in the past year. . . . If they don’t have issues NOW, 
we’re . . . wasting time and energy seeing carriers that don’t necessarily need to be seen.” 
Another respondent urged that FMCSA “ensure adequate roadside inspection activity in the past 
6 to 12 months prior to assignment,” to provide the most current picture of carrier safety 
possible. These observations parallel the complaint above about the prioritization of 
investigations, that carriers who had not been contacted by FMCSA for a long period were 
prioritized over carriers with more failed BASICs but who had been seen more recently. The 
field staff is clearly focused on working with the highest risk carriers based on the most recent 
and complete data possible.  
Respondents were also asked about the intervention types recommended for carriers. Most 
indicated that the recommended intervention types were appropriate and that each intervention 
type was useful in different situations, depending on the response of the carrier. “We are in 
support of all established interventions. Each have their place. The offsite [investigation] is more 
specialized but can be effective.” Another commented that “ the recommended types of 
interventions shown in CSI [Comprehensive Safety Information Web site] for the interstate 
carriers have been spot on.” A couple commented that they appreciate and use flexibility in 
selecting intervention types. The general sentiment was that the intervention types recommended 
in CSI were appropriate, that each intervention type has a role to play, but that the investigation 
managers exercised their judgment in applying interventions in specific cases, based on 
circumstances. “Even the cutoff limit for what falls into full [onsite comprehensive investigation] 
or focused [onsite investigation] is normally not an issues [sic] since once a company gets 
beyond a certain point the comfort level of investigation manager/safety investigator] dictates a 
full [review] regardless.” In other words, while the investigation managers typically find the 
recommended interventions appropriate, they exercised discretion, recognizing the reality that 
the boundaries between different intervention types are flexible in some instances. 
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Several respondents indicated that they sometimes override the recommended prioritization of a 
carrier for intervention. This might mean investigating a carrier with a priority of three over one 
with two investigation managers in the test States indicated that this was done at times, but 
primarily “due to resource placement during the test phase.” During the Operational Model Test, 
in some cases safety investigators were assigned to either the test or control group within a State, 
meaning they either dealt with test carriers or with control carriers. Depending on their base 
location and the location of a carrier, situations might occur requiring a safety investigator to 
travel a great distance to deal with a problem carrier. investigation managers in most of the test 
States indicated that sometimes they assign safety investigators to investigate nearby carriers 
even if they were slightly lower in priority, simply to allocate resources more efficiently. One 
respondent also indicated that he regularly overrode recommended offsite investigations when it 
would be quicker to simply drop by the carrier’s office to get the information needed.  
Respondents also indicated that they would override the recommended intervention type if 
circumstances warranted during an investigation. One example given was if a carrier refused to 
work with a safety investigator, in which case an offsite investigation would be upgraded to an 
onsite investigation. Investigators also reported changing the intervention type if additional 
information uncovered during the investigation merited a change in the intervention level. One 
investigation manager estimated this occurred in 10–15 percent of investigations. Others said 
that they don’t change the type often, though they did not quantify what “often” meant.  
Another respondent indicated that he would change the intervention type based on trends for a 
carrier. The BASIC scores and therefore whether a BASIC threshold is exceeded can vary from 
month to month, based on the window of data available. If a specific BASIC for a carrier was 
close to being deficient, but not over the threshold, the investigator may treat the BASIC as 
“likely to be deficient” and the type of intervention would be changed accordingly. (This 
assumes, of course, that the carrier has already been prioritized for intervention based on other 
BASICs.) On the other hand, a BASIC score may drop below the violation threshold, and the 
original intervention type would need to be overridden to apply a more appropriate intervention. 
As one respondent commented, “[t]he data [are] always changing.” 
Overall, when asked, respondents felt that the CSA 2010 model represented a positive change 
over the previous SafeStat system. One respondent stated that CSA 2010 was “[t]remendous 
improvement” over SafeStat. Another wrote that on a 10-point scale, “SafeStat=5 and the CSA 
SMS = 9+.” “The big advantages to CSA is all roadside violations are used. . . . Overall, CSA is 
superior to SafeStat.” Another said that it was “better but could still be improved.” 
One investigation manager indicated that the new Operational Model was not significantly 
different from an assignment point of view, pointing to some parallels in the rating system: A/B 
carriers in SafeStat and “mandatory review” carriers in CSA 2010. And another thought that 
CSA 2010 was an improvement over SafeStat in identifying problem carriers, but the reason 
given was that the data window in CSA is shorter than SafeStat. This same respondent expressed 
concern earlier about the use of older data to identify problem carriers, asserting that violations 
more than a year old were not reflective of the current status of the carrier. This person said that 
CSA was better that SafeStat since the data window was 24 rather than 30 months, but still stated 
that the older data is not useful. In this person’s view, only the current state of carrier violations 
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are useful. Using results from inspections more than a year old “can result in our conducting 
investigations on carriers with few or no violations in the past year.” 
On the other hand, drawing on the fact that CSA 2010 significantly increases the range of data 
from inspections used in evaluating carriers, some respondents pointed to the greater resolution 
in CSA 2010 in identifying problem areas within a carrier, stating that this allowed investigators 
to more easily find and work on deficiencies. One characterized CSA 2010 as a “much richer and 
more defined tool as opposed to SafeStat. . . . [I]t allows a much clearer view of a carrier’s 
compliance breakdowns and enables the Division to task resources accordingly.” 
Several questions in the survey addressed the process of certain interventions, specifically in off-
site investigations where documentation is requested from a carrier and then reviewed for further 
action. The two major issues addressed in the survey were how well carriers responded to these 
document requests and what problems arose in processing the documents once they were 
received. 
A wide variety of issues were raised. Document transfers can be bulky, so in some cases the 
safety investigator will arrange to have the carrier prepare a package with the documents and 
then have a near-by enforcement officer pick it up. Some respondents simply indicated that the 
response to document requests was reasonably successful or “[i]t is working fine.” Others 
provided more nuanced responses. 
The willingness and ability of carriers to comply with the document requests depends on a 
number of factors. An offsite request for documents is easier to ignore by the carrier. Several 
respondents indicated that small carriers do not have someone dedicated to compliance and often 
they have many other tasks and are not familiar with complying with the request. Timeliness is 
also an issue for small carriers when they do not have a dedicated compliance person. Companies 
that have had prior document requests are better able to supply the documents. One investigation 
manager speculated that “[i]t may be more efficient to take a day or two to do a focused onsite 
review than to do an offsite review and hope a carrier sends the documents that you need 
especially in the case of owner/operators.” This is an example of changing the intervention type 
to get a more efficient investigation. 
Several emphasized that good compliance on document requests depends on strong and clear 
communication. In some cases there are problems identifying the exact documents needed 
because carriers use different terms for the documents. One indicated that generally his Division 
got good results in document requests. Carriers are “vetted” in advance and those that seem 
“uncooperative or non-responsive are tasked for onsite focused reviews.” This respondent went 
on to say: “As long as the requests are specific and not too ‘broad’ document submission [is] 
highly successful. The use of a document request letter is an effective method to ensure a carrier 
provides the records and the proper records. Also, establishing a due date with the carrier for 
receipt of records and including same in the letter [is helpful].” 
As might be expected, there was a wide variety of experiences in document requests, and the 
result really depended on the responsiveness of the carriers. One survey respondent said that he 
had some good experiences in offsite investigations, including some with small, one or two 
driver carriers and others with large carriers. But there are also some offsite investigations that 
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“involved multiple phone calls to the carriers to initially make contact with them, then multiple 
phone calls to them again when we did not receive any of the requested documents, then multiple 
phone calls to them when we did not receive the right documents. Then more multiple attempts 
to contact the carriers in order to close out the reviews.” This respondent said the off-site 
investigation as such did not really save a lot of time, but that his investigators did realize time-
saving by “the past practice of almost always completing onsite comprehensive reviews as 
opposed to onsite focused reviews . . . Now we are seeing [fewer] carriers in CSI that require a 
full audit (as opposed to focused).” 
With respect to the process of requesting documents from the carriers, there was no systematic 
problem that was identified by the survey respondents. Some experienced good cooperation, 
while others had specific instances where the process was drawn out by the lack of cooperation 
from the carrier. Most said that small carriers were less likely to produce the correct 
documentation in a timely fashion, either because carriers did not understand what was required, 
were not familiar with the documents, or they were juggling multiple responsibilities. Good, 
clear, and consistent communication was emphasized, and failing that, converting to an onsite 
investigation was an option. 
In terms of processing the documents once they are received, about half of survey respondents 
did not report any problems. For the rest, the primary issue raised was the sheer volume of 
records. Some indicated that sometimes wrong and incomplete files were received. But the larger 
problem was simply processing the volume of records received. Some indicated problems in 
working with electronic documents. While printing the documents is expensive, reviewing 
voluminous electronic documents is time-consuming. Effective review requires organization and 
arrangement to be efficient. One respondent indicated that using multiple monitors can help in 
reviewing electronic documents.  
Document retention was also reported as a problem with the document requests. The volume can 
threaten to overwhelm existing IT systems for retention. 
One outcome of the investigations is to identify “process breakdowns,” which result in 
noncompliance with motor carrier regulations. The survey respondents were asked to evaluate 
how well this works and what primary lessons learned.  
Overall, respondents felt the process works well and offered many positive comments. One 
called it a “[v]aluable tool both for enforcement and industry,” and said that the safety 
management wheel graphic “helps [carriers] to visually see how all aspects of a carrier[‘]s 
operations have impacts to safety.” Another felt that the “Process Breakdown process is 
tremendous improvement in identifying unsafe motor carrier operations. FMCSA’s traditional 
model focused on identifying violations, particularly ‘Critical’ and ‘Acute’ violations. However, 
this new process has focused the investigation toward identifying any and all performance 
behaviors which may lead to unsafe operations.” The survey respondent said that it was well 
received by carriers and investigators, one of the best parts of the new CSA 2010 model. “Motor 
carriers seem more understanding of their actual problems when they are explained not in terms 




Another stated that it “needs to be a critical element of almost every intervention. There will be 
some ‘repeat’ offenders that do not need a process breakdown, because the carrier has 
consciously chosen a path of non-compliance. The vast majority of carriers, however, would 
benefit from this process (which existed before CSA, but was never adequately documented) and 
it indicates that the Agency’s mission is to reduce accidents through whatever means necessary, 
not always just fines and penalties.” 
Some respondents said that the process of identifying the critical reasons for noncompliance does 
not result in changed carrier behavior in all instances, because some carriers are not motivated to 
comply. “There will be some ‘repeat’ offenders that do not need a process breakdown, because 
the carrier has consciously chosen a path of non-compliance.” Another respondent indicated that 
some of the CSI Web site’s recommended readings for the carriers on safety and compliance 
were “lacking.” He said that many of the carriers are small ones and the owners would not take 
the time to read the references, or know what to do with them. “Many of the articles lack any real 
specific helpful tip in running a motor carrier business.” No other respondent made this point, 
however. 
With respect to the interventions that are typically used after an investigation—CSP, NOV, and 
NOC—survey respondents indicated generally that the range of tools available was appropriate 
and adequate. No one proposed any other intervention type. And no one argued that any of the 
interventions was not needed. Most also emphasized that discretion and flexibility in choosing 
and applying an intervention was very useful.  
One respondent said that “experienced safety staff” are “aware of the point at which enforcement 
should be taken.” He also stated that it is appropriate to have alternatives to monetary penalties 
(by implication the NOV and CSP) when doing nothing is not acceptable. In other words, a 
monetary penalty through a NOC is not always the most effective way to achieve compliance. A 
NOV or CSP can also be useful tools for some carriers. 
Another commented that “[t]he procedure works, as long as the division office continues to have 
discretion, as well. Generally, we follow the guidelines, but there are times when we are more 
inclined to do a NOV while the recommendation is for a NOC. With division discretion, we are 
able to do that.” Several of the respondents emphasized that allowing some discretion and 
judgment in choosing post-investigations was essential for efficiency and compliance, and that 
the investigation managers and safety investigators could exercise that judgment. “[T]here are 
times when we are more inclined to do a NOV while the recommendation is for a NOC.” 
Another respondent agreed, saying that “[i]f the violations do not warrant an NOV or an NOC, 
and the carrier does not display a positive attitude toward safety, then the CSP is warranted. … It 
is … good to have many different options at our disposal to get the carrier into compliance.” 
Selecting and employing the most effective tool to bring carriers into compliance, as opposed to 
punishing them, was the consistent theme in almost all responses. 
One objected that for some violations, discretion is taken out of the investigator’s hands. For 
some violations types and for some carrier types (e.g., passenger carriers), current policy 
prohibits NOVs and requires that they be included in an NOC. More than one respondent said 
that this inflexibility prevented them from using the NOV to bring about carrier compliance. 
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“The issue is when current policy (i.e. section 222 or passenger carrier policy that prohibits 
NOV’s) takes the selection from the hands of those involved.” 
Another respondent raised an almost philosophical question about using an NOC when, in his 
view, the CSA approach is to identify causal factors and processes for correction.  
The traditional notice of claim process was aimed at enforcement for “Critical” 
and “Acute” violations, not process breakdowns. Since the new model is strongly 
based on identifying causal factors and process breakdowns (which is evident in 
our usage of all roadside violation data when calculating BASIC measurements, 
not just out of service data), should we be officially using the same approach 
when initiating enforcement actions[?] This is particularly concerning since most 
of the causal factors and process breakdowns discovered during compliance 
reviews begin or are the result of non-critical and non-acute violations. 
NOVs were generally considered to be effective for most carriers. “The NOV gets their attention 
and initiates action which is what we want.” One respondent observed that NOVs seem 
particularly effective in the current environment since the carriers have more motivation to avoid 
the monetary penalty of an NOC. “NOV’s require corrective action and have a varied number of 
uses with or without contact with the subject carrier. They are monitored, tracked and counted 
which allows the safety investigator to receive credit for work completed. They further 
demonstrate the Agency’s mission and provide the safety investigator the opportunity [to] utilize 
their onsite skills to determine the correct course of action, or give the carrier a ‘chance’ to 
comply prior to assessing a civil penalty.” 
Others agreed with this observation but said that the NOC also must be included in the range of 
tools available. “[T]he notice of claim process is traditionally FMCSA’s most effective tool for 
changing behavior.” Moreover, an NOV requires resources to track and monitor carriers and can 
be time consuming. Several said that the NOV requires a commitment of resources to followup 
to ensure that behavior has changed. One suggested NOVs for violations that are easy to correct. 
Many violations where policy dictates a NOC could be handled with an NOV. “NOVs force the 
carrier to correct the violation, while NOCs simply require that they pay money.” 
Opinion was more varied about the value of CSPs. Some indicated that the value of a CSP was 
that it forced a carrier to think through his or her operations and to consider what they can do to 
improve them. “[I]f the carrier is taking the time and effort to put in writing their plan of action 
as to how they are going to fix the problem or essentially the violation, then there’s a 
presumption that they understand the problem and are more likely to stick with their plan to 
correct the problem.” Moreover, the CSP establishes a basis for further action if the carrier fails 
to follow through on the CSP. Lessons learned in addressing one area of concern could be used 
in improving operations in other areas. On the other hand, one respondent pointed out that if the 
CSP is not mandatory, if “there are no consequences for failing to complete one, the value 
becomes questionable.” 
A few of the respondents said that in their experience CSPs were effective. “We have seen a 
noticeable positive change in some of our carrier’s BASIC deficiencies during the 6 to 8 month 
periods following a compliance review [after] which the carrier received a CSP.” More of the 
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respondents, however, indicated that they did not know whether CSPs were effective, because 
they had not seen any data on the outcomes. “We have had carriers do [a] CSP but I do not know 
if this has contributed to the company safety practices or not.” And one respondent reported poor 
results from CSPs, but primarily because consultants employed by the carriers advise them not to 
sign the CSP. The CSPs are essentially a voluntary process, and this respondent indicated that 
the carriers indifferent to compliance are not willing to finalize. In this person’s experience, 
CSPs are used for carriers with no serious violations, “in other words, the carriers who are 
substantially in compliance already.” 
Overall, the respondents’ views on the CSA 2010 process were generally positive. Most agreed 
that CSA 2010 represents a significant improvement over the SafeStat process. More carriers are 
“touched” by CSA than under the previous regime. They are seeing the same carriers as before 
but also a large number of new carriers, who are discovering that FMCSA is monitoring their 
safety and is requiring compliance. The respondents generally agree that the system is 
identifying the right carriers for interventions and provides the right tools to bring carriers into 
compliance. Several stated, in different contexts, that using all available data on safety is the 
right thing to do. 
Several emphasized the usefulness of preserving flexibility in the local divisions. Their approach 
is clearly predicated on bringing carriers into compliance and they believe that they have the 
experience, knowledge, and discretion to choose the best tools to do so. Each of the interventions 
was regarded as useful, depending on the situation. Some were unwilling to vouch for the 
effectiveness of certain intervention types, specifically the CSP, but virtually all clearly indicated 
that each intervention type could be useful in different situations. It also appears from their 
comments that most regarded most carriers as willing to comply with the regulations, though 
there are some carriers who are indifferent to compliance and would not comply without 
coercion. 
Several raised questions about the system of assigning priority to carriers for interventions and 
the relevance of the data used to measure safety. The process of assigning priority order for 
investigation includes both the time since the last contact with the carrier along with the severity 
of the violations. Some of the respondents thought that there was too much emphasis on the 
interval of time since the last carrier contact, and who prefer to put more stress on the current 
violations of carriers. In that regard, they challenged the relevance of violations committed over 
a year ago. The investigators would like more safety data and more recent safety data. 
Overall, however, the survey of the field staff showed widespread support for the CSA 2010 




12. TEST-ONLY STATES 
In addition to the four original States in which carriers were randomly allocated into a test group 
and a control group, five additional States were added as test-only States as the Operational 
Model Test progressed. As such, all carriers in the newly added States were test carriers and 
subject to CSA 2010 interventions. According to data recorded in the CSA 2010 files, the five 
States were added at varying times: 
• Minnesota: April 2009. 
• Montana: July 2009. 
• Delaware, Kansas, Maryland: October 2009. 
Since these States were added as the test proceeded, they do not provide 29 months of data, but 
data from time to inclusion until June 2010. Data collected from the four original States are more 
consistent with each other since these States were included in the test at the same time, and 29 
months of data were recorded for the majority of carriers. However, the same information that is 
recorded for test carriers in the original four States is also recorded for test carriers in the five 
test-only States. Therefore, data recorded on test carriers in the new States can in some sense be 
used to validate certain findings presented for carriers in the original four States. 
12.1 SAFETY MEASUREMENT THRESHOLDS EXCEEDED IN TEST-ONLY 
STATES 
Inspection of SMS data on the test-only States suggests that by January 2010, all test-only 
carriers had been added to the database. After that time, until June, 2010, the total number of 
test-only carriers remains fairly stable. Table 60 shows the distribution of test-only carriers by 
number of SMS thresholds exceeded during the month of January 2010. Due to some 
differences, Minnesota and Montana have been categorized into one group, and Delaware, 
Kansas, and Maryland into another. For Minnesota and Montana, results are very similar to 
results presented in Table 7 from the original four States. The majority of carriers did not exceed 
any SMS thresholds, while 6.0 percent exceeded at least one. For the other three States, the 
results are a little different. In Delaware, Kansas, and Maryland combined, about 4.1 percent of 
carriers exceeded at least one threshold. 
Table 60. Number of SMS Thresholds Exceeded (Test-Only States, January 2010) 
Thresholds Exceeded Carriers (MN, MT) Percent Carriers (DE, KS, MD) Percent 
0 22,230 94.0% 37,590 95.9% 
1 1,027 4.3% 1,176 3.0% 
2 268 1.1% 325 0.8% 
3 83 0.4% 86 0.2% 
4 31 0.1% 28 0.1% 
5+ 7 <0.1% 10 <0.1% 
Total 23,646 100.0% 39,215 100.0% 
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When carriers exceed any threshold, they usually exceed only one. Table 61 shows the 
percentage of carriers that exceeded each of the BASIC thresholds for carriers that exceeded one 
threshold. Results are also broken out by two groups of States. As in the original four States, 
Fatigued Driving and Vehicle Maintenance have the largest percentages. However, in Minnesota 
and Montana, the percentage for Fatigued Driving is 43.8 percent (compared to 35.2 percent for 
all carriers in the original four test states). In Delaware, Kansas, and Maryland, the largest 
percentage of carriers exceeding a threshold is 28.5 percent for the Vehicle Maintenance BASIC. 
The Driver Fitness BASIC also shows some differences, with 1.7 percent of carriers exceeding 
that threshold in Minnesota and Montana, but 13.8 percent in the other three States. 
Table 61. SMS Threshold Exceeded for Carriers Exceeding One Threshold 
(Test-Only States, January 2010) 




(DE, KS, MD) 
Carriers 
(DE, KS, MD) 
Percent 
1–Unsafe Driving 94 9.2% 124 10.5% 
2–Fatigued Driving 450 43.8% 285 24.2% 
3–Driver Fitness 17 1.7% 162 13.8% 
4–Controlled Substance/ Alcohol 4 0.4% 21 1.8% 
5–Vehicle Maintenance 211 20.5% 335 28.5% 
6–Improper Loading/Cargo Securement 201 19.6% 188 16.0% 
7–Crash Indicator 50 4.9% 61 5.2% 
Total 1,027 100.0% 1,176 100.0% 
12.2 INTERVENTIONS THAT CARRIERS RECEIVED IN TEST-ONLY STATES 
Table 62 shows the percentage of carriers with interventions by number of interventions received 
for the test-only carriers in the five States. There were 4,763 carriers that received 5,957 
interventions at any time after these States were added to the test. Among carriers that received 
interventions, 78.8 percent received one. An additional 17.8 percent received two interventions. 
Relatively few carriers received more than two interventions, with approximately 3.4 percent 
receiving three or more. 
Table 62. Percent of Carriers Receiving Interventions by Number of Interventions, 
Test-Only States 
Number of Interventions Carriers Total Interventions Percent Carriers 
1 3,755 3,755 78.8% 
2 847 1,694 17.8% 
3 139 417 2.9% 
4 19 76 0.4% 
5 3 15 0.1% 
Total 4,763 5,957 100.0% 
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Table 63 shows the percentage of carriers that received interventions when the last intervention 
is closed/completed (all tasks completed and the intervention closed). In this case, results are 
restricted to the 3,703 carriers that received 4,459 interventions.  
Table 63. Percent of Carriers Receiving Interventions by Number of Interventions, Last 
Intervention Closed/Completed, Test-Only States 
Number of Interventions Carriers Total Interventions Percent Carriers 
1 3,069 3,069 82.9% 
2 527 1,054 14.2% 
3 95 285 2.6% 
4 9 36 0.2% 
5 3 15 0.1% 
Total 3,703 4,459 100.0% 
Table 64 shows the distribution of carriers with interventions by the last closed/completed 
intervention. In some sense, these carriers represent a group for potential evaluation since the last 
one is closed/completed. However, closed/completed only means that the safety investigator has 
completed tasks associated with a particular intervention, and not that any safety issues have 
been necessarily resolved. A carrier is still likely being monitored for potential additional 
interventions. 
Among carriers with one closed/completed intervention, 76.3 percent received warning letters. 
An additional 9.6 percent received the onsite focused investigation, 8.0 percent received the 
onsite comprehensive, and 5.5 percent received the offsite investigation. For carriers with two or 
more interventions in which the last intervention is closed/completed, the NOC is most common. 
Among carriers with two interventions, the NOC represents 26.9 percent, and the onsite focused 
25.4 percent. Percentages associated with the CSP and the NOV are relatively small. This may 
partly be due to the test-only States being added at later times during the Operational Model 
Test, and the CSP and NOV tend to be terminal interventions.
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Table 64. Distribution of Carriers With Interventions by Last Closed/Completed Intervention  



























































































12.3 CARRIERS TOUCHED BY CSA 2010 IN TEST-ONLY STATES 
Table 65 shows the annual percentage of carriers with interventions based on the six months 
from January, 2010, through June, 2010. This 6-month period was chosen because all five test-
only States were participating fully in the test during this time, according to information recorded 
in the CSA 2010 database. The total number of carriers with interventions is 1,978 and the 
average number over 6 months is 47,099. The annual percentage expected to be touched is 8.4 
percent. This compares to 9.9 percent shown in Table 14 for carriers in the original four States. 
Table 65. Annual Percentage of Test Group Carriers With Recent Activity Touched by 
Interventions  










of Carriers With 
Interventions 
Annual Percent of 
Carriers With 
Interventions 
47,099 2,322 1,978 3,956 8.4% 
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13. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION  
In accordance with its primary mission to reduce crashes, injuries, and fatalities involving large 
trucks and buses, the FMCSA initiated the CSA 2010 Operational Model Test. Major goals of 
the test were to improve the current process used to monitor and assess the safety performance of 
motor carriers and drivers operating on the Nation’s highways. The CSA 2010 program focused 
on initiating contact with more carriers and drivers, development of a new measurement system 
to replace SafeStat, application of a wider range of progressive interventions to correct high-risk 
behavior, and more efficient use of Agency resources.  
Originally, the test was conducted in Colorado, Georgia, Missouri, and New Jersey. Carriers in 
these States were randomly divided into a test group that was subject to the provisions of the new 
CSA Operational Model, and a control group that would continue to be monitored by the 
Agency’s current process. For the four original States, the test ran for 29 months from February, 
2008, through June, 2010. However, five additional States (Montana, Minnesota, Maryland, 
Kansas, and Delaware) were phased into the program as test-only States at various times as the 
test proceeded. 
The CSA process begins for a carrier when a carrier exceeds one of the BASIC thresholds of the 
new SMS. The carrier is then subject to any number of various interventions, depending on the 
type and number of thresholds exceeded. The intervention process is designed to address the 
specific behavior that precipitated the intervention, namely, exceeding at least one SMS 
threshold, so that further interventions are not necessary.  
This report is an evaluation of the CSA 2010 Operational Model Test. The evaluation focuses on 
the key components of the Operational Model. In particular, the thresholds exceeded in terms of 
type and frequency, the interventions received in terms of type and frequency, and the number 
and percentage of carriers touched under the new model are calculated and reported. Intervention 
cycles and patterns were explored and effectiveness of interventions was assessed by comparing 
test carriers that received CSA 2010 interventions to control carriers that did not receive CSA 
interventions, and to control carriers that received traditional CRs. Costs to the agency of 
performing CSA2010 interventions and total amounts claimed were investigated and compared 
to the current process of conducting CRs. The new SMS that is used to rank a carrier’s safety 
performance in the seven BASICs was evaluated largely by assessing associations between 
percentile scores and crash rates. Comparisons were made with the current model under SafeStat, 
and quality of the MCMIS data files used by both measurement systems was assessed. Finally, 
results from a survey completed by field staff participating in the Operational Model Test were 
presented to determine which aspects of CSA 2010 worked well and which did not. 
Overall, approximately 6.1 percent of carriers exceeded at least one of the SMS thresholds. 
Approximately 4.5 percent exceeded one threshold and 1.3 percent exceeded two. Only about 0.3 
percent exceeded more than two. Vehicle Maintenance and Fatigued Driving thresholds were 
most likely exceeded. For carriers that exceeded only one threshold, these two BASICs 
accounted for about 73 percent of the total. When multiple thresholds were exceeded, in addition 
to these two, the Unsafe Driving BASIC tended to be included. 
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For carriers receiving interventions, about 50 percent received one. Among intervention patterns, 
the Warning Letter, with no interventions following thereafter, was by far the most likely. About 
one-third of all intervention patterns consisted of a warning letter followed by no other 
interventions (Figure 24). Most patterns were characterized by one or two interventions. Often 
they involved one of the investigations (offsite, onsite focused, onsite comprehensive) either as 
the first intervention, or following the warning letter. The CSP and the NOC tend to be terminal 
interventions, and usually occurred as the second or third intervention. The NOV was rarely 
used. 
Annually, it is estimated that CSA interventions will touch approximately 6.3 percent of the 
carrier population (based on all interventions, including warning letters). This compares to about 
2.2 percent of carriers that receive full CRs under the current process. Therefore, the number of 
carriers touched by CSA on an annual basis is approximately 6.3/2.2 = 2.9 times greater than the 
current system based on CRs alone. When restricted to carriers with recent activity, CSA is 
expected to touch about 9.9 percent of the population. (Excluding warning letters, the percentage 
of carriers expected to be investigated annually under the CSA program is about 6.2 percent. ) 
The corresponding percent of “recent activity” carriers with CRs is 3.2 percent. The ratio 9.9/3.2 
= 3.1 remains fairly constant. 
The effectiveness of CSA 2010 interventions was assessed by comparing test carriers that 
received CSA 2010 interventions to control carriers that did not. Three control groups were 
considered. One control group consisted of control carriers without CRs. In terms of safety risk, 
this group was considered to be a mild group. Another group consisted of carriers with CRs. This 
group was considered to be representative of high-risk carriers. The third group was sampled 
from control carriers to have safety characteristics similar to test carriers prior to evaluation. 
Carriers were then followed over a 12-month period and evaluated on the percentage of SMS 
thresholds exceeded. The procedure is described in detail in section 8 and Figure 15 depicts a 
timeline of events. 
It appears that the FMCSA was most successful in bringing carriers under SMS thresholds in 
cases where a Warning Letter was followed by no other interventions. After 12 months of 
followup, approximately 17 percent of test carriers were still exceeding at least one SMS 
threshold, compared to about 45 percent of control carriers matched to test carriers. Carriers 
addressed with a “warning letter only” tended to have milder violations, so that the warning letter 
sufficed to resolve the problem. As discussed above, this intervention pattern was also found to 
be the most prevalent, accounting for one-third of the patterns and giving the largest sample size 
of carriers for evaluation. 
The effectiveness of the investigations (offsite, onsite focused, onsite comprehensive) was also 
examined for carriers with one intervention. A similar pattern emerged. There appeared to be a 
lag time of about eight months before carriers with these interventions improved. Once they did 
show signs of improvement, however, generally a smaller percentage of them exceeded the 
BASIC threshold values than their counterparts in the control groups. For example, for the onsite 
focused investigation, after 12 months of followup, 40.6 percent of test carriers were still 
exceeding at least one SMS threshold, compared to about 56.7 percent of control carriers 
matched to test carriers, and about 60 percent for control group carriers receiving traditional 
 
103 
CRs. Unlike the “warning letter only” pattern, however, sample sizes for carriers with 
interventions based on investigations are smaller. 
For carriers with multiple interventions, it is more difficult to assess the effects that interventions 
had on safety behavior. For example, intervention patterns that ended in an NOC generally took 
about 1 year to be closed/completed (all tasks completed and the intervention closed). In 
addition, these carriers tend to be high-risk carriers from the beginning and during the 
investigation process. Therefore, many of these carriers still exceeded SMS thresholds after the 
investigation became closed/completed, and the test group does not show lower percentages of 
thresholds exceeded than a control group even after matching controls on crash rates and BASIC 
scores. However, for carriers with interventions ending in a NOC, Figure 25 shows test carriers 
initially having high percentages of any thresholds exceeded and improving relative to the 
control group with CRs and matched to the test group after 12 months of followup. 
Costs to FMCSA of performing CSA 2010 interventions on carriers in the Operational Model 
Test were investigated. All CSA2010 interventions considered were those that were classified as 
closed/completed to ensure that all tasks performed during a particular intervention have been 
completed. For comparison, costs to the Agency of performing CRs on control group carriers 
under the current enforcement program were also calculated. The estimated average cost per 
carrier for all interventions performed is $754, while the median cost is $590. When restricting to 
SafeStat A/B carriers, the average cost is $1,032 and the median cost is $824. For comparison, 
the average cost for non-test carriers receiving CRs is $1,438 and the median is $1,058. 
In addition to the costs to FMCSA of performing interventions on carriers, dollar amounts 
claimed from test and control group carriers were also calculated. During the 29 month 
evaluation period of the Operational Model Test, 720 claims were made on test carriers and 640 
claims were made on control carriers in the original four states. The average amount per claim 
was $5,016 for test carriers and $6,296 for control carriers. Because a few carriers had very large 
claims, the average does not reflect the typical claim, and the median is a better statistic for 
comparison. For test carriers the median is $2,200 and for control carriers the median is $2,480. 
The conclusion is that there is not a significant difference in the experience between test and 
control carriers with respect to claims made. 
The SMS was evaluated to determine to what extent the SMS identifies unsafe carriers. Crash 
rates were calculated for carriers that exceeded the BASIC thresholds, and were compared to the 
crash rates of carriers that did not exceed any BASIC thresholds. Crash rates were also calculated 
for carriers identified under the current SafeStat system and compared to those under the SMS. 
In addition, scatter plots were made to assess associations between BASIC percentiles and crash 
rates. To provide a large sample of carriers, crash rates were calculated using 473,847 carriers 
not participating in the CSA 2010 test. 
For all BASICs, crash rates were higher for carriers exceeding SMS thresholds than for carriers 
not exceeding thresholds. The crash rate was highest for carriers exceeding the Unsafe Driving 
threshold. Rates were also high for the Fatigued Driving BASIC and the Controlled Substance 
and Alcohol BASIC. The SMS also identified many more carriers for intervention than did 
SafeStat. Scatter plots indicate that all of the BASIC measures have positive associations with 
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crash rates, except for the Driver Fitness and Loading/Cargo Securement BASICs. Excluding the 
Crash Indicator, the Unsafe Driving BASIC has the strongest association with crash rates. 
A survey of field staff participating in the Operational Model Test was conducted to determine 
which aspects of CSA 2010 worked well and which did not. The purpose was to collect their 
insights and perspective on both the process and results of the new system of identifying unsafe 
carriers and intervening. Responses were received from eight States, including all four of the 
original test States: New Jersey, Colorado, Georgia, and Missouri. Overall, the evaluation of 
CSA 2010 was quite positive, in terms of identifying the right carriers for interventions and 
having the right tools to improve carrier behavior. There were some critiques of the method of 
prioritizing carriers for interventions and questions about the quality of the data used to score the 
BASICs (mostly having to do with the timeliness of the data) but, overall the people who were 
actually operating the new system believe that the new CSA model represents a significant 
improvement over the prior SafeStat system.
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APPENDIX A: SUPPORTING DATA FOR PLOTS WITH 12 
MONTHS FOLLOWUP (SECTION 7) 
Table 66. BASIC 1: Unsafe Driving Test 
Month BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 132 132 100.0% 
1 116 132 87.9% 
2 93 128 72.7% 
3 77 121 63.6% 
4 60 111 54.1% 
5 47 106 44.3% 
6 36 98 36.7% 
7 25 91 27.5% 
8 23 84 27.4% 
9 16 81 19.8% 
10 12 78 15.4% 
11 12 74 16.2% 
12 10 69 14.5% 
Table 67. BASIC 1: Unsafe Driving Test  
Control Without CR 
Month BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 667 667 100.0% 
1 570 667 85.5% 
2 524 651 80.5% 
3 458 634 72.2% 
4 406 611 66.4% 
5 363 591 61.4% 
6 304 573 53.1% 
7 273 554 49.3% 
8 245 537 45.6% 
9 227 517 43.9% 
10 210 488 43.0% 
11 196 463 42.3% 




Table 68. BASIC 2: Fatigued Driving Test 
Month BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 693 693 100.0% 
1 588 693 84.8% 
2 517 677 76.4% 
3 444 650 68.3% 
4 391 605 64.6% 
5 337 588 57.3% 
6 289 573 50.4% 
7 255 551 46.3% 
8 224 525 42.7% 
9 200 504 39.7% 
10 181 486 37.2% 
11 146 465 31.4% 
12 110 447 24.6% 
Table 69. BASIC 2: Fatigued Driving 
Control Without CR 
Month BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 2037 2037 100.0% 
1 1733 2037 85.1% 
2 1575 1991 79.1% 
3 1423 1942 73.3% 
4 1287 1885 68.3% 
5 1210 1845 65.6% 
6 1102 1801 61.2% 
7 983 1758 55.9% 
8 915 1714 53.4% 
9 826 1661 49.7% 
10 790 1615 48.9% 
11 719 1560 46.1% 




Table 70. BASIC 3: Driver Fitness Test 
Month BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 121 121 100.0% 
1 107 121 88.4% 
2 89 118 75.4% 
3 73 109 67.0% 
4 56 103 54.4% 
5 51 100 51.0% 
6 40 96 41.7% 
7 33 94 35.1% 
8 26 91 28.6% 
9 25 86 29.1% 
10 21 82 25.6% 
11 21 75 28.0% 
12 14 73 19.25% 
Table 71. BASIC 3: Driver Fitness 
Control Without CR 
Month BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 454 454 100.0% 
1 384 454 84.6% 
2 329 440 74.8% 
3 308 428 72.0% 
4 282 420 67.1% 
5 250 410 61.0% 
6 222 399 55.6% 
7 206 393 52.4% 
8 189 381 49.6% 
9 169 373 45.3% 
10 154 365 42.2% 
11 143 359 39.8% 




Table 72. BASIC 5: Vehicle Maintenance Test 
Month BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 692 692 100.0% 
1 583 692 84.2% 
2 514 673 76.4% 
3 451 656 68.8% 
4 373 620 60.2% 
5 329 598 55.0% 
6 286 578 49.5% 
7 245 556 44.1% 
8 209 531 39.4% 
9 176 508 34.6% 
10 154 484 31.8% 
11 128 468 27.4% 
12 111 442 25.1% 
Table 73. BASIC 5: Vehicle Maintenance 
Control Without CR 
Month BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 2216 2216 100.0% 
1 1894 2216 85.5% 
2 1716 2175 78.9% 
3 1552 2113 73.5% 
4 1401 2049 68.4% 
5 1322 2010 65.8% 
6 1240 1968 63.0% 
7 1139 1917 59.4% 
8 1060 1875 56.5% 
9 991 1832 54.1% 
10 894 1767 50.6% 
11 838 1706 49.1% 




Table 74. BASIC 6: Improper Loading/Cargo Securement Test 
Month BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 188 188 100.0% 
1 162 188 86.2% 
2 145 184 78.8% 
3 112 178 62.9% 
4 100 169 59.2% 
5 87 162 53.7% 
6 78 157 49.7% 
7 76 155 49.0% 
8 64 150 42.7% 
9 65 147 44.2% 
10 60 142 42.3% 
11 55 138 39.9% 
12 48 135 35.6% 
Table 75. BASIC 6: Improper Loading/Cargo Securement 
Control Without CR 
Month BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 685 685 100.0% 
1 584 685 85.3% 
2 527 673 78.3% 
3 480 662 72.5% 
4 446 649 68.7% 
5 411 637 64.5% 
6 386 629 61.4% 
7 362 619 58.5% 
8 342 609 56.2% 
9 331 600 55.2% 
10 320 588 54.4% 
11 309 577 53.6% 









APPENDIX B: SUPPORTING DATA FOR PLOTS WITH 12 
MONTHS FOLLOWUP (SECTION 8) 
Table 76. Intervention Pattern: Warning Letter Only Test 
Month Any BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 1,749 1,749 100.0% 
1 1,261 1,749 72.1% 
2 1,064 1,683 63.2% 
3 891 1,583 56.3% 
4 774 1,525 50.8% 
5 652 1,428 45.7% 
6 590 1,423 41.5% 
7 510 1,363 37.4% 
8 422 1,276 33.1% 
9 371 1,227 30.2% 
10 292 1,114 26.2% 
11 219 1,051 20.5% 
12 181 1,048 17.35% 
Table 77. Intervention Pattern: Warning Letter Only 
Control Without CR 
Month Any BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 4,281 4,281 100.0% 
1 3,508 4,281 81.9% 
2 3,211 4,189 76.7% 
3 2,945 4,081 72.2% 
4 2,747 4,007 68.6% 
5 2,572 3,921 65.6% 
6 2,349 3,840 61.2% 
7 2,216 3,758 59.0% 
8 2,086 3,677 56.7% 
9 1,945 3,586 54.2% 
10 1,824 3,481 52.4% 
11 1,675 3,394 49.4% 




Table 78. Intervention Pattern: Warning Letter Only 
Control With CR 
Month Any BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 800 800 100.0% 
1 613 800 76.6% 
2 558 750 74.4% 
3 513 698 73.5% 
4 455 644 70.7% 
5 414 594 69.7% 
6 360 538 66.9% 
7 341 505 67.5% 
8 301 468 64.3% 
9 268 421 63.7% 
10 227 368 61.7% 
11 198 320 61.9% 
12 165 278 59.4% 
Table 79. Intervention Pattern: Warning Letter Only 
Control Matched to Test 
Month Any BASIC Threshold Exceeded Test Total Carriers Percent 
0 1,000 1,000 100.0% 
1 805 1,000 80.5% 
2 739 963 76.7% 
3 675 931 72.5% 
4 623 905 68.8% 
5 592 882 67.1% 
6 537 860 62.4% 
7 498 829 60.1% 
8 457 805 56.8% 
9 425 779 54.6% 
10 394 755 52.2% 
11 361 731 49.4% 




Table 80. Intervention Pattern: Offsite Investigation—One Intervention Test 
Month Any BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 68 68 100.0% 
1 51 68 75.0% 
2 48 67 71.6% 
3 49 67 73.1% 
4 47 65 72.3% 
5 43 63 68.3% 
6 42 62 67.7% 
7 40 59 67.8% 
8 37 57 64.9% 
9 30 54 55.6% 
10 30 53 56.6% 
11 29 53 54.7% 
12 22 49 44.9% 
Table 81. Intervention Pattern: Offsite Investigation—One Intervention  
Control Without CR  
Month Any BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 4,008 4,008 100.0% 
1 2,750 4,008 68.6% 
2 2,575 3,921 65.7% 
3 2,352 3,840 61.3% 
4 2,218 3,757 59.0% 
5 2,087 3,676 56.8% 
6 1,948 3,585 54.3% 
7 1,828 3,480 52.5% 
8 1,680 3,392 49.5% 
9 1,555 3,293 47.2% 
10 1,472 3,179 46.3% 
11 1,381 3,101 44.5% 




Table 82. Intervention Pattern: Offsite Investigation—One Intervention  
Control With CR 
Month Any BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 800 800 100.0% 
1 613 800 76.6% 
2 558 750 74.4% 
3 513 698 73.5% 
4 455 644 70.7% 
5 414 594 69.7% 
6 360 538 66.9% 
7 341 505 67.5% 
8 301 468 64.3% 
9 268 421 63.7% 
10 227 368 61.7% 
11 198 320 61.9% 
12 165 278 59.4% 
Table 83. Intervention Pattern: Offsite Investigation—One Intervention  
Control Matched to Test 
Test Month Any BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Test Percent 
0 1,241 1,241 100.0% 
1 960 1,241 77.4% 
2 890 1,222 72.8% 
3 843 1,198 70.4% 
4 777 1,168 66.5% 
5 732 1,151 63.6% 
6 684 1,124 60.9% 
7 651 1,106 58.9% 
8 627 1,075 58.3% 
9 595 1,053 56.5% 
10 566 1,027 55.1% 
11 547 987 55.4% 




Table 84. Intervention Pattern: Onsite Focused Investigation—One Intervention Test 
Month Any BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 84 84 100.0% 
1 72 84 85.7% 
2 69 83 83.1% 
3 63 81 77.8% 
4 62 79 78.5% 
5 56 73 76.7% 
6 51 67 76.1% 
7 42 58 72.4% 
8 38 55 69.1% 
9 30 49 61.2% 
10 25 45 55.6% 
11 22 41 53.7% 
12 13 32 40.6% 
Table 85. Intervention Pattern: Onsite Focused Investigation—One Intervention  
Control Without CR 
Month Any BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 4,008 4,008 100.0% 
1 2,750 4,008 68.6% 
2 2,575 3,921 65.7% 
3 2,352 3,840 61.3% 
4 2,218 3,757 59.0% 
5 2,087 3,676 56.8% 
6 1,948 3,585 54.3% 
7 1,828 3,480 52.5% 
8 1,680 3,392 49.5% 
9 1,555 3,293 47.2% 
10 1,472 3,179 46.3% 
11 1,381 3,101 44.5% 




Table 86. Intervention Pattern: Onsite Focused Investigation—One Intervention  
Control With CR 
Month Any BASIC Threshold Exceeded CR Total Carriers Percent 
0 800 800 100.0% 
1 613 800 76.6% 
2 558 750 74.4% 
3 513 698 73.5% 
4 455 644 70.7% 
5 414 594 69.7% 
6 360 538 66.9% 
7 341 505 67.5% 
8 301 468 64.3% 
9 268 421 63.7% 
10 227 368 61.7% 
11 198 320 61.9% 
12 165 278 59.4% 
Table 87. Intervention Pattern: Onsite Focused Investigation—One Intervention  
Control Matched to Test 
Month Any BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 837 837 100.0% 
1 635 837 75.9% 
2 615 822 74.8% 
3 557 799 69.7% 
4 525 779 67.4% 
5 497 759 65.5% 
6 480 738 65.0% 
7 456 720 63.3% 
8 437 693 63.1% 
9 417 670 62.2% 
10 392 651 60.2% 
11 359 620 57.9% 




Table 88. Intervention Pattern: Onsite Comprehensive Investigation—One Intervention Test 
Month Any BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 33 33 100.0% 
1 27 33 81.8% 
2 24 30 80.0% 
3 22 29 75.9% 
4 17 26 65.4% 
5 16 24 66.7% 
6 14 23 60.9% 
7 16 23 69.6% 
8 13 20 65.0% 
9 12 20 60.0% 
10 9 18 50.0% 
11 8 16 50.0% 
12 5 11 45.5% 
Table 89. Intervention Pattern: Onsite Comprehensive Investigation—One Intervention  
Control Without CR 
Month Any BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 3,772 3,772 100.0% 
1 2,228 3,772 59.1% 
2 2,093 3,691 56.7% 
3 1,952 3,600 54.2% 
4 1,833 3,493 52.5% 
5 1,685 3,405 49.5% 
6 1,560 3,305 47.2% 
7 1,474 3,189 46.2% 
8 1,383 3,110 44.5% 
9 1,294 3,011 43.0% 
10 1,219 2,925 41.7% 
11 1,145 2,825 40.5% 




Table 90. Intervention Pattern: Onsite Comprehensive Investigation—One Intervention  
Control With CR 
Month Any BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 800 800 100.0% 
1 613 800 76.6% 
2 558 750 74.4% 
3 513 698 73.5% 
4 455 644 70.7% 
5 414 594 69.7% 
6 360 538 66.9% 
7 341 505 67.5% 
8 301 468 64.3% 
9 268 421 63.7% 
10 227 368 61.7% 
11 198 320 61.9% 
12 165 278 59.4% 
Table 91. Intervention Pattern: Onsite Comprehensive Investigation—One Intervention Test 
Control Matched to Test 
Month Any BASIC Threshold Exceeded Test Total Carriers Test Percent 
0 193 193 100.0% 
1 153 193 79.3% 
2 148 187 79.1% 
3 136 181 75.1% 
4 125 173 72.3% 
5 123 166 74.1% 
6 119 163 73.0% 
7 112 161 69.6% 
8 104 155 67.1% 
9 98 144 68.1% 
10 96 138 69.6% 
11 90 132 68.2% 




Table 92. Intervention Pattern: Warning Letter—Investigation Test (Two Interventions) 
Month Any BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 376 376 100.0% 
1 279 376 74.2% 
2 252 350 72.0% 
3 214 324 66.0% 
4 182 290 62.8% 
5 171 266 64.3% 
6 143 241 59.3% 
7 120 215 55.8% 
8 101 201 50.2% 
9 80 180 44.4% 
10 76 162 46.9% 
11 63 142 44.4% 
12 54 130 41.5% 
Table 93. Intervention Pattern: Warning Letter—Investigation Test (Two Interventions) 
Control Without CR 
Month Any BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 3,146 3,146 100.0% 
1 1,396 3,146 44.4% 
2 1,309 3,047 43.0% 
3 1,234 2,961 41.7% 
4 1,161 2,861 40.6% 
5 1,099 2,751 39.9% 
6 945 2,461 38.4% 
7 888 2,401 37.0% 
8 843 2,313 36.4% 
9 790 2,240 35.3% 
10 720 2,139 33.7% 
11 657 2,031 32.3% 




Table 94. Intervention Pattern: Warning Letter—Investigation Test (Two Interventions) 
Control With CR 
Month Any BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 800 800 100.0% 
1 613 800 76.6% 
2 558 750 74.4% 
3 513 698 73.5% 
4 455 644 70.7% 
5 414 594 69.7% 
6 360 538 66.9% 
7 341 505 67.5% 
8 301 468 64.3% 
9 268 421 63.7% 
10 227 368 61.7% 
11 198 320 61.9% 
12 165 278 59.4% 
Table 95. Intervention Pattern: Warning Letter—Investigation Test (Two Interventions) 
Control Matched to Test 
Test Month Any BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 796 796 100.0% 
1 479 796 60.2% 
2 444 773 57.4% 
3 424 744 57.0% 
4 377 640 58.9% 
5 357 616 58.0% 
6 321 574 55.9% 
7 291 543 53.6% 
8 257 499 51.5% 
9 236 470 50.2% 
10 200 425 47.1% 
11 179 392 45.7% 




Table 96. Intervention Pattern: Warning Letter—Investigation—CSP Test 
Month Any BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 385 385 100.0% 
1 299 385 77.7% 
2 288 370 77.8% 
3 244 342 71.3% 
4 218 314 69.4% 
5 207 299 69.2% 
6 188 285 66.0% 
7 166 264 62.9% 
8 147 242 60.7% 
9 137 228 60.1% 
10 120 210 57.1% 
11 106 194 54.6% 
12 92 185 49.7% 
Table 97. Intervention Pattern: Warning Letter—Investigation—CSP Test 
Control Without CR 
Month Any BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 3,432 3,432 100.0% 
1 1,700 3,432 49.5% 
2 1,572 3,331 47.2% 
3 1,486 3,213 46.2% 
4 1,392 3,134 44.4% 
5 1,304 3,035 43.0% 
6 1,229 2,949 41.7% 
7 1,155 2,849 40.5% 
8 1,093 2,739 39.9% 
9 941 2,450 38.4% 
10 886 2,391 37.1% 
11 842 2,303 36.6% 
12 789 2,231 35.4% 
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Table 98. Intervention Pattern: Warning Letter—Investigation—CSP Test 
Control With CR 
Month Any BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 800 800 100.0% 
1 613 800 76.6% 
2 558 750 74.4% 
3 513 698 73.5% 
4 455 644 70.7% 
5 414 594 69.7% 
6 360 538 66.9% 
7 341 505 67.5% 
8 301 468 64.3% 
9 268 421 63.7% 
10 227 368 61.7% 
11 198 320 61.9% 
12 165 278 59.4% 
Table 99. Intervention Pattern: Warning Letter—Investigation—CSP Test 
Control Matched to Test 
Month Any BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 986 986 100.0% 
1 667 986 67.6% 
2 622 956 65.1% 
3 583 923 63.2% 
4 532 847 62.8% 
5 504 815 61.8% 
6 464 777 59.7% 
7 429 744 57.7% 
8 401 704 57.0% 
9 358 656 54.6% 
10 331 613 54.0% 
11 300 573 52.4% 




Table 100. Intervention Pattern: Interventions Terminating in NOC Test 
Month Any BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 267 267 100.0% 
1 232 267 86.9% 
2 204 247 82.6% 
3 187 229 81.7% 
4 168 209 80.4% 
5 143 187 76.5% 
6 126 168 75.0% 
7 109 159 68.6% 
8 96 150 64.0% 
9 87 134 64.9% 
10 79 120 65.8% 
11 66 106 62.3% 
12 55 95 57.9% 
Table 101. Intervention Pattern: Interventions Terminating in NOC Test 
Control Without CR 
Month Any BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 3,432 3,432 100.0% 
1 1,700 3,432 49.5% 
2 1,572 3,331 47.2% 
3 1,486 3,213 46.2% 
4 1,392 3,134 44.4% 
5 1,304 3,035 43.0% 
6 1,229 2,949 41.7% 
7 1,155 2,849 40.5% 
8 1,093 2,739 39.9% 
9 941 2,450 38.4% 
10 886 2,391 37.1% 
11 842 2,303 36.6% 




Table 102. Intervention Pattern: Interventions Terminating in NOC Test 
Control With CR 
Month Any BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 800 800 100.0% 
1 613 800 76.6% 
2 558 750 74.4% 
3 513 698 73.5% 
4 455 644 70.7% 
5 414 594 69.7% 
6 360 538 66.9% 
7 341 505 67.5% 
8 301 468 64.3% 
9 268 421 63.7% 
10 227 368 61.7% 
11 198 320 61.9% 
12 165 278 59.4% 
Table 103. Intervention Pattern: Interventions Terminating in NOC Test 
Control Matched Test 
Month Any BASIC Threshold Exceeded Total Carriers Percent 
0 420 420 100.0% 
1 303 420 72.1% 
2 283 408 69.4% 
3 265 393 67.4% 
4 221 331 66.8% 
5 213 316 67.4% 
6 204 305 66.9% 
7 194 289 67.1% 
8 174 277 62.8% 
9 160 259 61.8% 
10 151 246 61.4% 
11 140 230 60.9% 




APPENDIX C: BOX PLOTS OF MATCHED DISTRIBUTIONS 
AND CRASH RATES (SECTION 8) 
 
Figure 27. Onsite Focused Investigation 
 




Figure 29. Onsite Comprehensive Investigation 
 




Figure 31. Warning Letter—Investigation 
 




Figure 33. Warning Letter—Investigation—CSA 
 




Figure 35. Interventions Ending in NOC 
 
 
Figure 36. Interventions Ending in NOC 
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APPENDIX D: SUPPORTING DATA FOR SAFESTAT A/B 
ANALYSIS (SECTION 9) 
Table 104. Percent Exceeding At Least Two BASIC Thresholds Test 
Month At Least Two 
Thresholds Exceeded 
Total Carriers Percent 
0 496 818 60.6% 
1 462 781 59.2% 
2 423 734 57.6% 
3 391 702 55.7% 
4 355 670 53.0% 
5 334 641 52.1% 
6 322 620 51.9% 
7 297 593 50.1% 
8 279 564 49.5% 
9 239 543 44.0% 
10 231 518 44.6% 
11 194 483 40.2% 
12 176 457 38.5% 
13 163 416 39.2% 
14 154 390 39.5% 
15 135 357 37.8% 
16 110 317 34.7% 
17 94 289 32.5% 




Table 105. Percent Exceeding At Least Two BASIC Thresholds Test 
Control With CR 
Month At Least Two 
Thresholds Exceeded 
Total Carriers Percent 
0 341 606 56.3% 
1 331 590 56.1% 
2 326 567 57.5% 
3 303 548 55.3% 
4 284 524 54.2% 
5 261 499 52.3% 
6 247 478 51.7% 
7 230 462 49.8% 
8 212 436 48.6% 
9 199 416 47.8% 
10 183 390 46.9% 
11 160 356 44.9% 
12 151 337 44.8% 
13 136 310 43.9% 
14 118 279 42.3% 
15 97 240 40.4% 
16 86 204 42.2% 
17 71 179 39.7% 




Table 106. Percent Exceeding Unsafe Driving or Crash Indicator Thresholds Test 
Month Exceeded Unsafe 
Driving or Crash 
Indicator 
Total Carriers Percent 
0 270 818 33.0% 
1 255 781 32.7% 
2 236 734 32.2% 
3 218 702 31.1% 
4 192 670 28.7% 
5 180 641 28.1% 
6 159 620 25.6% 
7 150 593 25.3% 
8 133 564 23.6% 
9 120 543 22.1% 
10 114 518 22.0% 
11 96 483 19.9% 
12 85 457 18.6% 
13 80 416 19.2% 
14 78 390 20.0% 
15 69 357 19.3% 
16 52 317 16.4% 
17 52 289 18.0% 




Table 107. Percent Exceeding Unsafe Driving or Crash Indicator Thresholds Test 
Control With CR 
Month Exceeded Unsafe 
Driving or Crash 
Indicator 
Total Carriers Percent 
0 225 606 37.1% 
1 220 590 37.3% 
2 215 567 37.9% 
3 203 548 37.0% 
4 182 524 34.7% 
5 171 499 34.3% 
6 156 478 32.6% 
7 149 462 32.3% 
8 134 436 30.7% 
9 126 416 30.3% 
10 110 390 28.2% 
11 92 356 25.8% 
12 79 337 23.4% 
13 73 310 23.5% 
14 62 279 22.2% 
15 51 240 21.3% 
16 45 204 22.1% 
17 39 179 21.8% 




Table 108. Average Number of BASIC Thresholds Exceeded Test 
Month Total Carriers Average Number BASICs 
Exceeded 
0 818 1.81 
1 781 1.78 
2 734 1.76 
3 702 1.71 
4 670 1.63 
5 641 1.59 
6 620 1.55 
7 593 1.52 
8 564 1.45 
9 543 1.36 
10 518 1.37 
11 483 1.28 
12 457 1.23 
13 416 1.20 
14 390 1.22 
15 357 1.18 
16 317 1.12 
17 289 1.05 




Table 109. Average Number of BASIC Thresholds Exceeded Test 
Control With CR 
Month Total Carriers Average Number BASICs 
Exceeded 
0 606 1.80 
1 590 1.77 
2 567 1.78 
3 548 1.73 
4 524 1.73 
5 499 1.69 
6 478 1.66 
7 462 1.61 
8 436 1.56 
9 416 1.52 
10 390 1.50 
11 356 1.50 
12 337 1.44 
13 310 1.43 
14 279 1.43 
15 240 1.38 
16 204 1.47 
17 179 1.44 
18 157 1.36 
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Table 110. Average Log Crash Rate Per 100 Power Units Predicted by Model Test 
Month Total Carriers Average Log Crash Rate Per 
100 PU 
0 817 1.59 
1 772 1.60 
2 714 1.60 
3 668 1.60 
4 628 1.59 
5 593 1.59 
6 567 1.58 
7 537 1.58 
8 500 1.57 
9 477 1.54 
10 449 1.57 
11 415 1.53 
12 392 1.50 
13 352 1.52 
14 327 1.50 
15 300 1.48 
16 262 1.43 
17 234 1.41 




Table 111. Average Log Crash Rate Per 100 Power Units Predicted by Model Test 
Control With CR 
Month Total Carriers Average Log Crash Rate Per 
100 PU 
0 606 1.63 
1 587 1.63 
2 560 1.65 
3 535 1.66 
4 508 1.66 
5 482 1.65 
6 458 1.65 
7 441 1.64 
8 412 1.64 
9 390 1.61 
10 364 1.60 
11 331 1.62 
12 313 1.59 
13 288 1.59 
14 263 1.59 
15 225 1.59 
16 194 1.56 
17 167 1.56 




APPENDIX E: AN EMPIRICAL BAYES MODEL FOR 
PREDICTION OF CRASH RATES 
The empirical Bayes model, including the data used based on a sampling procedure, was 
described at a high level in subsection 8.7. The model is now described in detail for the 
interested reader. The model requires specification of a likelihood for the data and a prior 
distribution for the parameters. The likelihood follows a Poisson distribution and the Poisson 
mean parameter follows a Gamma distribution. The Poisson–Gamma mixture results in a 
Negative Binomial likelihood for the crash counts that is used to calculate maximum likelihood 
estimates for parameters in a regression model. The following notation is used. 
 
Figure 37. Notations 

















Figure 38. Poisson Distribution 



















Figure 39. Gamma Distribution 
Negative Binomial: Combining likelihood with prior gives the Negative Binomial for y. The 
parameter mu is attached to a log-linear regression function. 
 
Figure 40. Negative Binomial 
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The Negative Binomial likelihood is maximized with respect to beta and alpha to give maximum 
likelihood estimates. 
Empirical Bayes estimator: a weighted average of the observed rate y/t and the Negative 


















































Figure 41. Empirical Bayes Estimator 





APPENDIX F: SURVEY FOR FIELD PERSONNEL 
Thank you for participating in the CSA 2010 Operational Model Test Survey. Being actively 
involved in the daily operations of this test program, your responses are extremely important and 
will provide valuable feedback about the feasibility, practicality, and effectiveness of the CSA 
2010 program. The goal is to find out which intervention processes worked well for FMCSA and 
which did not. When replying to the questions, please be as specific and concise as possible. 
1. We would like you to evaluate CSA2010’s monthly intervention selection and carrier 
assignment process, and let us know what appears to be working well, what isn’t 
working, and what needs to be changed. Please address the following items: 
 
 
A. CSA2010’s prioritization of the carriers selected for intervention. 
 
[use this space for your answer] 
 
 
B. CSA2010’s recommended type of intervention for the motor carrier. 
 
[use this space for your answer] 
 
 
C. Have there been times when you have had to override the recommended 
prioritization for the carrier? If yes, please discuss below (if not already 
discussed in your response to 1A or 1B, above). How often does this occur? 
 
[use this space for your answer] 
 
 
D. Have there been times when you have had to override the recommended type of 
intervention? If yes, please discuss below (if not already discussed in your 




2. Compared to SafeStat, how would you rate CSA2010’s monthly intervention selection 
and carrier assignment process in terms of identifying carriers that are unsafe? 
 






3. Considering the document request procedures, how often is the initial request for 
documents successful? Partially successful? Not successful at all? Can the task of 
document acquisition be improved? 
 




4. What are the major problems, if any, in processing the documentation received from 
the carriers? How can these be addressed? 
 




5. Consider the task of identifying motor carrier “Process Breakdowns” during the 
investigation. Please evaluate how well this works. What are the primary lessons 
learned in effectively and accurately identifying Process Breakdowns? 
 
[use this space for your answer] 
 
 
6. Is the procedure for determining the appropriate post-investigation intervention 
effective? Can it be improved? 
 
[use this space for your answer] 
 
 
7. Based on your experience with the Op Model Test, do you think that NOVs issued as a 
result of a CSA2010 investigation are an effective intervention tool? Please discuss. 
 
[use this space for your answer] 
 
 
8. Based on your experience with the Op Model Test, do you think that CSPs issued as a 
result of a CSA2010 investigation are an effective intervention tool? Please discuss. 
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